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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned  with prov id ing  an analysis of 
Soviet  policy towards Japan in the recent years of the late 
1970s and in the 1980s. Inputs in Soviet policy from the 
ideo log ica l ,  poli t ical,  military and economic perspectives 
have all been examined in detail.
It is argued in many places that much of the comment 
in Western sources on this subject is misleading thus many 
o f  the f ind ings  seek to mitigate this s ituation. The 
criticism that has been levelled at the Soviets by Western 
analysts that they lack what can be defined as a 'policy' on 
Japan has been considered and found to be misplaced.
Questions o f  to what d egree  the Soviets 'understand' 
Japan and the Japanese, as well as to what degree  they 
have su ccess fu l ly  integrated  differing approaches (ideolo­
gical, military, economic, po l it ica l)  into a coherent  policy  
have been invest igated  and shown, by and large, to have 
been o f  mixed nature in the f irs t  case ,  and of overall 
successful coordination in the second.
NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
The system of transliteration utilised in this work is that of the 
Library of Congress, United States. Other systems used in works cited have 
been retained as in the originals. Unless otherwise indicated all 
translations from Russian are the responsibility of the author.
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PREFACE
The principal prompting behind this research was a belief- 
subsequently verified in many places - that, given what we might assume to 
be their importance, Soviet - Japanese relations do not seem to rate an 
accordingly high coverage in either Western or Soviet international affairs 
literature. An associated belief which prompted investigation was that 
what comment did exist, with few exceptions, seemed to be of a ’broad 
brush’ nature. Moreover, many Western sources seemed to be inclined to 
present much the same story whether it concerned economics, the regional 
military situation, or overall political relations. This observation on 
its own was a worthy reason to inspire a closer examination of the 
available facts.1
A further shortcoming of the available literature was a lack of a 
comprehensive evaluation of the Soviet standpoint vis-a-vis Japan. Neither 
Soviet day-to-day contact with the Japanese nor the significance of Japan 
to the Soviets were detailed.2 Consequently the work herein examines from 
a Soviet viewpoint the period in relations with Japan from the early 1970s 
to 1986, with an emphasis on the latter 1970s to the present day (1986).
As we have alluded to abovet one of our original considerations had 
been that most comment on Soviet - Japanese relations was of a general
!For an indication of these trends in the literature see for example, 
K.Ogawa, "Japanese - Soviet Economic Relations : Present Status and Future 
Prospects’ in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Vol. II No. 1, March 1983. 
D.Rees, ’Gorshkov’s Strategy in the Far East’ in Pacific Community January 
1978. pp. 143-155. T.Robinson, ’Soviet Policy in East Asia’ in Problems of 
Communism November - December 1973. Vol.XXII pp.32-50. The compilation of 
chapters in D.Zagoria (ed), Soviet Policy in East Asia Council on Foreign 
Relations Inc., Yale University Press,1982. S.Kirby ’Siberia : Heartland 
and Framework’ in Asian Perspectives Fall - Winter 1985, Vol. 9 No. 2 pp.274- 
294.
2T.Robinson, op . cit.. G.J.Sigur, Y.Kim (eds), Japanese and US Policy in 
Asia Praeger, New York,1982. A. Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia 
: Threat or Promise ? Stanford University Press, Stanford) 1982.
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nature. In particular this had taken the form of a repetition of emphasis 
on specific incidents - the China treaty, 1977 fishery negotiations, the 
northern island dispute - followed by an outline of general Soviet policy 
principles vis-a-vis north east Asia.3
In the case of economic relations the emphasis had been placed on 
repetition of the scale of contracts between the two nations with no 
attempt to place them in a comparative context. Noticeably absent from 
Western and Japanese studies was any attempt to place Japan in an 
ideological context as seen by the Soviets. This point has been verified 
by the work herein whereby the only references to the ideological 
influences which might be behind Soviet relations with Japan which this 
author has come across amounted to a handful of paragraphs scattered in a 
number of articles or chapters. The largest part of this work concentrates 
upon Soviet ideological concerns and Japan and in doing so hopes to begin 
to rectify the deficiency which exists in this area.
Concerning ideology the questions which it was hoped to find answers 
to were for example ; What has been the general Soviet ideological approach 
to relations with the West in the 1970s and 1980s and how and where does 
Japan fit in to those images ? What is the ideological-based image that the 
Soviets have of Japan itself ? What, if any, are the influences - and in 
what areas - that ideology has had on Soviet policy towards Japan ?
A more general question posed was to what extent the Soviets 
’understand’ Japan, the Japanese and the Japanese governmental systems. 
Though in part a rather abstract concern, an attempt has been made to 
supply sin estimation of this.
3See for example, D.Rees, ’Japan’s Northern territories’ in Asia 
Pacific Community Winter 1980 No.7 pp.13-42. F.Langdon, ’Japanese - Soviet 
200 mile Zone Confrontation’ in Pacific Community October 1977. pp.46-58. 
M.Leighton, ’Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan’ in Survey 
Autumn/Winter 1983. Vol.27 118/119 pp.112-151.
The approach taken in this work has been to analyse Soviet policy 
towards Japan in terms of delineating trends of that policy and not to 
become overly concerned with deriving policy from attention to the course 
of major incidents in relations with Japan. This, as argued above,is a 
criticism levelled at other work in this area i.e. that too much attention 
and significance has been given to events (especially the economic) at the 
expense of the wider questions. Hopefully we have rectified this in the 
work presented without swinging to the other extreme and neglecting detail 
when appropriate.
The approach taken in our investigation has been to divide the 
analysis into four major sections : Soviet ideology and Japan, Soviet- 
Japanese economic relations, the Soviet military and Japan, and Soviet 
policy towards Japan. A short introductory section outlines some important 
traditional and historical influences relevant to understanding Soviet 
approaches to Japan. There is also a small appendix on Soviet-Japanese 
fishing.
It is recognised that such a compartmentalisation is artificial. 
However for purposes of manageability it has merits in that it allows for 
trends in particular fields of Soviet-Japanese relations to be highlighted 
in order that they can be drawn together to produce a final analysis. One 
further point must be made at the outset concerning the chosen 
compartmentalised approach. It should be emphasised that this is a study 
of Soviet policy and processes ; the external rhetoric, actions, national 
styles of other non-Soviet players have only been considered in the context 
of their influence on the Soviet position or on Soviet action. This study 
is not concerned with assessing the rationales, merits or weaknesses of 
Japanese policy or any other state’s policy per se but only with the Soviet 
Union. Any study set in north east Asia must involve not only the Soviets
but Japan, China and the United States. It was believed that the great 
danger was therefore to wander into expositions of other nations’ 
strategies which were not entirely relevant to the issues which we wish to 
illuminate. These have hopefully been kept to a minimum appropriate to 
aspects of our work. Given that the Soviet concern here is with Japan, 
when necessary certain aspects of the Japanese policy process or of Japan 
itself or of Japanese national traits have been set-out at length.
The short introduction outlines traditional and historical themes 
which can be seen to run through Russian and Soviet policies towards Japan. 
It is necessary to draw these out and point to their relevance as factors 
which should be seen as important elements in influencing policy not least 
as in themselves they are not necessarily obvious influences due to their 
mainly abstract nature.
The first part consists of an examination of the influence of 
ideology on Soviet policy and is broken down into an analysis of Soviet 
ideological views of Japan at three levels, the global, the regional 
(Pacific) and of Japan as a social-political structure. Soviet ideological 
comment on the question of Japanese remilitarisation is also outlined. The 
salience of ideology to Soviet policy formulation throughout the 1970s is 
also detailed by explaining that within the Soviet Union during these years 
a debate, with ramifications for internal politics and external affairs, 
took place over how the changes which were being forced on Soviet society 
by the ’scientific and technical revolution’ and the trends of 
modernisation could be incorporated into the body of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. Aspects of this debate impinged upon the conduct of trading 
relations with the capitalist nations as the limits of contact with 
capitalism were questioned. As one of the major planks of Soviet relations 
with Japan concerns trade relations, this had direct relevance for our
study.
Part two focuses on the issues of Soviet-Japanese trade. In the 
initial section the basic framework of the trading arrangements between the 
two nations is set-out ; the trade contracts, the concentration of trade on 
energy-related materials and the development of Siberia, the role of 
coastal trading, and the significance of trade overall as seen by both 
parties. Section two of this part involves a closer examination of these 
trading arrangements and concludes by disputing the conventional wisdom. 
The overall value of Soviet trade with Japan is put in context by 
comparison with Soviet trade with other leading Western nations. The 
influences of the debate within the Soviet leadership over the extent and 
necessity of trade contact with the capitalist nations (part of the wider 
debate over ideological orthodoxy) are speculated upon and an impact on 
contact with Japan estimated.
The aim of these investigations into the trade relationship was to 
gauge what importance was attached to the scale of trade by both parties 
and to estimate how the structure of trade had changed (if at all) 
throughout the timeframe of the study. It was also hoped to assess how the 
trading relationship has been influenced by political factors and to decide 
if the two nations assigned trade the same importance as a factor in 
overall relations.
Part three deals with the Soviet military and Japan. Militarily, the 
Soviet presence in north east Asia has been growing in qualitative terms 
through the 1970s. The problems created for Japan as a result of this 
growth of military strength as well as the possible uses to which it could 
be put by the Soviets in any future war in the Far East are examined in 
this part. Initially the military situation which confronts Soviet 
planners in the Far East and Pacific has been estimated and subsequently
possible operational plans for Soviet forces in the region in the event of 
war are suggested. From these an evaluation is made regarding the question 
of how powerful - or otherwise - Soviet forces in the region are. Within 
this part there is also an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Japanese Self Defence Forces ; this has been done with the intention of 
putting the ’threat’ from Japan as the Soviets see it into a material 
context. Certain specific scenarios involving a Soviet war with Japan- 
the oft-cited 'blockade’ and amphibious invasion - are also analysed in 
depth. This part concludes with an assessment of the political uses of 
Soviet military power against Japan and specifically of the thesis that the 
Soviets are pursuing a policy of deliberate military coercion vis-a-vis 
Japan.
The fourth part of the work seeks to provide an overview of the 
important trends in Soviet-Japanese relations. It is subdivided into 
Soviet views of the Japan-China, and Japan-United States relationships. A 
significant component of this fourth part attempts to answer the question 
of to what degree the Soviets ’understand’ Japanese politics and policy 
processes and indeed to what extent both parties understand each others’ 
national ’styles’. Elements of this latter consideration are illuminated 
by the study of relevant ’styles’ as manifested in negotiations.
The work concludes with some final comments which seek to draw 
together the main trends illustrated by the research and suggests how, if 
at all, they can be seen to represent what can be termed a Soviet ’policy’ 
on Japan.
A small appendix considers matters arising from Soviet-Japanese 
fishing, specifically it seeks to examine the argument that the Japanese 
fishing industry has suffered due to exclusion from fishing grounds by the 
Soviets.
INTRODUCTION
HISTORICAL FACTORS AND SOVIET POLICY 
This study considers Soviet relations with Japan over a specific and 
limited period. There is, however, a broader context of ideas, themes and 
problems in Russian and Soviet policies towards Japan which have proven of 
a recurrent nature. Some of these are creatures of the twentieth century, 
but others have a lineage stretching back into the nineteenth century or 
even earlier; and, as we shall see, they crop up again and again as basic 
building blocks of Russian and Soviet policies. Those that sure most 
directly relevant are discussed in greater detail in the analysis, but the 
existence of all of them has to be borne in mind as necessstry background to 
the study. Their absolute or relative importance in particular situations 
cannot always be precisely assessed, but their absence can never be 
assumed.
Russian expsmsion into Asia, though punctuated by periods of relative
inactivity, has itself been a constant of history since the seventeenth
century. Until the late nineteenth century, such expansion mostly took the
form of physical acquisition by military means, but by the end of the
1880's emphasis had come to be placed on economic penetration. Jelavich,
in an historical study of Russian foreign policy argues that by the 1890’s
The inauguration of an active policy in the East was largely 
due to the actions of the influential and able minister of 
finance, Witte, who thought of the question largely in terms of 
economic gain. Throughout his career in office, he advocated 
Russian expansion in Asia, but he favoured a policy of gradual 
economic penetration. He thus csime into conflict with those 
who wished to pursue the same goals quickly and by military 
means1
The Soviets as Marxists are quick to proclaim the salience of the economic, 
but equally they can clearly be seen to have placed singular emphasis on
!B.Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914. Lippincott 
Co., New York,1964. p.236.
the military in their dealings with Japan. Thus while the economic- 
military dichotomy continues, the balance, for the present, has swung in 
favour of the primacy of the military.
A more obvious and long term constant which has dominated Russian and 
Soviet thinking and action has been the struggle to exclude outside powers 
from East Asia and to limit Japanese alignment with any of these outside 
powers. Russian and Soviet policy has been a catalogue of competition 
against these foreign entanglements in the region. The legacy of these 
experiences for the Soviets has been a hard and fast perception of 
continual interference by outsiders in a region where they view themselves 
as having a paramount legitimate interest.
In pursuing these related aims the Russians and Soviets have had 
their successes and failures. The evidence lies in the chequered history 
of, for example, the 1896 Russian-Japanese condominium over Korea; the 
Russian and later Soviet moves to arrive at a modus vivendi with Japan over 
Mongolia and China in which, implicitly, the presence of non-regional 
powers would be minimised, or from the Soviet viewpoint, preferably reduced 
to zero; the proposed bi-lateral treaty of goodneighbourliness of 1978.
A question related to the idea of limiting Japanese alignment with 
outside powers concerns the extent to which the Russians and Soviets have 
perceived Japan as a ,,tool,‘ of other powers. The evidence indicates that 
it is a matter of debate within Soviet policy circles2, but it has clearly 
been a dominant theme in the Russian and Soviet world views from before the 
1902 Japan-British partnership, through to Japanese post-war co-operation 
with the United States. Two comments, separated by fifty years, made by a 
Soviet ambassador to Japan and by a prominent Soviet military commentator
2See, for example, Iu.Kuznetsov, "Kuda tolkaiut Iaponiiu?" (Whereis 
Japan Heading?) in Kommunist No.4. March 1983, pp.98-109. V.Bunin,; 
"Nakasone’s Military Policy" in Far Eastern Affairs No. 2 1984 pp.64-74.
illustrate its abiding relevance.
It's the Americans; foreign (American) circles want to set 
Japan and the Soviet Union at loggerheads3
In preparing for war against Russia, Japan received help from 
the USA and Britain. In 1902 Japan concluded an alliance with 
Britain. The USA, striving for mastery of the Pacific, was 
interested in pressing its influence over Japan and Russia.
They lent Japan 500 million dollars specially for war 
supplies...4
A more speculative influence that has coloured both Russian and 
Soviet approaches has been that Russian expansion in the East has never won 
the real support of large sections of the Russian public. Nor has the 
Russian public shown great interest in Japan.5 In a similar vein the 
present-day Soviet leadership's plans for the Eastern regions of the 
country have constantly been beset by the lack of any large scale 
enthusiasm on the part of the Soviet population to settle in the Eastern 
regions on a permanent basis. Both Soviet and Russian governments devoted 
significant attention to overcoming this lack of support, but its absence 
has had implications in a wider external dimension : Tsarist governments 
were, and Soviet governments have been, compelled by whatever means to 
emphasise and reinforce their claim to be a legitimate participator in 
Asian affairs (lest others perceive Russian ambivalence) and have felt the 
need to dispel any idea that it is they who are somehow the "interfering 
outsider".
3Soviet ambassador Troyanovsky to Admiral Kato. 9 June 1932. As quoted 
in Soviet Foreign Policy Vol.I 1917-1945. Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
1980 p.274.
4General-Lieutenant, M.M.Kir'ian, "Pobeda na dal'nem Vostoke" (Victory 
in the Far East) in Voprosv Istorii No.8 1985 pp.21-34. Quotation p. 23.
5See, G.Lensen, The Russian Push Towards Japan. Princeton University 
Press, 1959. p.468 and Jelavich, o p . cit. p.236. For a collection of essays 
on various historical Russian views of Japan and the East see, I.J.Lederer, 
Russian Foreign Policy : Essays in Historical Perspective Yale University 
Press, New Haven 1962.
A further carry-over from Tsarist policies in the East to 
contemporary Soviet policies is the problem associated with the economic 
development of Siberia and the Far East. The Western, and indeed Russian, 
image of Siberia as a "treasure house" of resources is an accurate one, 
however there are major problems associated with the cost of developing 
these resources. In the short term, or in the case of specific projects, 
the return on investment may have deemed these projects to be worthwhile 
but the hard fact for the Tsarist and Soviet governments has been that 
taken long term over the whole gamut of investment, the development of 
Transbaikal and the Far East has been, and was, a burden on their 
respective economies. 6
Before turning to examine the last of the major long term historical 
trends - the legacy of experience - there are two more recent, but still 
"historical", principally Soviet, experiences which have a background 
influence on Soviet policy formulations. After the United States had 
supplanted Britain, by the 1920’s, as the dominant power in the Western 
Pacific and set about establishing a network of alliances, the Soviets-
6In recent times the Far East’s imports were more than twice the value 
of its exports. See, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1967g. Izdatel’stvo 
"Finansi i statistika" Moscow, 1968. In the 1930’s there was a rough 
balance between the Far East’s exports and imports but the situation had 
been much worse in earlier years. One Soviet writer based at the Institute 
of Economic Research in Khabarovsk has commented that "The Far East had a 
chronic deficit in its foreign trade balance in the sixty years before 
1917. From 1906 to 1915, imports exceeded exports from three to nineteen 
times. Exports accounted for 45 percent of total trade in 1905 but dropped 
to only 5 percent in 1915". See, N.L.Shlyk, "The Soviet Far East and the 
International Economy" in J.J.Stephan, V.P.Chichkanov (eds), Soviet- 
American Horizons on The Pacific University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1986, 
pp.114-125. Quotation p.115. See also the information presented by Shlyk in 
Table 1. A major historical influence on the economic development of the 
Soviet Far East has been the levels of trade with adjacent territories, 
mainly China and Japan. They are important today in terms of future 
prospects for development; in the 1920’s, for example, China and Japan were 
the Far East’s main trading partners. See, Shlyk, p.117. For evidence of 
the scale of earlier economic co-operation see, B.N.Slavinskii, "Russia and 
the Pacific to 1917" in Stephan and Chichkanov, o p . cit. pp.32-49. Also, 
P.Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy Batsford, London 1986.
more forcibly than had ever been apparent to Tsarist governments - saw
themselves as confronted by a barrier stretching across the Pacific rim
from the Aleutians to New Zealand. Soviet perception of this can be seen
as early as 1925 in a commentary in Izvestiia (27 January) which makes the
point that in signing the Peking convention with Japan "the USSR had forged
an effective weapon to break the iron ring designed for the Pacific area by
the Washington Conference . . We turn to the impact of this perception
later in the concluding part of the study.
A recent survey of some Soviet writings on the Soviet intervention in
the Far East in the closing stages of the war concludes that the writings
illuminate Soviet perceptions of a turning point in East Asian 
history. They also underline the inseparability of the 
historiography of World War II and contemporary international 
affairs, notably the USSR’s relations with the United States,
China, Japan, North Korea and Vietnam7
Despite Soviet umbrage caused by their not receiving the credit they think
they deserve for intervening in the Pacific war, for our study of Japanese
policy the important point is the political significance of historical
Soviet actions.
As a result of the capitulation of Japan, the peoples of China,
Korea, and the other countries of South and South East Asia 
were able to create the favourable conditions for the 
successful gaining of freedom and independence8
The Soviet role in liberating Asian nations not only from Japanese 
but also from Western oppression is a central issue which the Soviets seek 
to propagate in their current efforts to mobilise opinion against the neo- 
imperialism’ of Japan and the United States, as the Soviets proclaim 
themselves not merely liberator but now guardian and guarantor of that
7J. J. Stephan, "The USSR and The Defeat of Imperial Japan 1945" in 
Soviet Studies in History Vol.XXIV No.3 Winter 1985/86. pp.4-5.
8M.M.Kir’ian, op .cit. p.23. See also, General of the Army, Professor
S. P. Ivanov, "Krakh Kvantunskoi Armii" (The Fall of The Kwantung Army) in 
Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia No.5 1985. pp.79-97.
liberation.
Lastly, in outlining any major historical influences, which have made 
a notable contribution to Soviet views on Japan, we must try to come to 
terms with the most abstract : What are we to make of the general impact of 
Russian experiences - of all sorts - of Japan and of similar early Soviet 
experiences, on contemporary Soviet policies?
Russian contacts with Japan date back to the eighteenth century and 
took on various forms, initially trade, cultural and then of course more of 
a political complexion. Those contacts were limited. Japan became a 
military "probleiir by 1900 but after 1905 not again until 1918 and then 
remained so for another twenty-,seven years. While Soviet contact with Japan 
increased, paradoxically the rigours of Stalinist orthodoxy limited any 
potential benefits and in some ways was detrimental to achieving a better 
understanding of the Japanese. This whole experience can be symbolised by 
the fall and rise (by the mid 1960's) of Vostokovedenie within the Soviet 
Union. The Tsarist Russian public had, as we have said, no enthusiasm or 
attraction for Siberian settlement, nor was Japan a subject of great 
interest. For the Soviet public the former is certainly still true, and, 
it is tempting to argue that the latter still remains true also. But for 
present purposes it is the impact on, or speculation of, policymakers that 
is of importance. These impacts cannot be quantified, however there is 
sufficient evidence in the literature to note their existence as part of 
the context in which particular policy decisions are made.
PART I
SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND JAPAN
Introduction
It is the intention of this section to examine the ideological 
context of Soviet relations with Japan. The main Soviet conceptions with 
regard to relations with Japan will be set out and an attempt will then be 
made to suggest some implications for Soviet policy with these ideological 
premises as a background. In the context of appraising Soviet relations 
with Japan it is helpful to identify two related aspects of ideology. 
First, ideology serves to legitimate not merely the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union but also by embodying elements of traditional, and historico- 
cultural beliefs it serves to legitimate a Soviet presence in Asia as a 
whole and in particular North East Asia, an area with which Russia has had 
a long tradition of association. The second aspect of ideology is the 
concept most readily identifiable with the term itself i.e. its’ Marxist- 
Leninist component which centres on the political and philosophical 
interpretations of relations within the world.
We can characterise ’ideology’ as being of three parts : general 
philosophical assumptions, doctrinal elements that govern a political 
course at a given time, and ’action programmes’ which are tied to 
particular circumstances. The last category is in practice the most 
pragmatic - but we should note that all of the preceding are subject to 
revision by Party theorists. This observation notwithstanding, during the 
time-frame in which this study is based nothing resembling a consensus on 
the question of ideology (its nature, its role or its place in Soviet 
policy) emerged in the West. Debate was, and is, still polarised between 
the old dichotomies of interpreting ideology as functioning as the ’real
source’ of Soviet action or as a ’verbal smokescreen’.1 Agreement has not 
been reached even with regard to the nature of ideology itself, let alone 
its purpose. The conduct of this somewhat artificial debate in Western 
policy circles during these (Brezhnev) years by and large obscured the fact 
that what has been referred to as an ’ideological retooling’ took place 
within the Soviet ideological arena. It was a retooling that held 
ramifications for both Soviet domestic and foreign policies. It paralleled 
and reflected the ascent of the Soviet Union to a perceived status of 
coequal with the United States. It is against this backcloth of 
ideological refurbishing that we should view Soviet relations with Japan 
during this period.
The art of politics for a Marxist-Leninist encompasses the idea of 
compromise; this view is probably no different from that held by a non 
Marxist-Leninist. Successful politics involves mastering the technique of 
managing the day-to-day antagonisms of conflicting orders. Compromise in 
politics in this sense is a tactical expedient and should not be seen as 
choice of course in itself for a Marxist-Leninist. On this question of 
compromise we should recognise the distinction made in dealing with it 
between politics and ideology. Politics embodies the idea of compromise, 
ideology does not. L.I. Brezhnev made this point quite clear;
Naturally, in the course of co-operation between states with 
different socio-economic systems and different ideas, the 
peculiarities stemming from class distinctions cannot be 
removed. Evidently it would be an illusion to think that 
change may occur in the general approach of each country to 
problems which it views and resolves in its own way on the 
basis of its system and international ties. The relaxation of 
international tension is far from calling-off the battle of
iFor example see ; L.Labedz, ’Ideology and Soviet foreign policy’ in 
Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s Adelphi paper 151. Part I. pp.37-45. 
Also, V.V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy Little, 
Brown and Co., Boston, 1971. Chapter 10.
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ideas. This is an objective phenomenon.2
The main approach of a Marxist-Leninist to international relations is 
one concerned with power and its measurement - be it political, social, 
economic or military. From this viewpoint the period of razriadka 
(detente) has been presented by the Soviets as an 'objective' situation 
forced upon the capitalist bloc through the West's reluctant recognition of 
Soviet power. Reflecting on the gains of the early 1970's Brezhnev made 
this point obvious: 'The transition from the Cold War and the explosive 
confrontation of two worlds to the easing of tension was connected above 
all with the changes in the alignment of forces in the world arena'. But 
while stressing that a turning point had been reached he also warned of 
overoptimism, 'The Communists are by no means predicting the 'automatic 
collapse' of capitalism. It still has considerable reserves. However, 
events of recent years confirm with new force that it is a society without 
a future'.3 Since before the revolution the concept of operations which 
has been utilised by the Soviets in their analyses of power relationships 
(global, regional and domestic) has been referred to as sootnoshenie sil or 
'correlation of forces'. As a concept it is altogether different (as the 
Soviets constantly emphasise) from those utilised in the West. Soviet 
commentators refer to these Western versions as a variant of the 
traditional 'power' or 'balance of power' concepts. G. Shakhnazarov, one 
of the foremost Soviet commentators on ideological matters and 
international politics argues that 'In the overwhelming majority of works 
published in the West the aforementioned 'power' concept continues to hold
2L.Maksudov, Ideological Struggle Today Progress Publishers, Moscow, 
1983. p.19.
3Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. XXVIII, No.8. pp.8,13. 
Hereafter abbreviated to CDSP.
complete sway and an attempt is made to attribute changes in the world 
situation to the transition from a bipolar world (USSR-USA) to a tripolar 
one (USSR-USA-China), or to a five polar one (including Western Europe and 
Japan). .. ’. While not denying that this idea can prove useful for ’ limited 
tasks’ in international relations, Shakhnazarov argues that 'what matters 
is that it cannot be used to solve global tasks. This calls for a 
fundamentally new, scientific construction and methods of evaluation’.4 
According to Soviet estimation, although nation states still continue to 
operate on the international scene, an adequate estimate of the correlation 
of forces and especially of the tendencies in international affairs can 
only be made by employing a ’systems’ approach instead of a ’power’ one.
Having outlined what the Soviets claim the ’correlation of forces' is 
not, let us outline what the Soviets believe it is :
This correlation is indispensable both for the elaboration of 
long term foreign policy strategy and for the state’s practical 
activity in international affairs...Naturally the existence of 
a large number of factors influencing the general situation 
complicates the analysis and estimation of the general 
correlation of forces on a world scale. Nevertheless, Marxist- 
Leninist science has accumulated considerable experience in 
analysing and comparing the economic, military and political 
potentials of different states. ..this makes it possible to give 
an objective estimation of the general balance of forces in the 
present world and to determine in time the basic tendencies in 
international relations, as well as foresee the prospects of 
their development...Contrary to the concepts of bourgeois 
politologists, Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the fact 
that the category of the correlation of forces in the world 
cannot and should not be reduced to the correlation of states’ 
military potentials, and that in the ultimate end this 
correlation is nothing but the correlation of class forces in 
the worldwide system of international relations. In effect 
classes interact not only within social systems of individual 
countries but also outside their framework. The social systems 
of different countries come out as the components of the world 
system of international relations. These relations are 
maintained in the form of economic, political, legal, 
diplomatic, military, cultural, ideological and other contacts
4G.Shakhnazarov, ’Effective Factors of International Relations’ in 
International Affairs (Moscow) February 1977. pp.84-85.
17
between nations and classes through their political bodies...As 
a rule various states, parties and political forces do not act 
in the world scene individually but unite into definite groups, 
systems of states, or political, economic or military 
coalitions based on common class or state interests. Hence, 
the foreign policy potential of a state depends not only on its 
own forces and internal resources, but to a considerable 
extent, on such external factors as the existence of reliable 
socio-political allies among other states, national contingents 
of congenial classes, mass international movements and other 
political forces active on the world scene...Thus, the 
correlation of forces in the world implies not only the 
correlation of forces between individual states, but first and 
foremost, the correlation of contemporary class forces, namely 
the international working class and the bourgeoisie, the forces 
of socialism and capitalism, the forces of progress and those 
of reaction.5
The major factors influencing the international situation are 
according to the Soviets (1) those forces actively influencing the 
international situation at a particular moment, (2) the class nature of 
those forces and the ways in which they act, (3) their potential for 
development, or their ability to reach their final goals and solve their 
immediate tasks, (4) the form of their organisation - national, 
international, state, public etc, (5) the mechanism of their interaction.6 
Thus, by the early 1970’s so the Soviets argued, the alignment of forces 
had swung - if not overwhelmingly in their favour - at least to a degree 
whereby the Soviet Union could legitimately be regarded as a global power. 
The most obvious symbols of this new alignment were the SALT I agreement (a 
recognition of Soviet strategic power) and thé signing of the ’Basic 
Principles of Relations between the USA and the USSR’ in 1972 (a 
recognition of overall Soviet equality with the United States). Such new 
found and long-strived for acceptance was proclaimed via a more assertive 
ideological stance based on the greater confidence of a de facto overall
5A.Sergiyev, ’Leninism on the correlation of forces as a factor of
international relations’ in International Affairs (Moscow) May 1975. pp. 
99-107. Quotations pp.99, 100, 101, 103.
6Ibid p.79.
Soviet strength, with particular emphasis on the military component as the 
most tangible and visible evidence of that strength.
The Soviets place most emphasis on the military component of their 
superpower status. Thus while Soviet spokesmen proclaim peaceful 
coexistence as being a multi-faceted process, it is the military aspects of 
the process which are in practice most heavily stressed. In theory the 
'correlation of forces’ can be in one’s favour even if the military 
situation is not, and the Soviets claim that military factors only receive 
such attention because they are visible expressions of strength. Other 
factors, as detailed in the Sergiyev quotation, they are at pains to point 
out, still retain their importance.
Brezhnev’s ’Peace Programme’, as it has become known, of the late 
1960’s and early 1970’s was designed to ensure Soviet security by combining 
two approaches : one at the national level and the other at the 
international level. As concepts these two approaches were given the 
labels of ’self-guaranteed peace’ and ’peace’ respectively. Despite the 
gains made on an international level, the maintenance of security for the 
Soviets was clearly interpreted by them as dependent on their ability to 
guarantee their security by unilateral means by holding a militarily strong 
position relative to the enemies which they saw arrayed against them.
’Detente’ in this context is really ’military detente’, for it was in 
this sector that the Soviets believed their political gains to be most 
vulnerable to Western advances in arms programmes which they could only 
hope to match by foregoing the development of other sectors of the Soviet 
state. Furthermore it was assumed that without some sort of perceived 
equality in the military sphere any political moves would lack the 
necessary credibility.
V. Nekrasov made this point on the centrality of the military
equation in an article in the party theoretical journal Kommunist :
Today the sharpest confrontation between the forces of social 
progress and reaction takes place precisely on the matter of 
war and peace...however the specific nature of the present time 
in international relations is the need to surmount the 
opposition of aggressive and reactionary circles, extremely 
galvanised of late, to the positive changes in global politics.
A most acute struggle is being waged on problems of detente in 
the military field and of supporting political detente with its 
achievements7
Vasili Kulish, a Soviet writer on the political uses of force in 
international relations, similarly stated that in the present day when 
political processes have advanced further than military processes, 
'questions of military detente assume exceptional importance’.8
Sergiyev sums-up the stress that the Soviets put on the military 
aspect of the correlation of forces. He distinguishes the Western approach 
to world politics from that of the socialist camp : the West functions as a 
’military - political’ bloc whereas the socialist community is one of 
’economic, political and cultural co-operation ... complemented by their 
military co-operation and mutual assistance’. However prior to that he 
states quite clearly that ’The military strength of a state is by all means 
a decisive element of its position in the world’9 Sergiyev’s stance, as we 
have outlined it, is confused. In this he mirrors the overall Soviet 
position which seeks to solve the dilemma by fudging the issue. Regardless 
of the evidence in many Soviet statements which allude to the importance of 
non-military factors, it is recognised that the primary legitimation of 
Soviet superpower status lies with a perception of its military power. 
That notwithstanding the non-military factors which Sergiyev considers,
7V.Nekrasov, ’Absurd but Dangerous Myth’ in Kommunist No.12 1979, 
pp.91-102. Quotation p.104. JPRS Translation.
8V.Kulish, ’Detente, International Relations and Military Might’ in
Coexistence Vol.4 No.2. 1976. pp.175-195.
9A.Sergiyev, o p .cit. pp.103, 101.
economic strength, strength and solidarity of progressive forces, 
diplomatic links, and particularly the relationship of class forces, were 
all deemed by the Soviets to be areas where they had gained ground by the 
mid-1970s.
There is a consensus amongst Soviet ideologists with regard to these 
concepts outlined above. The concepts as such represent either 'core 
values' or basic judgements regarding the changes in the international 
situation. These are the basic building blocks for Soviet ideology.
This then is the ideological background against which we must examine 
how the Soviet Union conducted its relations with Japan in the 1970s and 
into the 1980s. How then do the Soviets view their relations with Japan in 
an ideological context ? Where does Japan fit into the Soviet world view ? 
For purposes of evaluation we can utilise three levels of investigation 
which are in practice inter-related. First, an appraisal of Japan as a 
member of the capitalist bloc. Second, an interpretation of Japan's 
relations with regional countries of the Pacific. And third, Soviet 
comment on Japan as a nation state ; its social structure, its domestic 
forces and overall political stability.10
JAPAN AS A MEMBER OF THE CAPITALIST BLOC
Prominent in the Soviet vocabulary for describing the world of the 
1970's was, and is, the concept of 'centres of power'. The emergence of 
these new loci of power carried with it the implicit recognition that the 
world had become truly multipolar and the emergence of this multipolarity 
is characterised by Soviet ideologists as a function of exacerbated
10For a Marxist appraisal of Japan by a native English speaking 
scholar see, R.Steven, Classes in Contemporary Japan Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1983. This is a very thorough work which deals with a 
class analysis of Japan and is replete with numerous tables on a wide range 
of subjects from e.g. patterns of shareholding in companies to levels of 
employment to appraisals of class consciousness by workers.
interimperialist contradictions. As is illustrated by a comment by 
G. Trofimenko, 'The multipolarity concept is primarily a recognition by US 
theoreticians of the limited nature of US imperialism’s potential in the 
modern world...it embraces a recognition of new ’centres of power’ in the 
capitalist world (such as the EEC and Japan); a realisation of the well- 
known lack of convergence between the interests of the US and the policies 
and interests of many of its chief capitalist allies...’11
It is to state the obvious that Japan is viewed as one of these new 
centres of power but implicit in the Soviet view is that because of its 
potential in certain more dynamic aspects of modern development Japan (like 
the EEC) has a fractious relationship with other leading capitalist states; 
thus in its relations with other capitalist states it is depicted not 
merely as a centre of power but as a rival centre of power. As the Soviets 
see it, though the scientific and technical revolution has caused a 
broadening of the ties of international economic co-operation, it also in 
tandem has caused a deepening of interimperialist contradictions such that 
’in examining the internationalisation of economic life, no 
’liberalisation’ of international economic ties can weaken the 
nationalistic character of state monopoly capitalism ; neither can such 
measures diminish the desire of the monopolies of each industrialised 
capitalist country to strengthen its ability to compete at the expense of 
o th e r s’.12 This theme of the irreconcilable nature of the leading 
capitalist economies runs as a leitmotif throughout Soviet commentaries on 
Japan. The moves toward economic integration in the West, the Soviets
11As quoted in J. Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign 
Policy Cornell University Press, Ithaca,1982. p. 112.
12Y. Pevzner, ’Uneven development of Capitalism’ in V. Tsygankov (ed), 
Present Day Japan Oriental Studies in the USSR No. 7, USSR Academy of 
Sciences, Moscow,1983. pp.41-66. Quotation p. 47.
argue, presuppose a mutual interest which they (the Soviets) most 
emphatically deny exists.
M.Maksimova, in the second part of two articles on the subject of 
’Capitalist Integration and World development’ argues that while the later 
years of the 1970’s have led to ’a strengthening between each of the 
capitalist states in their mutual dependence on each others’ development of 
their own industry and markets, and science and technology and in the world 
currency markets’ these years have also produced a ’deepening of economic 
and social contradictions’ which have led the capitalist powers to 
undertake greater measures of economic and political collaboration such as 
the ’numerous attempts at reform of international currency regulation, an 
upgrading of the activities of the OECD, the creation of an international 
energy agency under the auspices of the United States etc’. But, she 
continues, ’these principal levers of state monopoly regulation lie in the 
hands of national governments. The economic and political development of 
the capitalist states has been separated into the economically strong 
(US,FRG,Japan) and the economically weak, thus preserving interimperialist 
contradictions. All of these serve as serious barriers on the path to 
overcoming the acute contradictions of contemporary capitalism - the 
contradictions between the growth rates of mutually dependent capitalist 
states and between the necessity in international politics to co-ordinate 
economic politics and the imposition of state monopoly limits on the 
regulation of economic life’.13
In the wider realm of capitalist development in the 1970s Japan is 
portrayed as having evolved from acting as a side-lines participant in
13M. Maksimova, ’Kapitalisticheskaia integratsiia i mirovoe razvitie’ 
(Capitalist Integration and World development) in Mirovaia Ekonomika i 
Mezhdunarodnve Otnoshenia Izdatel’stvo, ’Pravda’. Moscow,No.4 1978 pp.14- 
24. Quotation p.17. Hereafter cited as MEMO.
international economic decision-making at the turn of the 1970's to acting 
as a central force in the mainstream of that decision-making by the end of 
the 1970’s. The decade of the seventies is persistently appraised by 
Soviet theorists as having been one of ’structural crisis’ for the Western 
economies in which ’even Japan suffered more than the United States and a 
number of other capitalist states’.14 However Soviet commentators suggest 
that because of the dynamism of the Japanese economy and its ’unscrupulous’ 
methods of competition, Japan’s technological momentum has been maintained 
at the expense of other (by implication, capitalist) nations’ rates of 
recovery.
The central issue of friction between Japan and her fellow capitalist 
nations is the question of international trading and competition. 
Throughout the 1970s this has been of particular worry for the European 
nations as one Soviet economist argues in a section of an article entitled 
Trade Piracy :
...most of all (the sources of worry) has been the chronic 
imbalances of trade in favour of Japan throughout the 1970s.
If in 1970 the net balance in favour of Japan was 905 million 
dollars, by 1979 it had risen to 6.3 billion, and by 1980 to a 
further 11 billion dollars. Then there is also the range of 
Japanese exports which have spread to encompass the main 
centres of (European) industrial production. They have 
enveloped the heart of the shipbuilding industry, the iron and 
steel industry, home electronics, photographic goods, tape 
recorders, televisions, bicycles and car production.15
Given the scale of these statistics, Aliev concludes that underlying
relations between Japan and Western Europe is a very sharp current of
antagonism, the results of which have up until now been in favour of Japan.
The trading competition has also afflicted relations with the United
14Ibid. p.23.
15R.Aliev, ’Iaponiia i zapadnaia evropa : partnerstvo i 
sopernichestvo’ (Japan and Western Europe : Partnership and Rivalry) in 
MEMO No. 9 1981 pp.69-80. Quotation p.71.
States and spilled-over into international money markets where the 
competition with the United States has been especially severe, according to 
Soviet writers. The Japanese attempts to establish the Yen as a recognised 
international currency despite resistance from the United States has been 
successful by the turn of the 1980s in that Tokyo is now recognised as ’a 
financial centre of international significance'.16
Outside the parallel tracks of co-operation and competition with the 
main centres of imperialism, Soviet analysts have also commented - though 
far less frequently - on Japanese involvement in other regions of the 
globe, notably in South East Asia and Africa. The increasing involvement 
of both the Japanese government and Japanese business in the markets of the 
developing nations is characterised by Soviet writers as an entirely 
natural progression, inevitable due to increased activity by Japan in 
foreign policy circles and due to the fact that these nations, as trading 
partners, account for an estimated 60% of Japanese long-term private 
investment, 45-50% of Japanese commodity exports and more than 50% of 
Japanese imports.17
In line with a Leninist interpretation of colonial relations Soviet 
theorists have been quick to argue that Japan has only ostensibly 
participated in the aid programme to developing nations and that it would 
be 'political immaturity' to believe otherwise as 'any honest researcher 
cannot but subscribe to the words of prominent Japanese scholar, T.Ozawa, 
that the purpose of the Japanese government's traditional approach to 
aid...is to create favourable conditions for the export of commodities and
16Yu.Stolyarov, 'Japan's Monetary Ambitions' in Far Eastern Affairs 
No.3 1981. pp.65-75.
17See, Y.Kovrigin, 'Japanese Economic 'Aid' to Developing Countries' 
in Far Eastern Affairs No.l 1982. pp.63-75. Kovrigin argues that these 
percentages are all much higher than the respective figures for the EEC and 
the United States.
for direct investments’.18 The donor countries, the Soviets point out, are 
extremely critical of both the relative size of the Japanese aid 
contributions and the hard terms of the loan arrangements. The Soviets 
claim that as a result of exploitative Japanese policies the developing 
nations have exhibited a lack of faith in Japanese assertions of 
’unselfishness’ for Japanese aid is widely seen as being ’insufficient, 
wrongly motivated, poorly administered, too selective and out of step with 
that of other donors’.19
For the most part the picture drawn by Soviet analysts of the 
Japanese role in Africa is similar, one of classic textbook neocolonialism. 
In her book, Iaponiia i Afrika. I.V.Volkova accuses the Japanese in their 
dealings in Africa of exploiting cheap labour and using African nations as 
a cheap source of capital investment and resources, as well as using them 
as new markets for cheap Japanese goods. She also asserts that the Japanese 
have been collaborating extensively with the racist South African 
government, giving it important aid which has facilitated the development 
of its nuclear industry.20
JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC 
Theoretical calculations of the global correlation of forces axe 
fraught with difficulties, as the Soviets themselves admit. One of these 
difficulties is that theorists are dealing with abstract concepts on a wide 
scale. However at a regional level the abstract becomes more manageable. 
A more careful balance sheet of the disposition of powers, effectiveness of 
military forces, influence of political variables and actual accumulation
18Ibid. p.64.
19This is also an opinion expressed by The Oriental Economist, Japan 
Economic Yearbook 1980/81 p.56. ’Despite these improvements Japanese 
economic assistances are widely believed to be far from satisfactory’.
20I.V.Volkova, Iaponiia i Afrika Izdatel’stvo, ’Mysl’, Moscow 1981.
of information are all much easier to accomplish. Therefore the regional 
correlation of forces tends to possess more likely operational meaning for 
the formulation of Soviet foreign policy actions than the wide sweep of the 
global assessment.
Looking at the north east Asian region the Soviet Union sees an area 
whose prevailing trend is one of stability, with no prospect for sudden or 
unexpected change. In this context the conditions are seen as propitious 
for the Soviet Union to establish itself further, albeit slowly, as an 
Asian political and military power. The United States has been seen as the 
principal opponent, although concern has also been frequently expressed 
over China. For its part Japan, due to its economic strength and 
associated political influence in the region and to a lesser extent its 
potential for military growth, is seen as the only east Asian power capable 
of hindering the Soviet Union in its quest for greater status within the 
area.
Japanese involvement in the Pacific-Asian region is an 
intensification of its wider global concerns where Japanese influence has 
less potential for success than in regions closer to home. In conducting 
their relations with states in the region the Soviets see Japan as having 
the advantage of being an Asian industrial giant, thus giving it a foothold 
in both the camps of capitalism and the developing markets of Asia. One 
Soviet researcher sums up the position thus : ’Being a major capitalist 
state in Asia Japan has long been trying to act as a mediator between the 
developing and developed capitalist countries, posing as practically the 
sole protector of the former’s interests’.21
Japanese initiatives in the region are seen to be both political and
21S.Ignatushchenko, ’Economic relations with developing countries’ in 
Tsygankov, o p . cit. pp.85-100. Quotation p.92.
economic and unlike their effect at a global level both (rather than mainly 
the economic) have an impact. Both come together in the Japanese prompting 
of the ’Pacific community’ idea, a favourite target of Soviet commentators. 
Yu.Bandura, one of the small group of Soviet Japanologists decries Japanese 
expansionism as the root of the ideas behind the new trading association 
and labels it as an attempt by the Japanese to dominate the Asian market at 
the expense of other main capitalist rivals. More to the point, Bandura, 
while admitting that the Soviet Union has not been excluded from 
participating in these plans, contends that the creation of the community 
would merely ’facilitate Japanese diplomacy against the Soviet Union and 
serve as a basis of this diplomacy’.22 Accepting the Soviet definition of 
the purposes of the organisation (effectively to create a captive market 
for Japanese producers), it is not surprising to see the Soviets claim that 
the United States has constantly resisted all Japanese proposals on the 
issue and sought to quash the idea of a closed economic grouping. The 
American response to any military grouping (created as a by-product of the 
economic arrangements) has been far more favourable. Yet despite this 
repeated American pressure to nullify Japanese efforts the Japanese have 
persisted as ’in this struggle the ruling classes of Japan have attached 
special significance and consequence to establishing a wide-ranging 
economic and political bridgehead in the Asia-Pacific region’, an aim ’long 
desired’ by Japan.23
The imbalance of Japanese trade with the ASEAN nations in favour of 
Japan is utilised as a telling factor in unmasking the true nature of
22Yu.Bandura, ’The Pacific community - Brainchild of Imperialist 
diplomacy’ in International Affairs (Moscow) June 1980. pp.63-70. Quotation 
p. 65.
23R.Aliev, ’Politika Tokio v Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom regione’ (Tokyo 
politics in the Asia-Pacific region) in MEMO No.9 1980. pp.25-36. Quotation 
p. 25.
Japanese concern for the region. Japan accounts for 27% of total ASEAN 
exports and 24% of imports, whereas the proportional figures for the 
Japanese trade balances are 9% and 12% respectively.24 In response to 
ASEAN requests for a system of guaranteed exports receipts involving Japan, 
the Japanese have refused to agree to its establishment on the grounds of 
being committed to free trade principles and thus unable to participate in 
a bloc economy. To the Soviets this reply only serves to illustrate that 
"... at present the structure of Japan-ASEAN trade only accords with the 
Japanese monopolies’ long-range interests of keeping the ASEAN countries as 
suppliers of valuable raw material’.25
As indicated earlier, although contradictions within the capitalist 
camp are held responsible for Japanese moves towards establishing more 
advantageous trade markets, by and large this is not the case when 
tendencies of Japanese militarism are discussed. While the subject of 
militarism has always been prominent in Soviet discussions of Japan, until 
the middle 1970’s the emphasis of these discussions had clearly been on the 
precedents set by past Japanese aggression in China and South East Asia. 
Virulent attacks were carried out on the past record of Japanese military 
adventures and warnings extrapolated from this evidence, but these attacks 
were not very numerous. There is a discernible change in this situation 
both with regard to the substance of the comment and its frequency by the 
turn of the middle 1970’s, when the attacks become more frequent as the 
Soviets slowly became more aware of a real Japanese participation in
24See, F.Anin, ’ASEAN in the focus of Japanese diplomacy’ in 
International Affairs (Moscow) March 1982. pp.41-45.
25Ibid. p.42.
Western inter-alliance war planning in the Pacific.26
Militaristic tendencies evident in Japanese circles are seen by the 
Soviets at the end of the 1970s as the product of wider factors closely 
linked to US military-strategic doctrines of foreign policy. As Moscow 
sees it in the present day there exists in Japanese conduct a 'clear 
discrepancy between the officially proclaimed doctrine of adherence to 
peace and the steadily increasing military potential...which is a salient 
feature of Japan's foreign policy...and is especially dangerous because it 
has the all-round support and encouragement of the imperialist NATO 
powers'.27
The growth of Japanese influence and involvement abroad is the most 
visible consequence of a more assertive stance on the part of the Japanese 
ruling classes. Professor I.Latyshev has commented that 'The road that 
Japanese diplomacy has traversed in the last 18 years was marked by 
contradictions and discrepancies in treating such vital problems of 
contemporary political life as the easing of international tensions 
ensuring lasting peace in the Pacific area, developing business and 
friendly relations between all countries of the area, and even defending
26See, N.N.Mil'gram, 'Militarizm v Iaponii'(Militarism in Japan) in 
Narodi Azii i Afriki Izdatel'stvo, 'Nauka', Moscow, 1972. Also, Iaponskii 
Militarizm - Voenno-Istoricheskoe Issledovanie (Japanese Militarism - A 
Military-Historical study) Izdatel'stvo 'Nauka', Moscow,1972. Both these 
studies are historically based with little else in the way of content 
except prediction based on past events. As such they are fairly typical of 
the very few commentaries on Japanese militarism of the early 1970s. For a 
change in style and for a linking of Japanese militarism to more 
contemporary politics see, for example, M.Ukraintsev, 'Krakh Militariskoi 
Iaponii' (The fall of Militarist Japan) in Kommunist No. 13 1975. pp.110- 
117. This is an historical feature which reviews the past (written on the 
30th anniversary of the defeat of Japan) but ties in references to Chinese 
prompting behind contemporary Japanese military expansion. M.Ukraintsev is 
a pseudonym for M.S. Kapitsa, leading Sinologist and now a Deputy Foreign 
Minister of the Soviet 'Union.
27D.Petrov, 'Militarism in Japan imperils peace in Asia' in Tsygankov, 
o p .cit. pp.67-84. Quotation p.67.
Japanese national interests and security etc’.28 He continues, ’However
lately in 1969-70 the symptoms of change have become more apparent. The
main causes of the changes envisaged in Japanese foreign policy have been
the rapid growth of the economic power of Japan’.29
This growth of economic power has been utilised both as the base for
expansion and the rationale for expansion, in that the Japanese claim that
they must take steps to protect their overseas markets in South East Asia.
Soviet commentators use these statements to substantiate the Soviet
accusation that Japan is merely out to establish a new ’South East Asia Co-
Prosperity sphere’. The Soviet warnings by no means fall on unreceptive
ears, as present-day South East Asia arguably still harbours bitter
memories of the last Japanese occupation.
One of the approaches taken by the Soviets over the question of
Japanese plans of expansion into areas of Asia is that the Japanese,
specifically the ’revanchists’, have failed to see that they cannot turn
back the clock : in trying to re-establish a meaningful presence they are
working against the flow of events and the forces of change. No less a
person than K.Chernenko set out the Soviet position by declaring that
In spite of what would appear to be the instructive experience 
of the ignominious collapse of such anti-communist alliances 
such as SEATO and CENTO, attempts are again being made to knock 
together militarist axes and triangles like the Washington- 
Tokyo-Seoul bloc. We are against such geopolitics, against all 
kinds of ’spheres of influence’ and ’zones of interest’, 
against closed military groups in general and in the Pacific 
ocean in particular30
Japanese participation in American strategy in the Far East has
28Prof. I.Latyshev, ’New Foreign Policy Concepts of the Japanese 
ruling circles’ in Asian Quarterly (Brussels) Vol.4 1971. pp.359-371. 
Quotation p.359.
29Ibid. pp.361-362.
30Quoted in S.Zinchuk, ’The threat to peace in the Pacific’ in New 
Times (Moscow) No.25 1984 p.18.
always been a theme emphasised in Soviet commentary. For example, an entry 
in the Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsvklopediia asserts that ’In August 1964, 
Japan gave its consent for American atomic submarines to enter Japanese 
ports, in November 1967 it agreed to admit atomic aircraft carriers and 
other surface vessels’3* The point which the Soviets make concomitant on 
this is that they see Japanese ’consent’ or ’agreement’ as largely 
concessions forced from the Japanese government by great pressure from 
successive American administrations. It is the idea that the American 
ruling classes wish to hold Japan as an outpost of imperialism that most 
dominates Soviet thinking, though it has been acknowledged with increasing 
frequency (as the threat from Japanese militarism looms greater) that 
Japanese militarists are more inclined to pursue their own state goals with 
the increasing military influence at their disposal rather than merely 
serve the military goals of United States policy. But nevertheless it is 
still seen as clear that the overriding threat to peace in the Pacific 
stems from American ambition and global hegemonism.
The Japanese response, or rather non-response, to Soviet proposals 
for security arrangements in the Pacific, launched in 1969 and 
intermittently raised ever since, has been a target for ideological attack 
also. Soviet ideology of course stresses the fundamentally peaceful nature 
of Soviet policy in the region, with the principle of collective security 
as one of its main pillars. ’The collective defence of peace envisages 
above all the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence as a 
universally recognised standard of relations between countries with 
different social systems’, writes I.Kovalenko one of the principal Soviet
31Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsvklopedia (3rd ed.) Moscow p.523.
Japanologists.32 The continual refusal of Japan to take-up Soviet 
initiatives has been put down to the intransigence of the revanchist 
military circles, and their ’playing up’ to the dangerous plans of outside 
powers with ambitions in North East Asia. In the past this accusation has 
always been levelled at the United States but by the later 1970’s an old 
fear seemed to be materialising and prompted an intensification of Soviet 
ideological rhetoric. ’A special role in the camp of the enemies of peace 
is assigned to co-ordinated anti-Soviet hegemonistic policy’.33 This very 
real fear of a coalition of powers, of which Japan is an important member, 
hemming-in the Soviet Union provided new grounds for the further 
ideological indictment of Japan.
JAPAN AS A NATION STATE 
The growing interaction of Japan with other states is a reflection of 
changes brought about within those concepts which had guided earlier 
Japanese diplomacy and foreign policy. Like their Western counterparts, 
Soviet analysts distinguish the idea of diplomacy from that of foreign 
policy but accept that at times they can be virtually indistinguishable. 
For the Soviets diplomacy is, in general, merely a bourgeois means of 
conducting foreign policy. In a Soviet assessment, foreign policy, like 
diplomacy, can only ever reflect the interests of the ruling class of the 
state it purports to represent. In the case of Japan these class interests 
are symbolised in power by the ’ruling circles’ which comprise the LDP 
(seen as the party of ’big business’), elements of the military hierarchy 
and business groups, particularly the Keiretsu.
321.Kovalenko, Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1979. p.214.
33’The 26th Congress of the CPSU and the Soviet Union’s struggle for 
peace and security in Asia’ in Far Eastern Affairs No.3 1981. pp.3-15. 
Quotation p. 9.
As Soviet writer Kapchenko points out, 'from the Marxist-Leninist
point of view, home and foreign policies are individually linked, for both
are an expression, different in form, but identical in content, of the
interests of the ruling class of a given state. Their social class basis
is absolutely wrong to separate foreign policy from home policy and all the
more so to oppose the two'.34
In the piece by Latyshev cited earlier, he provides an overview of
the changes in the course of Japanese foreign policy and argues that
Paying attention to the problems of economic relations with 
individual countries and to regional problems Japan’s 
government was up to now rather slow to formulate any broad 
long-term foreign policy goals. However, lately in 1969-70 the 
symptoms of changes in the strategy of Japanese foreign policy 
have become more and more apparent.... the new foreign policy 
doctrines, put on the order of the day by the ruling circles of 
Japan signify in total a new stage in the development of 
Japanese foreign policy. This is the stage when the ruling 
classes of Japan are striving for establishing themselves in 
the world politics as a self-independent political force. The 
aspiration of Japanese diplomats for bolstering the role of 
Japan in international affairs is a result of the change in the 
balance of forces between Japan and the other capitalist 
countries. The new doctrines put forward by the ruling circles 
of Japan contain an unambiguous claim for the extension of 
economic, political and territorial spheres of influence. The 
modern foreign policy concepts of Japan, like Japanese slogans 
in the past, contain the idea of a revision of the system of 
international economic ties, territorial borders, international 
agreements and diplomatic relations in the Pacific. That is 
why these concepts are fraught with the danger of international 
conflict.35
Who are these ruling circles ? How do they participate in the policy 
process ? One Soviet analyst, A. Makarov, has provided a sketch of the 
relevant groups as he sees them : his assessment is worth quoting at length 
as it provides an illuminating representative insight into how at least 
some Soviet observers view the situation in Japan.
34N.Kapchenko, 'Scientific principles of Soviet foreign policy' in
International Affairs (Moscow) No.10 1977. pp.81-91. Quotation p.83.
35Prof. I.Latyshev, op.cit. p .361. pp. 370-371.
"As it develops, Japanese state monopoly capital tends to exert am 
increasing impact on governmental policy. Yet, owing to postwar political, 
economic and social reforms (1945-52), the introduction of universal 
suffrage and the growing prestige of progressive forces, above all the 
Communist and Socialist parties, the monopolies are unable to flaunt their 
political influence in a conspicuous way. Like other imperialist countries 
the Japanese monopolies' political domination is a de facto rather than de 
jure affair”, (p.83)
The organisations of businessmen and trade associations, 'exert a 
significant influence on the planning of government measures in the economy 
and other spheres. However it is the big four of the national business 
organisations known as the ’Zaikai’ (literally ’financial circles’) that 
take a most active part in deciding on the key issues of national policy 
and maintain an energetic pressure on the whole system of state 
institutions... (pp.83-84) unlike the other developed capitalist countries, 
hardly any of the Japanese financial and monopoly elite are appointed to 
high governmental posts...despite the formal independence of politics 
established from financial and monopoly capital, and¡an insignificant 
monopoly representation in political institutions and the civil service, 
the monopoly financial elite is directly involved in policymaking’ (pp.85- 
86).
Therefore, ’by exerting pressure on the state machinery as the most 
important link in the political system, monopoly capital is seeking the 
best political and social conditions for itself. Through the mechanism of 
state regulation, it exerts a decisive influence on the shaping of the most 
important policies, such as general economic structure, economic planning, 
financial system, social security, education, militarisation etc. 
Moreover, in Japan, which depends on foreign trade for its survival, the
monopolies are particularly concerned with external economic expansion’.36
One of the major mechanisms for maintaining the link between 
government and business circles is the practice, or phenomenon of 
amakudari. Literally the term means a 'descent from the sky'for heaven) 
("ama" - sky, "kudari" - going down) and refers to the practice of high 
level government officials taking early retirement (often in their early 
50’s) and transferring to high ranking posts in industry or private 
companies. Obviously this creates circumstances for strong ties between 
government, the civil service and private business. Critics of these 
arrangements also point to the possibilities for corruption which can arise 
from such a relationship. Mention of this practice has not been found in 
any of the Soviet writings consulted for this study. Given the importance 
of the connection between business and government in Soviet ideological 
views of Japanese policy-making, this omission should be pointed-out. 
Either the Soviets have little knowledge of amakudari or they are unwilling 
to comment upon it.37
The question of explaining the trading relationship between the 
Soviet Union and Japan is one which, despite much discussion in the West 
over the practical results of its implementation, Soviet ideologists have 
no trouble in confronting. The Japanese encouragement of trade is said to 
stem from continual attempts by Japanese business to thrust trade upon the 
Soviet Union. The Soviets are sure that the motive behind Japanese 
enthusiasm for trade is that they (and the West) view it as a means of
36A.Makarov, ’Financial and Monopoly capital and Japan’s political 
mechanism’ in Far Eastern Affairs No.3 1982. pp.83-91.
37While a large number of Soviet sources have been examined it has not 
been possible to examine every single major Soviet source, thus the author 
adds the reservation that judgement here is not definitive. The question of 
amakudari arose in conversation with J.A.A.Stockwin, who suggested that the 
Soviets might be hesitant t.o comment on it because it could be viewed as 
running counter to economic determinism.
subversion : and use it as a tool to nudge the Soviet Union away from an 
autarkic command economy to one governed by a philosophy of 'market 
socialism'.
To Soviet ideologues one aspect of trading relations is in fact the 
most insidious tool of all utilised by the West in its struggle against the 
Soviet Union on the political front - the convergence thesis argument is a 
constant target of attack for Soviet writers. It has been labelled by 
ideologists as a 'reactionary utopia' in that it tries to unite that which 
cannot be united. It is claimed that capitalists (including in particular 
the Japanese) have three aims in mind when propagating the concept : (a) to 
try to get Communists to accept the legality of bourgeois systems, (b) to 
embellish capitalism by associating it in a merger with socialism and (c) 
to denigrate socialism, to ideologically disarm the socialist public and to 
lead them to believe in compromise. These comments by Soviet writers serve 
to put trade with Japan into its proper political context. As Brezhnev 
reminded us, there can be no compromise on questions of ideology.
The issues of the political mechanism of a given country are always 
the subject of close scrutiny by party theorists. Soviet Japanologists 
correspondingly focus their work on the most important questions of this 
which they see as being based around the class antagonisms within the 
Japanese polity. They further claim that an understanding of the 
developments within Japanese society cannot be obtained without a prior 
understanding of the class struggle within Japan.
The conduct of relations between labour and capital is the crucial 
centre of the class struggle. Soviet commentators are aware of the various 
influences of particular traditions in Japanese society which have delayed 
effective labour-group formation there - such as the patriarchal attitude 
reflected in the systems of life-time employment, the automatic pay rises
based on age considerations, the specific organisation of trade unions, the 
deferential attitudes towards superiors and the problems caused by the 
relatively late emergence of capitalism in Japan. These traditions, 
combined with a lack of class consciousness (perhaps the most serious 
problem to be surmounted) and reinforced by intensive bourgeois propaganda 
which emphasises the value to Japan of its economic stability because this, 
almost alone, has enabled Japan to play a special role in the world, have 
brought about until recently stability in Japanese labour relations.
The stability, Soviet writers now argue, has all but evaporated. The 
turning point in the state of relations between labour and capital came 
around the late 1970s, since then relations have been undergoing ’intensive 
modernisation’. So much so that Japanese employers, although seeking 
peaceful relations, have ’been forced to discard the now economically 
ineffective systems of employment and payment’ so that relations are now 
characterised by ’a fierce economic struggle of the proletariat and the 
relative immaturity of political demands’ : for the future the predictions 
are that ’conflicting relations between labour and capital can worsen even 
further and this will depend on the stand that the Japanese working class 
adopt...whether they will pursue the ’coprosperity of the nation’ or 
consistently defend their interests from positions of class strategy’.38
These changes have forced the hand of the Japanese ruling groups into 
trying by more overt means to counter the growing anti-monopoly trends. 
The medium by which they have principally tried to achieve this goal has 
been the use of bourgeois ideology : specifically the twin ideas of anti­
communism and anti-Sovietism.
A leading Soviet commentator on internal (labour) politics, Professor
38A.Orefemov, ’Labour and capital in Japan’ in Far Eastern Affairs No. 
1 1982. pp.98-105. Quotation p. 105.
B.Pospelov, suggests that in Japan the two themes have been intermingled 
into the form of a ’modernisation theory’. The nationalistic elements of 
the theory constitute its main support but take two forms : Pospelov argues 
that Japanese monopolies have constantly emphasised that it is unpatriotic 
to struggle against what the proletariat label as ’the monopoly yoke’ since 
to do so would impede Japanese revival. He further contends that 
nationalism in the Japanese context holds the peculiar connotation of 
referring to a ’community’ and ’community relations’ - the ideas of which 
have been styled as a successful alternative to the Marxist vision of a 
communist society. He states that ’the notion of community was the central 
category of the philosophical and sociological concepts of the ideologues 
of the monopolist bourgeoisie in prewar Japan. It was widely used to 
disguise the exploiter essence of the Japanese bourgeois state and to 
emphasise the character of personal relations in the East’.39 The point 
which Pospelov is seeking to make is that it is still utilised today in a 
similar fashion by the ruling bourgeoisie.
Yet another Soviet echoes Pospelov’s judgement about the use of the 
concept of ’Japanese uniqueness’ and suggests that ’Japanese bourgeois 
propaganda is trying to create an impression that Japan occupies a special 
place in the modern world and is allegedly immune to the social and 
economic upheavals which affect the majority of advanced capitalist 
states’. 40
In conclusion Pospelov argues the case that the modernisation theory 
’attaches particular importance to the capitalist state, interpreting it as 
a supraclass mechanism reflecting the interests of allegedly the entire
39Prof. B.Pospelov, ’Nationalism in the service of anti-communism’ in 
Tsygankov, op .cit. pp.123-141. Quotation p.127.
40I.Tamghinsky, ’Japan in the vice of contradictions’ in Far Eastern 
Affairs No.4 1980. pp.105-117. Quotation p.105.
nation by directing social developments along the road of 
industrialisation. ’Serving the fatherland through industry’ is a common 
slogan in Japan’.41
Changes in the equilibrium of labour relations in Japan were due to 
several factors. As we have argued above, the Soviets considered the 
decade of the 1970s as years of destabilisation for the Western economies, 
and therefore the first and major consideration in explaining the tension 
in labour relations that we have to look at is the affliction which beset 
the Japanese economy. Yu.Kuznetsov, writing in the Party Journal Kommunist 
describes how ’The case of Japan illustrates clearly Lenin’s theory of 
unequal economic development of capitalist states in the period of 
imperialism...’.42 The Japanese pace of development was so fast that it 
was hailed as an example of ’model growth’, but ’progress was neither 
smooth nor without pain, nor did the Japanese escape the internal 
contradictions of capitalism’, for growth was achieved at the expense of 
other things and as a result the level of development of Japan’s social 
infrastructure fell behind, leaving many social problems in its wake.
In common with almost every other economic assessment of Japan by 
Soviet analysts, Kuznetsov stresses that 1974-75 was a turning point for 
Japan.
The crisis of 1974-75, occurring at the same time as the 
worsening of the energy and other structural crises of 
capitalism, along with sharp increases in the price of oil and 
certain raw materials, signalled the end to the high rates of 
growth for the Japanese economy and created the need for its 
restructuring4 3
By the early 1980’s the Japanese economy was still experiencing
41Pospelov, o p .cit. p.126.
42Yu.Kuznetsov, ’Kuda tolkaiut Iaponiiu ?’ (Where is Japan heading?)
in Kommunist No. 4 1983. pp.98-109. Quotation p. 98.
43Kuznetsov, o p .cit. p.99.
growth but not at its impressive earlier rates. This, as the Soviets saw 
it, pointed to the truth that not even Japan was immune to the 'incurable 
maladies of capitalism’. Growth rates of GNP and of industrial production 
declined steadily - they were only 3% and 0.3% respectively in 1982 - the 
lowest they had been for 7-8 years. The general malaise affecting the 
economy was summed-up by the Tokyo correspondent of New Times who said 
that, 'For the first time since the crisis of 1974-75, owing to the 
curtailment of export, the volume of trade decreased...a sharp crisis 
occurred in state finances. The deterioration of the economy was due 
primarily to the internal processes, and above all the growth of structural 
disproportions between the not inconsiderable production possibilities and 
limited personal consumption, between the material intensive and energy 
consuming industries and the newest industries connected with scientific 
and technical progress...’.44
One of Lenin’s dictums had been that a state can only be strong when 
its people are politically conscious. An understanding of the
consciousness within each class of a state is a central feature of 
understanding in turn the international and internal politics of any given 
nation. In Japan the intensification of the class struggle has been 
ascribed by the Soviets to the economic crisis and to an increased 
development of class consciousness itself within the proletariat. Both 
these developments led to the heightening of the role of progressive forces 
which are active over a wide range of issues and at all levels in Japanese 
politics. The Soviets give their support in the main to the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP), (also, but with less sense of public commitment, to 
the Socialist Party (JSP)). This support for the JCP has not been without
44Yu.Stolyarov, ’A Skidding Locomotive’ in New Times No.39 1983. 
pp.24-26. Quotation p.24.
its fluctuations or trials. As with many Marxist-Leninist movements the 
Soviets have been confronted in the past in dealings with Japan with the 
problem of how to deal with - if at all - splinter groups and factions. 
After the JCP break with the Soviet Union over the Partial Nuclear Test Ban 
treaty in 1963 the Soviets lent support to the Japanese Communist Party 
"Voice of Japan" group. This support continued until the late 1960s- 
early 1970s.45 JCP proposals for the creation of a united progressive 
front and of a coalition government were "made real" by the crisis of 1974- 
75 and since. Reporting on the 15th Congress of the Party, L.Mlechin 
attributes the popularity of the JCP to 'its advocacy of a radical 
reorganisation of the economy, its demands to put an end to the rapid rise 
of the prices of necessaries, rents, power rates and fuel prices, and its 
opposition to capitalist ’rationalisation' which has resulted in mass lay­
offs and unemployment'.46 The impact of the Lockheed scandal of the mid- 
1970s and the continuing disclosure of political corruption has been seen 
to enhance the popularity of the JCP as it has always made clear that it 
has been ’sharply critical of corruption in the upper echelons of society’.
Particularly praiseworthy in Soviet eyes has been the JCP’s stand 
against Chinese expansionism and interference (via Maoist groups) in 
Japanese internal politics. The Maoists were a ’small but vociferous' 
grouping in Japanese politics, who slavishly follow pro-Chinese tactics 
notable for narrow minded sectarianism, dogmatism and adverturism. (The 
pro-Chinese groups in Japanese politics are still a target of Soviet 
attacks but less so than in the 1970's and of course it is uncertain
45For an account of the reasons for the split and the resultant 
mainstream JCP swing towards China, see, R.Swearingen, The Soviet Union and 
Postwar Japan Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1978. pp.108-114.
46L.Mlechin, 'The Japanese Communist congress' in New Times No. 10 
1980. p.7.
whether they can still be labelled as ''Maoist".) In its activities the JCP 
not only mobilises its forces against Peking's subversive activity in 
Japan, but in doing so also consistently exposes 'the hegemonistic 
ambitions of the Great Han chauvinists in the international arena - and 
their collusion with US imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism'.47
Soviet treatment of the Japanese Socialist party is more mixed. 
Particular policies pursued by the Socialists are labelled as 'progressive' 
(the same heading applied to those of the JCP) but in general the 
Socialists have been accused of slipping 'further and further towards anti­
communism and right-wing opportunism, refusing to act jointly with the JCP, 
which weakens the left-wing pressure on big monopoly capital and its party 
the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). Opposition is formed not through 
consolidation of progressive forces, but through collaborationist policies 
and right wing reformist ideological views of the Komeito and the DSP 
(Democratic Social Party).'48
In contrast, Soviet evaluations of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party are far from uncertain in their verdicts. In an article reviewing 
the 1979 Academy of Sciences Yearbook on Japan, N.Vladimirov speaks for all 
Soviet ideologists when he refers to the LDP as the 'political headquarters 
of the national elite'. The LDP has always been attacked as the big 
business party which has maintained power by its unscrupulous manipulation 
of the factional divisions in the Japanese political system. The economy 
has ’stagnated as a result of policies in its search to resolve economic 
difficulties by more intensely exploiting the working masses and 
encroaching upon the living standards...has naturally provoked widespread
471.Kovalenko, ’The fight of the communist party of Japan against
Peking’s great power influence’ in Far Eastern Affairs No. 1 1981. pp.14- 
27. Quotation p. 26.
48I.Tamghinsky, op.cit. p.110.
popular resentment.49
V.Khlynov, resident in Japan for many years, and now analyst at 
IMEMO, in his overview of Japan in the 1970’s lauded the efforts of the 
progressive forces in Japan and sees the 1976-77 elections as having been a 
turning point in the fortunes of the LDP and its supporters. The 
Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito he dismissed thus : while 
claiming to be a democratic party the DSP is ’in actual fact by 
manoeuvering between the democratic and conservative forces thereby 
creating grave difficulties in Japan’s democratic camp. The DSP supports 
the ruling party on many major political issues and often makes alliances 
with it. In recent years this won it notoriety. The DSP is often called 
’the other LDP’...the political goals of the Komeito are vague, 
contradictory, and eclectic...the reforms it suggests do not affect the 
foundations of capitalism’.50
The concern voiced by the Soviets over the trend towards 
militarisation in Japan, evident in the increased frequency of reports in 
the Soviet press on Japanese military issues, concentrates on the 
implications for regional security but also sought to show the internal 
forces which are prompting the growing Japanese revanchism.
The Soviet view of the internal situation vis-a-vis the 
militarisation question is fairly straightforward. Clearly it is the LDP 
and other ’self-seeking’ right wing groups who are at the centre of 
Japanese revanchism. At the same time, the forces of opposition to the 
trends of revanchism sure not insignificant. While the most vocal of these 
groups may be the ’progressive forces’, the Soviets are aware that they
49N.Vladimirov, ’Japan faces the 1980s’ in Far Eastern Affairs No. 1 
1980. pp.26-37. Quotation p. 29.
50V.Khlynov, ’Japan’s growing internal political struggle in the 
1970s’ in Far Eastern Affairs No. 4 1979. pp.119-132. Quotation p.122.
(the progressive elements) axe only the vanguard of a far wider politically 
significant movement in Japanese politics which embraces a wide spectrum of 
associated causes from womens' rights to general pacifism.51 The Soviets 
consider that the women's movement (women were by 1982 the majority of the 
Japanese workforce) through annual conferences such as the 'Mothers' 
Congress' has become an important factor in the security debate in Japan 
and, for example, stress that the JCP's struggle to improve the material 
and political position of women in Japanese society has been the most 
important field of the Party's social activity and a cause which the Party 
has 'consistently' worked for. Religious organisations which have never 
before participated in political campaigning are now reckoned to be doing 
so with significant impact. The latent peace movement is broadly based and 
the Soviets are well able to recognise it and its potential. As Kuznetsov 
made plain, 'The special characteristic of the anti-war movement at the 
present stage in Japan is the wide participation of new sectors of the 
population, and new social and political forces. Standing resolutely 
against the nuclear threat are members of the intelligentsia from various 
political persuasions - writers, artists, actors and lawyers'.52
The Soviet appraisal of the internal mechanics of Japanese society 
seems to have been conducted via the guidelines of classical Marxism- 
Leninism. It is an overall view of a slowly changing, but politically 
stable, society. The changes which have taken place are not necessarily 
for the better. The 'working class' have become progressively worse-off
51See, Iu.Barsukov, 'Grazhdanskie dvizhenie v Iaponii' (The People's 
Movement in Japan) in MEMO No. 6 1976. pp. 56-63. These comments by 
Barsukov are echoed by the more recent writings of Kuznetsov and 
Tamghinsky. See below.
52Yu.Kuznetsov, o p .cit. p.104 See also, I.Tamghinsky, 'The Womens' 
movement in Japan' in Far Eastern Affairs No. 4 1982. pp.55-66. Quotation 
P. 63.
but have in the process achieved a greater sense of class solidarity. 
However that in turn has provoked a reaction from the ruling elites who 
have cleverly propagandised politics with the scare of a Soviet threat. 
Even more reactionary moves have been taken by the rightist group who have 
been growing in strength themselves. The course of remilitarisation which 
has been increasingly pursued is one of hidden consequences and therefore 
of great danger to the Soviet Union. These moves, symbolised by the recent 
suggestions to modify the Japanese constitution where concerned with 
defence matters, are ones which the Soviets are no longer confident the 
widely-based pacifist sentiments of the population can suppress.53
53It is not the author's intention here to suggest that moves to 
modify the constitution are merely a ’recent’ phenomenon. It is a 
phenomenon which has recurred since its high point in the 1950s to the 
present day, thus it has been a target for Soviet criticism for thirty 
years.
In the preceding section we have tried by the use of quotations from 
Soviet sources to present the overall views and interpretations which they 
(the Soviets) have of Japan or of Japan’s role in the world politics. The 
picture that we have gleaned is, as stated, an overall one. This approach 
was taken firstly, for reasons of brevity - as some of the more pertinent 
points will be expanded at greater length - but also secondly, as a mode of 
operation imposed by the available sources. Settling for an ’overall 
image’ is always an unsatisfactory compromise but Soviet commentary on 
Japan (let alone any real analysis) is both superficial and repetitive ; 
Soviet investigation of Japanese involvement with Latin America and Africa 
serves as a good illustration of that superficiality. Apart from an 
occasional reference in the Japan yearbooks produced by the USSR Academy of 
Sciences, this author has only encountered one article on Japanese 
involvement in Latin America, yet Japan has substantial investment in the 
region (approximately one-third of Japanese overseas aid or investment goes 
to Latin America).54
There may well be valid reasons why Soviet ability to comment on 
Japan is limited - bureaucratic resistance, lack of incentive for 
researchers to work in less important fields, lack of co-operation with 
other specialist bodies (for example, in conversations with Soviet 
academics concerned with Japan the author was told that liaison took place 
with other institutes involved in work but, for example, the Institute of 
Latin America was never mentioned. The implication was that this co­
operation was limited to the Oriental institutes). These are of course not 
research oriented problems confined to Soviet scholars; aspects of Western
46
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54Iu.Barsukov, ’Iaponiia i Latinskaia Amerika’ (Japan and Latin 
America) in MEMO No. 7 1975. pp.116-119.
analysis of Japan can equally be found lacking. Nevertheless the end 
product is still an inhibiting factor in that in looking at Soviet ideology 
and Japan at the theoretical level we have to move to the particular by 
deduction from the general.
As we indicated in the opening paragraphs of the preceding section 
the years which our study encompass constituted a time in which an 
ideological reformulation was taking place within the Soviet Union. This 
fact has two important consequences for our study : first, the process of 
reformulation served to heighten the salience of ideology and the 
importance of ideological directives both in the international arena and 
domestic politics ; second, this correspondingly overemphasised the issue 
of ideological conformity as a factor in decision-making. It came to be 
used by Brezhnev as a tool (amongst others) to settle domestic rivalries 
and in the process temporarily increased the influence of Party theorists 
in policy matters. Our starting point then is with the ideological debate 
in the Soviet Union during the 1970’s.
The consensus among political scientists who study the Soviet polijty 
is that the problem which Soviet political structures faced during this 
decade was one of legitimacy.55 Expressed simply it was a problem of how 
to resolve the crisis created by the conflict between assuring the 
continuing legitimation of the Soviet bureaucratic system and accommodating 
the inevitable changes associated with the ’objective’ trends of 
modernisation.
Why should accommodating these changes pose a problem for the Soviet 
system ? Marx had stipulated that as the intermediate body of the state 
advances towards communism the idea and practice of functional
55See, R.Judson Mitchell, Ideology of a Superpower Hoover Press, 
Stanford California, 1982. Also, T.Gustafson, Reform in Soviet Politics 
Cambridge University Press, 1981.
specialisation becomes outmoded and surpassed. The doing-away with
functional specialisation constitutes a fundamental prerequisite of the
attainment of communism - as such ’specialisation’ is viewed as a prime
source of repression for those who wielded political power within a state.
The problem which confronted the Soviet leadership was that as a direct
result of a process of technological modernisation functional
specialisation in the Soviet state (as in other similarly advanced states)
was increasing and not decreasing as communist theory postulated. The
answer which the Soviet leadership sought to adopt to the problems caused
by modernisation was to redefine in ideological terms the effects of
modernisation and resolve the leaderships’ dilemma, of how to assure
legitimacy while accommodating change, by producing an ideological
justification for increased specialisation.
Specifically the Soviets redefined the Marxist concept of the
’division of labour’ within society and argued that as technological
complexity increases with communism, although class antagonisms have been
eliminated, the requirements of the era of advanced socialism necessitate
high levels of organisation. Thus they turned the Marxist concept of
’division of labour’ on its head, for he had postulated that specialisation
(high levels of organisation) would be eroded as the state advanced towards
communism. G. Marchuk, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences
supported the new idea thus :
The scientific and technical revolution is based on skilled 
specialist cadres who can actively influence the development of 
the production process...this formulates particular 
requirements concerning the training of specialists and the 
upgrading of their professional standards... scientific and 
technical progress is the basis for intensive national economic 
development. The future of our economy lies in upgrading 
effectiveness. This is the way of ensuring its successful and 
dynamic development. The Party is steadfastly pursuing a line 
of acceleration of scientific and technical progress, improved 
planning and management, and intensified levels of organisation
48
and order at workplace and management level56
The technical revolution (the Soviet term is "scientific and 
technical revolution", abbreviated to ’STR’) is of course a world-wide 
phenomenon and thus to tackle an idea which had application to the 
capitalist as well as communist camps party theorists made a careful 
distinction between the content and consequences of the STR. Under 
communist control it would serve as a ’means of transforming human 
productive forces of society’. Administered under capitalist ideology it 
would only serve to increase the alienation of the workforce and deepen the 
contradictions inherent in the capitalist system.
Accusing the advanced industrial countries of ’technological 
exploitation’ was a common feature of Soviet ideological criticism applied 
to the state of Japanese industrial relations during the 1970s but had 
ceased to be used by the end of that decade as a major tool of criticism.57 
In the particular case of comment on Japan the decline in emphasis is less 
apparent by comparison with its use against Western industrial nations. 
Given the international dominance of Japan in certain fields of high 
technology and the corresponding degree of Japanese reliance on technology 
in industry, the effects of high technology on the structure of the 
Japanese economy and workforce were still a source of trenchant Soviet 
criticism. But even in this context Soviet writers attribute the labour 
unrest in Japan to the wider problems involved in a restructuring of the 
Japanese economy during the 1970s rather than to the idea of technological
56G.Marchuk, ’Components of scientific progress’ in Kommunist No. 13 
1978. pp.43-53. JPRS translation.
57A.Ulyanov, ’Iaponskii proletariat i tekhnicheskii progress’ (The
Japanese proletariat and technical progress) in MEMO No.9 1978. pp.149-150.
exploitation.58 For the most part discussion of science and technology in 
the Japanese case is centred around an examination of the level of 
technological dependence of the Japanese themselves or in comparison to 
Western nations.59
Soviet leaders and theorists put forward various approaches on how 
best to combine the scientific and technical revolution with the benefits 
of advanced socialism in order to speed-up the entry (at an unspecified 
date) of the Soviet people to the stage of communism. Thus while there was 
a divergence of view between Soviet leaders over the question of 
technology, its uses (and by implication the necessity of its importation, 
on whatever scale from abroad) and its relevance to Soviet goals, this 
divergence would best be characterised as a difference over ’means’ rather 
than ’ends’. In consequence it would be a mistake to see these differences 
of opinion as indicating deep divisions in the Soviet leadership and their 
extent should not be exaggerated. As we can see with hindsight, depicting 
these differences as ’deep divisions’ was the very mistake which the 
Western and the Japanese governments in fact made. Hoffman and Laird, two 
western watchers of Soviet science policy conclude in one of their studies 
on differing approaches to technology that, ’despite some differences in 
the views of Brezhnev and Kosygin and other top leaders these analyses (of 
how to utilise the technical revolution) have been characterised by an 
increasing attentiveness to the interconnections between ends and means and
58See, S.Ul’ianichev, ’Skol’ko v Iaponii bezrabotnikh ?’ (How many 
unemployed are there in Japan ?) in MEMO No.12 1983. pp.114-120.
59See, Yu.Stolyarov, S.Ulianichev, ’Nauchno - tekhnicheskaia strategia 
Iaponii’ (Japan’s scientific and technical strategy) in MEMO No.6 1983. 
pp.48-58.
between domestic and international politics'.60
Bruce Parrott, in the major work in English concerning politics and 
technology in the USSR, while positing two significantly differing 
tendencies with regard to how the Soviet Union should approach the West on 
the co-operative aspects of technology transfer, still qualifies his 
assessment by recognising that 'in proposing to weigh this hypothesis 
against the historical evidence, I wish to emphasise that it posits only 
differing tendencies and not hard and fast divisions within the elite'.61
As indicated in the opening paragraphs the debate over ideology had 
impact upon this internal debate over technology and its place in the 
Soviet system. Although Brezhnev and Kosygin were as one in accepting that 
there were serious economic problems, Brezhnev was stressing a slightly 
different remedy, more soundly ideologically grounded than Kosygin's. 
Brezhnev was talking of the problem in terms of a political solution by 
calling for an administrative rationalisation without a significant 
devolution of power. He was thus maintaining his own credibility by being 
seen to be an advocate of 'principled solutions' i.e. ones in accord with 
ideological dictate. Kosygin was approaching the problem from more of a 
technical viewpoint and found himself more at odds with ideological 
principles.
The interaction of ideological imperatives thus, in a more overt 
manner than had perhaps been the case in the past with regard to trading 
matters merely served to complicate the picture for the outside observer. 
The Japanese failed to see the distinction between ideology and official
60R.Laird, E.P.Hoffman, 'The STR and developed socialism and Soviet 
international behaviour' in Hoffman and Fleron (eds), The Conduct of Soviet 
Foreign Policy Hawthorne, NY,1980. pp.386-405. Quotation p.389.
6iB.Parrott, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union MIT Press, 
Cambridge Mass., 1983. p.6.
comment : official comment can be designed to set-out the government’s
policy and prospects - this involves an open discussion of differing views
; it can be used to legitimise governmental policies in which case problems
are minimised ; or it can be used in a domestic context to support
f
particular policies or individuals and to attack others. While differences 
in the expression of official thought can have significant consequences for 
particular policies we must remember that the policies themselves are 
always framed within the limits of the ideologically acceptable and thus 
policy will not become a substitute for ideology.
Soviet economic analysts had been quick to point out that an 
embryonic world economy was forming, in which all states could participate 
and from which all could benefit, including the Soviet Union. As Brezhnev 
saw it the consequent Soviet move into the international market would help 
to alleviate the domestic needs of the Soviet economy, thus allowing him to 
pursue investment in others sectors of expenditure. As events unwound 
through the early 1970s Brezhnev became aware that these hopes could not be 
fulfilled to the degree anticipated and there ensued a triumph of the more 
traditionalist approach to foreign trade. Soviet trade with the CMEA 
nations was not governed strictly by this approach however. The limits of 
the traditional autarkic view of foreign trade were relaxed in dealings 
with CMEA nations. In this case a ’division of labour’ principle seems to 
have applied to a limited extent, whereby the Soviets accepted that a 
significant percentage of certain products or resources needed by the 
Soviet Union could be produced by Eastern European nations. Eastern 
European production of locomotive engines, buses and certain categories of 
merchant shipping are good examples of some of these types of goods.
By the end of 1974 Brezhnev’s original hopes had been dashed and 
domestic investment for the 1976-80 period was severely retrenched in order
to maintain the projected levels of military spending. 62
In this instance the attainment of foreign policy goals had become
directly linked to the internal domestic challenge. Japan, for its part,
had observed the debate over foreign trade and drawn an erroneous
conclusion. It assumed, along with the rest of the advanced industrial
nations that detente was not merely possible, but necessary for the Soviet
Union. It either chose not, or was not able to take sufficiently into
account the ideological debate in the Soviet Union which was to have
particular relevance for the trading relations between the two nations ; it
chose not to (or could not) see that the Soviets were making it plain that
irresoluble antagonisms between the opposing systems would limit the levels
of exchange and co-operation. Mikhail Suslov, in an attack on ’panickers,
capitulationists and opportunists’ in Kommunist underscored the class
character of the line taken on the trade issue when he argued that
compromise with Leninist principles was out of the question - "The very
deepest roots of both domestic and foreign policy of our state...are
determined by the economic interests and the economic position of the
dominant class of our state. These must not be lost from view for a
minute, in order not to lose ourselves in the thickets and labyrinth of
diplomatic contrivances".63
This point has been emphasised once again by M.S.Gorbachev in a
speech made in Dnepropetrovsk in June 1985
We are ready to compete with capitalism exclusively in 
peaceful, constructive activities. That is why we stand for 
the promotion of political dialogue and interaction with
62For the primacy of the military sector in budget allocations see,
for example, G.W.Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as leaders : Building 
authority in Soviet politics Allen and Unwin, London,1982. Also, H.Gelman, 
The Brezhnev Politburo and the decline of detente Cornell University Press, 
1984. Chapter 3 and pp.178-181.
63B.Parrott, op.cit. p. 260
capitalist countries and for the extensive development of 
mutually beneficial trade, economic and scientific, technical 
and cultural contacts, and we are ready to develop these 
contacts on a stable and long-term basis. But these should be 
honest and truly mutually beneficial contacts without any 
discrimination. It is hopeless, for example, to use trade to 
intervene in our internal affairs. We do not need such trade, 
we can do without it.64
While still considering general concepts stemming from ideology which 
affected Soviet policy towards Japan we should bear in mind the overall 
influence upon policy of Soviet strategic views moulded round the idea of 
the correlation of forces.
L.I.Brezhnev’s glowing assessment of the Soviet Union’s world 
position, delivered at the 25th Party congress in February 1976, was as 
much about validating Brezhnev’s own foreign policy line as providing an 
ideological vision. Consequently, his predictions of a restructuring of 
world politics and of a decisive swing in the correlation of forces were 
somewhat overstated. At the global level, interpreting the correlation of 
forces, although it involves assessing things which can be quantified 
(military strength, GDP, trade volumes), is a difficult task not least as 
the ability to ’measure’ events at this scale and level is made difficult 
by the lack of any acceptable scale of values or method of categorisation. 
Moreover it also involves an estimation of factors which cannot be measured 
or quantified, such as political influence for example. Any assessment of 
these factors depends to a large extent upon the ’feel’ that Soviet leaders 
have for these issues. There exists a further obvious problem in relating 
the factors involved at the global and regional levels and in determining 
to what extent the regional contributes to the global and vice versa. 
Those forces which can be related to events at a regional level are easier 
to measure due to the decrease in scale and a similar decrease in the
64Press office of the USSR embassy, ’Mikhail Gorbachev’s stay in 
Dnepropetrovsk’ Soviet New Bulletin Soviet Embassy, Canberra.
number of variables which have to be considered. The overall Soviet
predictions of a restructuring of world politics were, as Soviet
commentators themselves admit, based on the extension of Soviet power to a
degree unprecedented in Soviet experience, even if not at all levels
comparable with that of the United States.
As we indicated in our opening remarks to Section I, Soviet theorists
argue that the correlation of forces can be theoretically favourable even
if one is militarily weaker than the opponent. However, although the
Soviets stress that military power is only one of various factors which
contribute to the overall equation, it is clearly the most important.
Aspaturian states with regard to the military factor that :
Although the resulting Soviet position does not represent 
outright falsehood, it amounts to a kind of ’cognitive 
deception’. Since a critical, if not always decisive, 
component of the ’correlation of forces’ is the state of the 
military balance, the two are obviously interrelated, and 
whereas it is possible to achieve superiority in the 
’correlation of forces’ without at the same time enjoying 
military superiority, it is nevertheless true that the military 
component of the ’correlation of forces’ is the most precise, 
measurable, and visible component in the calculation. 
Furthermore, changes in the military balance affect changes in 
the overall ’correlation of forces’ more immediately and 
reliably than changes in any other component, many of which are 
tangible and amorphous, thus making their calculation and exact 
weight elusive and subject to differing intuitive estimates and 
judgements rather than precise and unambiguous measurement65
The argument which the Soviets put forward that the military factor
is not a critical component of the overall calculation is clearly a self- ■
serving rationale. Although the Soviets are at their strongest in the
military field by comparison with their position in non-military factors,
65V.Aspaturian, ’Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces’ in 
Problems of Communism May - June 1980. pp.1-18. Quotation p.9. The only 
clear ’definition’ of the ’correlation of forces’ is contained in, 
Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopedia (Soviet Military Encyclopedia) ’Voennoe’ 
Izdatel’stvo, Ministerstvo Oboroni SSSR 1979. Vol. 7. p.445. This is a 
definition of the term as used in a purely military context.
they are still overall the militarily weaker of the two superpowers.66 
Hence they seek to de-emphasise the importance of the military factor in 
the overall equation but stress their military strength in particular 
circumstances.
We are therefore confronted with a situation in which both the West 
and the Soviet Union, but for different reasons, sought to emphasis the new 
level of the ’Soviet military threat’ ; the real emphasis of the new threat 
was placed not so much upon the strategic nuclear capabilities of the 
Soviet Union as upon the lower regional or theatre level capabilities or 
projection abilities. In the overall context of policy with regard to 
Japan then, Soviet ideology sought to stress the change in regional 
circumstances brought on by this new military strength in north east Asia 
and in the process endowed the military factor in relations with a higher 
profile than the realities of the regional military balance would otherwise 
have warranted.
In consequence, the central issue of Soviet - Japanese relations came 
to be an obsession on the part of both nations with the military equation 
in north east Asia. For the Soviets it would prove to be counterproductive 
as the Japanese military build-up was in the main justified as a response 
to this changing military situation and a concern over Soviet capabilities. 
A regional reading of the correlation of forces with the emphasis on the 
military aspect may well have given the Soviets the impression that they
66 It is accepted that there is superpower parity at the strategic 
nuclear level. In terms of theatre nuclear forces, especially in Europe, 
the Soviets are thought to have the edge. At a conventional level Soviet 
land forces in Europe are at least on a par with NATO forces (though many 
commentators argue they are the stronger) and in the Far East are probably 
superior to Chinese forces. The overall naval balance favours strongly the 
NATO powers, Japan and China. However the large number of Soviet 
submarines are a source of serious concern to NATO planners. While the 
Soviets have built up a power projection capability it is limited and still 
surpassed by the capabilities of the United States alone, not including the 
capabilities of other US allies.
were in a position of at least equality in some respects but at a 
disadvantage overall. Recognising this, the Soviets perceived a severe 
threat to their security emanating from American, Japanese and Chinese 
forces and reacting accordingly, assigned a high priority to military 
balances within the region.
Initially then, we have tried to show some aspects of the wider 
impact of ideology on the conduct of Soviet relations with Japan. First, 
it impinged more than might usually be the case upon Soviet internal 
politicking, which in turn had repercussions for the trade debate and the 
eventual course of trade with Japan - as we shall discuss in the later 
section which deals with trade, the Japanese were to misread the signals 
coming from Moscow and consequently their enthusiasm for trade with the 
Soviets (which they mistakenly thought the Soviets shared) was misplaced 
and illusory. Second, it had important consequences for the military 
situation by overemphasising aspects of this question. These aspects have 
been singled out for comment above others as their influence on the conduct 
of relations with Japan was indirect. Due to their global nature the 
effect that they would have in a particular region or in cases of bilateral 
relations was unpredictable and would vary from case to case.
JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ASSESSMENT
The Soviet assessment of ’centres of power’ within the capitalist 
camp, is superficially accurate. But some questions can be raised 
concerning it. The first concerns the problem of how within the Soviet 
idea we can interpret the division or equation of power between the 
different ’centres’ ? Only if we reduce the concept of ’centres of power’ 
to a purely economic measure does it make sense to talk of Japan as any 
real centre of power in its own right in a global sense. Japanese economic 
power gives it, arguably, a great deal of political power regionally but it
is more questionable how significant that is at a global level. This also 
applies to seeing Japan as a rival power centre in comparison to other 
members of a multipolar capitalist system.
There is a further problem in that implicit in the Soviet idea is an 
assumption that these are ’rival’ centres of power which are divided over 
objectives and means of operation which bring them into friction with each 
other. The problem for the Soviets is that capitalist bloc interrelations 
do not seem to bear-out Soviet theory on how they should be interacting. 
The difficulty lies in determining the depth of these divisions and their 
significance for policy. The Soviets realise these difficulties in 
practice but their concept of a divisive capitalist camp does not pay 
enough service to them. Despite the ideological belief the Soviets are 
clearly unsure about the idea of division within the capitalist camp as a 
sound base on which to conduct policy ; some Soviet ideologists have 
suggested that it would be unwise to overemphasise the depth of division 
and the extent to which it can be counted on as exploitable for the benefit 
of the Soviet Union while others have continued to stress the basic 
divisive nature of capitalism. The former grouping seem to have emerged as 
the dominant force.
M.Maksimova, in an article on the problems of European integration 
argues that ’American - Western European contradictions have never been 
sharper in the post-war period than today’, but she goes on to add that, 
’these two networks of capitalism are linked by a close network of capital, 
growing interdependence of economic development and alliance 
obligations’.67 This would seem to be a more moderating, not to say more 
accurate, account and a counter to the more extreme voices, counselling
67 As quoted in H.Adomeit, ’Capitalist contradictions and Soviet 
policy’ in Problems of Communism Vol. XXXIII May-June 1984. pp.7-18.
against exaggerated perceptions of rivalry in the capitalist camp.
Maksimova"s statement is indicative of a wider trend in Soviet 
thought which advocates caution over this question. Though couched in 
terms of an American - European comparison, the same could be said 
concerning Japanese relations with the Europeans or with the United States. 
In contrast to some commentaries which suggest a bitter fuelling of 
division between Japan and these other two capitalist centres during the 
1970s (mostly to do with economic matters), Soviet writers are also aware 
that Japan had at the same time moved closer to them, particularly the 
Europeans, over some issues such as the co-ordination of energy policy and 
the dialogue with the Third World.68
On the available evidence it cannot be said that this ideological 
uncertainty has been reflected in the conduct of policy vis-a-vis Japan. 
The Soviets have consistently acted in a fashion which has presupposed that 
on substantial issues there is no hope for the foreseeable future of 
achieving a meaningful rupture in policy outlook between Japan and the 
United States or Europe. In questions of trade or trade competition with 
the Soviet Union, between the Japanese and the Europeans the issue has 
never been a source of division as Japan and Western Europe share a like 
approach to dealing with the Soviets and the United States, grain deals 
excepted, is effectively not involved in trading at all with the Soviets. 
On matters of military security, the lessons which the Soviets would have 
gained from the comprehensive failure of their collective security 
proposals notwithstanding, they have similarly made no serious overt moves 
to encourage the severing of the military aspects of the Japanese- 
American alliance. This has been because they see this aim as unlikely to
68See, A.Utkin, 'Atlantizm1 i Iaponiia' (Atlanticism and Japan) in 
MEMO No.6 1976. pp.56-63 and Maksimova, o p .cit. For sources which stress 
division more see, Maksudov op.cit. and Sergiyev, op.cit.
be attainable, and active pursuit of it likely to be counterproductive.
These assertions are made in the context of what have been referred 
to as 'substantial issues’ or as 'serious moves’ ; it would be inaccurate 
to state that the Soviets have not played upon the obvious frictions 
between Japan and other leading states but the point to be made is that 
this provocation has taken place at a lesser level, over specific events, 
and not where the wide sweep of policy has been concerned. The Soviets 
would see this as the distinction between a dialectical approach to policy 
and an approach centred around what they would term 'petty politicking’
(melkoe politikantsvo). To be sure, in the framework of Soviet - Japanese 
relations there sure examples of this ’petty politicking’ or attempts to 
divide Japanese opinion or policy from that of the United States. These 
range from Soviet interference in, or attempts to exacerbate, trade 
wrangles between Japan and the United States to, for example, the Soviet 
verbal support for the Japanese groups hostile to the proposed F-16 
deployments at Misawa airbase in order that the decision be reversed or at 
least modified.
There are yet other examples which we might consider which show that 
the Soviets have not tried to exploit divisions beyond limits. When the 
Chinese invaded Vietnam the Japanese government’s response was fax more 
condemnatory of China than that of the United States’. Indeed the Soviets 
reportedly complimented the Japanese for taking such a stance during the 
crisis. The Soviets could well have attempted to widen this divide between 
Japan and the United States but made no such attempt. The divisions in the 
Western camp concerning sanctions over Afghanistan and Poland are another 
case in point. In both cases the Japanese government adopted a position 
far short of the measures advocated by the American government, and in some 
instances by European governments. In no instance did the Soviets try to
use those differences for some other purpose or lead Japan to abandon or 
lessen sanctions by providing an incentive to do so, such as offers of new 
contracts or promises of a better agreement over fisheries for example.
To conclude on this point ; the evidence of this study indicates 
that, though ideological dictate suggests that the Soviets should seek to 
promote and exploit the divisions between Japan and the United States and 
to a lesser extent the Europeans, in practice the Soviets have not 
consistently operated by this principle. They have indulged occasionally 
in what they would term ’petty politicking’ however they clearly feel that 
further action in the hope of fuelling serious discord between capitalist 
nations is unrealistic. Thus despite the ideological guidelines it does 
not follow, at least in the case of Japan, that the Soviet Union has either 
wished or been able to exploit the frictions between Japan and her allies 
beyond certain limits.
JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC
There are two areas in which the Japanese are involved and on which 
the Soviets comment which are global in scope but which have more relevance 
for the region closer to home for the Japanese. Specifically these are the 
questions of Japanese oil or energy dependence and Japanese aid to 
developing nations, particularly in South East Asia.
Oil dependence is a central concern of the Japanese in their global 
relations. The Soviets latched-on to this point as quickly as other 
observers after the 1973 oil crisis. By the end of 1974, Soviet references 
to capitalist countries had become subtly divided between those they viewed 
as ’oil dependent’ and those not seen as such. In their economic 
assessments of Japan Soviet writers interpret the structural reforms they 
see as having been undertaken in Japan during the 1970s as due in part to 
the effects of the oil crises, and argue that the crises exposed the
underlying vulnerability of Japan. Some Soviet ideologues have gone so far 
as to suggest that it was this dependence (99.8%) in the main that prompted 
Japanese expansionism into foreign markets and the build-up of Japanese 
armed forces which were needed "to protect interests abroad and Japanese 
supply lines’.69
In the actual conduct of Soviet - Japanese relations the issue of oil 
and of energy in general, is one of no substance. The Soviets, despite 
trading agreements over the supply of natural gas from Siberia to Japan, 
are not a supplier of oil or fuel to Japan on any significant scale. Even 
though Soviet analysts have sought to contend - a la textbook Marxist 
economic analysis - that Japan has ’needed’ the Soviet Union as a market 
for exports and as a source of trade (especially of fuels), the conduct of 
Soviet policy has been guided by a more realistic appraisal of the true 
circumstances. Figures for 1979 illustrate the situation vis-a-vis 
Japanese ’dependence’ on the Soviet Union as a source of energy : imports 
from the Soviets as a percentage of total requirements constituted only 
0 .8%.
The argument that the Japanese have built-up their armed forces, (in 
this case their naval forces), with the serious aim of protecting their 
interests or sea lanes of communication in areas as far away as south east 
Asia (as some writers imply) is not one which the Soviets have used to any 
lasting real effect except to score propaganda points. In these instances 
the propaganda value of these assertions is hard to estimate. The real 
thrust of the militarism argument in the context of day-to-day Soviet- 
Japanese relations has been the concomitant threat from militarism to the
69S.Ignatushchenko, o p . cit. p.87. Mineral fuels constituted 41.2% of 
the total import bill of Japan in 1979, an increase of 50% over 1978 
although the actual quantity imported had increased by only 5.8%. See, The 
Oriental Economist, Yearbook of Japan 1980/1 pp.36-38.
Soviet Union itself and not some ill-defined threat to far away places. It 
has been this threat to Soviet territory which has been attacked in 
ideological pronouncements and which has been one of the central problems 
reflected in the conduct of relations ; we shall discuss this later.
The other area of concern which impinges upon Soviet estimates of 
Japan at both a global and regional level is the issue of Japanese overseas 
aid and its functions in the south east Asian region. The Asian economic 
journal, the Oriental Economist in its 1980/81 yearbook on Japan comments 
that despite the improvements in aid throughout the 1970s "Japanese 
economic assistances are widely believed to be far from satisfactory".70 
If we choose to look at the Japanese contribution to aid projects as a 
gross figure Japan emerges quite favourably ; but measured as a percentage 
of GNP Japan emerges poorly compared to other members of the OECD. The 
Soviets are very critical of both the scale and purposes of Japanese aid, 
as we illustrated in the first section of this chapter. In practice when 
Soviet writers speak of Japanese overseas aid it is by inference Japanese 
aid to Asia (even more specifically, south east Asia) which is the subject 
of discussion. Japanese aid to Africa is occasionally mentioned, aid to 
Latin America and to the Middle East (which receives about 14% of total 
Japanese overseas aid) is mentioned only infrequently.
Having delineated the form of Soviet comment let us establish some 
facts on Japanese aid - a sizeable percentage of it goes to Latin America 
(some 30.2% in 1978), the majority of official government aid goes to Asia 
(60% in 1978) but as an overall percentage of the total (private plus 
governmental), contributions to Asia rank roughly on a par with those to 
Latin America. Africa holds third place on the ranking of recipients.71
70The Oriental Economist, o p .cit. p.56
71 See, Oriental Economist, op.cit. pp.58-59.
None of these points are effectively made by the Soviets. The non­
discussion of Japanese involvement with the Middle East is a particularly 
striking omission especially if we were to subscribe to the argument that 
the Soviets are very much informed on the Middle East oil and Japanese fuel 
dependency relationship. How can we explain these omissions ? The Soviets 
are aware of the discrepancy between Japanese economic power and political 
influence, and as the Japanese are deemed to have no meaningful political 
influence in Latin America and the Middle East this might explain the lack 
of comment. It could equally be for other reasons, for example, a lack of 
Soviet expertise in the specific field of Japanese overseas aid and 
development funding (though a lack of expertise in itself indicates a low 
priority), a lack of knowledge on Latin America (it was hinted at the 
beginning of this section that co-operation between the Institute of Latin 
America and the "oriental" institutes is perhaps not all it should be), or 
a problem of categorising both the Middle East and Latin America, since 
neither fits neatly under the heading of "developing countries’ ; or a 
combination of the above.
The relevance to Soviet policy of Japanese involvement with the 
developing countries overlaps with a wider issue of Soviet ideological 
views of the Third World itself and with the idea of a "world economy"; 
while not wishing to become involved in a long discussion of Soviet views 
of these, it would be worthwhile making some points pertinent to Japan.
Soviet analysts have pieced together a sophisticated appraisal of the 
factors relating to the changes in position of the developing states within 
the world system and of recognising that each developing state will 
inevitably pursue different approaches to its relations within the system. 
Karen Brutents in his otherwise ideologically traditionalist comment 
conceded such a point ; "The emphasis on anti-imperialism and socially
progressive policies differs from one country to the next. It depends on 
the degree of independence, government policies, socio-political complexion 
of the state...Another point to note is that the development of non­
discrimination (by the developing countries) in economic co-operation 
between socialist and capitalist states helps to establish normal and 
equitable economic relations throughout the world".72 What Brutents is 
implicitly admitting is that the Soviets have accepted the continued 
connection between developing states and the capitalist world - if only 
because it is inevitable and the Soviets can do nothing to change the 
circumstances.
The second factor to be considered is the emergence in Soviet
ideological circles of the debate over the idea of a ’world economy’, its
functioning and its consequences. We have encountered the ramifications of
this debate earlier in the Soviet theories of a divided western camp. One
of the reasons for a Soviet reluctance to exploit division beyond certain
limits was the potentially adverse effects this would have on the world
economy, and hence on the Soviet Union. Acting thus would imply Soviet
support for the argument which asserts that if there exists a state of
global interdependence there must be global problems from which no nation
is secure. The Soviet advancement of the interdependence argument
signalled that the process of development for the Third World lay within
the capitalist world economic system. Brezhnev himself made this clear,
A broad international division of labour is the only basis for 
keeping pace with the times and being abreast of requirements 
and potentialities of the scientific and technical revolution.
This, I should say, is axiomatic today. Hence, the need for a 
mutually beneficial long-term and large scale economic co­
operation, both bilateral and unilateral... of course this 
applies not only to Europe, but also to all continents, to the
72K.Brutents, ’The Soviet Union and the Newly developed countries’ in 
International Affairs (Moscow) No.4 1979. pp.3-14. Quotation p.4.
entire system of present day economic relations.73
To emphasise this point, N.S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade, 
at a meeting of the fourth UNCTAD in Nairobi in 1976 stated that while the 
Soviet Union was against "all manifestations of inequality, diktat and 
exploitation in international economic relations", the LDC plans for new 
stabilisation measures for commodity prices should be at "levels which, 
first, are economically sound, remunerative, and fair for producers and 
consumers alike" and continued to say that, the Soviet Union was aware "of 
the intention of the developing countries to consolidate efforts in 
protecting their interests on world markets...we assume, however, that 
implementation of such activities will be made with due regard for the 
interests of both commodity producers and consumers".74
There exists an obvious ’ideological unease’ about the whole issue of 
Japanese relations with the developing world. In these circumstances of 
global interdependence (which the Soviets implicitly accept) and if, as 
Patolichev stated he expected that ’mutual consideration’ should be the 
prevailing attitude to the conduct of economic relations between the 
developed and developing states, to what extent can we accept the Soviet 
criticism of Japan’s relations with the south east Asian states and LDC 
states as neocolonialist, as a serious influence on the actual conduct of 
their policy towards Japan?
In their own relations with the states in south east Asia the Soviets 
have used the ploy of an ’exploitative’ Japanese presence as a means of 
making propaganda gains - but to what extent they have been successful is
73As quoted in A.Sergiyev, ’Bourgeois theories of interdependence 
serves neocolonialism’ in International Affairs (Moscow) No.11 1976. 
pp.103-111. Quotation p.110.
74’Statement by head of the USSR delegation to 4th UNCTAD session’ in 
Foreign Trade (Moscow) No.7 1976. pp.2-9. Quotation p.9.
open to question. Other than for reasons of propaganda, the economic 
relationship which Japan has with these states has not figured as a source 
of contention between the Soviets and the Japanese. Neither has the Soviet 
view of Japanese relations with these states been a source of friction 
between the Soviets and the south east Asians.
It is more open to doubt though whether the same can be said of the 
political, and to a lesser degree of the military, implications of the 
Japanese relationship with the states of south east Asia. This brings us 
into contact with the Japanese ideas for a "Pacific community’ and with the 
militarism question.
The issue which the Soviets always regard with caution is what the 
Japanese might achieve by translating their economic power into military or 
political influence. The Pacific Community project is a target for attack 
precisely because it implies gains for the Japanese in these very 
directions. As one Soviet spokesman sees it "although mention is made all 
the time of one community, in reality it is hoped to kill two birds with 
one stone : to form a military - political alliance in the Asia-Pacific 
region headed by the United States to serve the interests of international 
reaction, and to create an exclusive economic grouping that would accord 
with the interests of Japanese imperialism".75
The rhetoric in front of the ideological pronouncement has its basis 
in a real fear, and for that reason the Soviets have always considered 
Japanese attention to community proposals as important. The Soviet fear is 
not that an actual community will come about, (all commentators are 
sceptical that the practical problems can be surmounted), but rather that 
the mere idea of a Pacific grouping will act as a block to the growth of 
Soviet influence.
75Yu.Bandura, op.cit. p. 69.
In interviews with Soviet academics the author was told in no 
uncertain terms that the actual creation of a Pacific community "was doomed 
as nobody will follow Japan" and that "while in principle a good idea, the 
practical problems make it a non-starter". Yet the evidence suggests that 
the Soviets are concerned either that the Japanese will make some gain from 
it or that it will be used to fuel continual anti-Soviet feeling, even if 
nothing concrete ever comes from it. Even though comments made to the 
author at four Soviet research institutes were universally dismissive of 
the Pacific community idea, it was significant that lengthy comments were 
made at all and that academics in all four institutes wished to discuss it.
Attack or comment on the community proposals is a frequent feature of 
Soviet writings on Japan, second only to comment on the remilitarisation 
issue, and this of itself is significant as an indication of its concern to 
the Soviets. It seems that in this instance the concern expressed in 
ideological rhetoric has been reflected in policy, in an attitude of 
caution against any manifestations of a scheme which might provoke an 
unexpected development detrimental to Soviet interest in East Asia.
Soviet Ideology and the Remilitarisation of Japan 
In part Soviet attacks on the Pacific community have been due to a 
belief on their part that the economic co-operation which forms the basis 
of the community has also the potential to form a framework for political, 
and perhaps military, co-operation.
With regard to the military situation in the East Asian region the 
Soviets have always stressed their capability to rebuff any aggressor and 
that they view the increase in their capabilities in the region as the most 
important factor in preventing hostilities and strengthening security. 
However they also make clear that in a region where the superpowers and 
other major powers intersect any unfavourable trend must be carefully
watched as it can be potentially dangerous.
The two main influences on the military equation in the area - be it 
the perceived Soviet build-up or the claims of a Japanese build-up - are 
central to Soviet - Japanese relations. Furthermore, it is arguable that 
the issue has so dominated the analysis of relations between the two 
countries that Western observers tend to regard relations mostly as a 
military problem.
It would be useful to precede Soviet views of militarisation and
Japanese defence capacity with a look at how the Soviets have interpreted
the legal basis upon which that defence capacity is premised i.e. Article 9
of the Japanese Constitution, which states that
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state 
will not be recognised.
Soviet commentators have, from time to time, claimed that the 
existence of the JSDF is a violation of Article 9. These references though 
are few and far between; the subject itself is usually given cursory 
passing mention in a wider context. For example, Krasnaia Zvezda in March 
1978 commented that, "the strength of the Japanese 'self-defence forces', 
created in breach of the Constitution, now totalled...”.76 I. Latyshev 
suggested that "...despite the fact that Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution prohibits the country from having any armed forces, Japan 
since 1954 has got an army of her own..."77
76See Soviet News 4 April 1978. (London, Press department of the Soviet 
Embassy.)
77Professor I.Latyshev, o p . cit. p.369.
Despite Soviet claims since its inception that the Japanese 
Constitution is merely a device of the United States' and of Japanese 
monopoly circles for justifying and achieving Japanese rearmament, it has 
equally, long implicitly been accepted that, regardless of semantic 
niceties, Japan would have armed forces of a sort, whatever they were 
called. The best evidence of this can be found in Soviet statements at the 
San Francisco conference of 1951 convened to ratify the US-UK-Japan (and 
hopefully, USSR) draft Peace treaty. The Soviet document, presented by 
Gromyko, which attacked the Western bias of the proposed treaty, also 
attacked it for not containing "any guarantees against the re-establishment 
of Japanese militarism". More to the point, Gromyko also submitted eight 
new articles for inclusion in any treaty. Two of these articles envisaged 
"The strict limitation of the nature and size of Japanese defensive forces" 
and "Restrictions on the nature of military training in Japan".78
The Soviets clearly harboured no illusions that Article 9 of the 
Constitution would act as a bar to a sovereign nation possessing armed 
forces of some sort. They conceded in the above statement that they 
expected that there would be military training/activity in Japan - their 
concern was to try and limit it. This "limitation" theme has been 
continually pushed by the Soviets; if anything ' the Latyshev article 
mentioned above symbolises this - his point of departure for criticism 
relates not to the fact that Japanese armed forces exist but to the fact 
that they are rapidly expanding armed forces.79
78See, R.Swearingen, The Soviet Union And Post War Japan Hoover 
Institution Press, Stamford, California 1978. pp.76-79 for an examination 
of the San Francisco conference and Soviet terms.
79For purposes of comparison, Soviet attacks on rumours of Japan 
acquiring a nuclear capability are of interest. In this case, presumably 
also acquiring nuclear weapons would be a contravention of Article 9, 
however this point is not the main pillar of Soviet argument, though it is 
used. The Soviets stress that it would be a violation of the self­
We indicated in Section I that publicly the Soviets appear divided 
over whether to attribute the rising trend of militarisation in Japan to 
the Americans "whose ruling classes wish to hold Japan as an outpost of 
capitalism" or to lay it at the door of the Japanese who have become more 
involved in pursuing their own goals by their own means. On balance the 
weight of opinion in the Soviet press seem to favour the former thesis.
V.P.Lukin, head of the section in the Institute of the USA and Canada 
which deals with American strategy in the Pacific, commented on this 
question that "It would be oversimplistic to say that Japan is either a 
puppet or independent of the United States. The truth is in the middle 
somewhere. The strength of the links varies from topic to topic and 
situation to situation", but that "in specific terms Japan is less 
independent from the United States than the other allies". He added that 
over the question of military co-operation (in technology in particular) 
the first priority of the United States was to ’use' Japan.
Japanese military associations with China have received considerable 
attention in the Soviet press and were highlighted by the 1978 treaty 
coverage. However, even here where Soviet concerns are very real, there 
are strands of ideology which stress that the irresoluble contradictions 
between the Chinese and the Japanese will place limits on the extent of 
collaboration.
China and Japan remain as before, two rivals in the struggle 
for domination in Asia which is likely to intensify as China’s 
economic and military might increases and it exerts greater 
influence on the continent, and in particular in south east 
Asia. Each side considers the region to be its zone of
declared three non-nuclear principles but more importantly that it would be 
violating the non-proliferation treaty which Japan signed in 1970 and 
ratified in 1976. "Violation of the Constitution" is an argument seldom 
used seriously against the Japanese when nuclear matters are discussed. 
See, for example, Pravda 31 March 1978. Also "Japan Playing With Fire Over 
Nuclear Weapons" in Soviet News 4 April 1978, I.Ivkov, Japan : Heading For 
Militarisation Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1979.
influence and would be unlikely to make concessions 
there...although Peking hypocritically declares that it 
welcomes the build-up of Japanese military might it would take 
all the necessary steps to keep the armed forces of that 
country below a certain level, so that they do not become 
superior to the Chinese military machine80
Western observers tend not to appreciate the substance of Soviet 
concern over trends in Japanese force development, especially as there is 
for the most part no Chinese criticism of Japanese expansion. But the 
situations for the Soviet Union and China are very different. To take one 
important difference as an example of how the Soviets would see the 
problem, let us compare the populations of the respective stretches of 
coastal territory facing Japan : that of the Soviet Far East (an area of 
6,215,900 square kilometres) according to the Soviet 1979 census only 
totals 6,819,000 persons. The Chinese coastal provinces of Liaonung, Jilin 
and Heilongjang have a combined population in excess of 90 million, further 
south the provinces of Jiangsu, Fujion and Zhejang have a population of 
over 126 million.81
In an interview with the author in late 1984, a Soviet academic 
suggested that the situation vis-a-vis Japanese militarisation had reached 
new degrees of seriousness "not present five years ago’. He listed seven 
factors which he thought especially significant ; (1) the deployment of F- 
16's to Misawa airbase (2) the decision to fit cruise missiles to American 
ships in the north west Pacific (3) the Japanese government's decision to 
co-operate more fully with the United States on matters of military 
technology (4) the plans for a '1000 mile zone' which he viewed as ’if not
80I.Tamghinsky, ’Japan in the vice of contradictions’ in Far Eastern 
Affairs No.4 1980. pp.105-117. Quotation p.117.
81 State Statistical Bureau, People’:s Republic of China, Statistical 
Yearbook of China 1984 Economic Information and Agency, Hong Kong, 1984. 
p.84. See Appendix Two for further details on Soviet population figures 
for 1983-84.
feasible today then tomorrow’ (5) the de facto Japanese ability to blockade 
the straits around Japan to Soviet shipping (6) and realities of Japanese 
co-operation with Korea, the United States and NATO (7) the general mood of 
anti-Sovietism in Japan.82
That which is observable in the conduct of Soviet policy both at an 
operational and strategic level with regard to Japan has reflected the fear 
over the course of militarism. Soviet attention to the issue has taken the 
form of either direct attacks on Japanese initiatives or indirect 
approaches designed to limit the possibilities of Japanese action. The 
best recent illustration of this two-sided approach has been the Soviet 
call for discussions on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Far 
East.
The original Soviet collective security proposals advanced in 1969
have long been accepted as a dead letter but in his speech at Tashkent on
March 25, 1982 Brezhnev added new substance to the idea by expanding on a
reference he had made a year earlier on ’discussing mutual fears’ and
making the offer more direct
our proposal on CBMs in the Far East does not necessarily 
presuppose an immediate collective assembly of all that 
regions’ countries. It is fully possible to begin movement 
along the path on a bilateral basis - for example, between the 
Soviet Union and Japan. What is bad about that? Nothing!83
In subsequent statements it became obvious that some sort of
collective scheme was being floated but the real basis of Soviet hopes was
two bilateral agreements involving Japan and China.84 Officials from both
82Interview with V.Khlynov at IMEMO, Moscow. September 1984.
83CDSP Vol.XXXIV No.12 1982. p. 6.
84See, for an emphasis of the Japan approaches, L.I.Brezhnev, 
’Iaponskim pisateliam - avtoram obrashcheniia s prizivom protiv iadernoi 
voini’ (To the Japanese writers - authors of a letter protesting against 
nuclear war) in Kommunist No.4 March 1882. pp.20-21. He says, ’Apart from 
this the Soviet Union is prepared to conclude a special agreement with non­
the Soviet Union and Japan publicly stated that the lessons learned from 
the European experience of CBMs would be of use and the Japanese publicly 
endorsed the idea. However Tokyo subsequently changed its attitude, 
suggesting that the situation in East Asia was sufficiently different from 
Europe as to make the scheme impractical.
Andropov pursued the idea further and proposed that the Soviet Union 
hold talks with Japan over the deployment to the Far East of Soviet SS- 
20s.85 It is noteworthy that commenting on this proposal A.A. Gromyko 
specifically indicated that the missiles were being deployed to the Far 
Eastern theatre so openly because there was no agreement with Japan that 
could limit such a move.
As with the question of trade, over the issues of Japanese militarism 
it is fair to argue that there is a clear connection between the 
ideological rhetoric and the salience or centrality of the issue for the 
conduct of overall policy. High placed Soviet officials commenting 
publicly on Japan invariably seemed to include (and this is certainly the 
case by the late 1970s) a reference to Japanese revanchism in their 
speeches and perhaps this, as much as any other indicator, is a guide to 
the issue’s importance for the Soviets.
JAPANESE INTERNAL POLITICS
We stated in our opening section that any Soviet ideological 
evaluation of a state political system begins with an analysis of class 
interests. Other factors, which in a non-Marxist-Leninist estimate might 
be deemed of significance, such as ’values’, are only seen to play a role
nuclear states. We see no obstacle to opening these discussions with Japan 
based on the proposals made at the 26th congress of the CPSU for 
establishing CBMs in the Far East, or on the basis of some other scheme 
acceptable to both parties’.(p.21)
85FBIS USSR Daily report. 19 April 1983. p.1.
in the sense that class interests are viewed as constituting the ultimate
in values. Other variables which might be of importance in determining the
political mould of a state, are seen as merely a means to an end for the
ruling class of the state.
The Soviet analyses of the role the Japanese ruling classes have in
policy-making unanimously stress the decisive influence of the big business
groups. They maintain this influence either through the necessity to
secure overseas markets or through their capacity as the main weapons
manufacturers - as one Soviet writer expressed it, "one out of every seven
companies registered on the Tokyo stock exchange works for war'.
This is not to say that there is not friction between business and
government, or between both and the Prime Minister. That this does occur
is aptly demonstrated by the attacks on Prime Minister Miki over the
Lockheed scandal. Commenting on why Miki had to shelve some of his plans
to reorganise aspects of LDP policy, I.Kovalenko considered that
Finding himself at the helm of government but having 
practically no major faction to back him, Miki is forced to 
reckon with the Party bosses and big business. His "welfare 
policy" - the fight against inflation and economic recession, 
restriction of the growth of commodity prices, promulgation of 
anti-monopoly laws, and a promise to reorganise the electoral 
system and follow a policy of dialogue with the Opposition- 
has been shelved. Premier Miki has been forced to admit that 
"there are limits to the LDP concessions to the Opposition".
He has been reminded that he must adhere to the traditional 
conservative policy and faithfully serve big business86
Yet the Soviets saw the Lockheed affair as Miki"s chance to fight
back against those elements who opposed him. Miki used the information
that the Lockheed corporation had been bribing members of the Japanese
86I.I.Ivkov, (pseudonym of Kovalenko) "The Lockheed shadow over Japan" 
in New Times No.31 1976 pp.24-25. Quotation p.24. See also, S.Levchenko, 
"Pre-election scene" in New Times No.26 1977. pp.22-23. He suggests that 
due to an ailing economy the monopolies have been forced to take reductions 
in their "superprofits" and so have been reducing sharply their 
contributions to the LDP.
76
government and business community, including former Prime Minister Tanaka, 
as a means of organising support (both parliamentary and public) behind 
him.
Concerning the alignment of progressive forces in Japan the Soviet
view recognises the potential for the pacifist groups to limit the
expansion of "undesirable trends", due to both the scale and broad base of
these groups" support. Indeed they recognise that the wide, national
feeling of pacifism which exists in Japan sets the general limit for
militarism. However the placing of the JCP in the forefront of the action
against these "undesirable trends" is an ideological decision not without
its political complications. We have already seen how Tamghinsky has
dismissed the JSP as "slipping further right" and how he accused it of
refusing to co-operate with the JCP ; in contrast to his attack on the JSP
he subsequently lauded the efforts of the JCP.
In turn, in contrast to Tamghinsky"s assessment consider opinions
voiced by Kovalenko on the same subject
It must be pointed out that in the first place, in spite of the 
serious difficulties between the JCP and the JSP there is much 
in common in the provisions of their programmes which creates a 
basis for developing broader co-operation. The bulk of the JSP 
members are against US imperialism and Japanese monopoly 
capital, fights against the revival of Japanese militarism and 
demands that all US troops be withdrawn from Japanese 
territory...nevertheless the JCP and other progressive forces 
have failed to draw up a broad programme of united action 
against imperialism and reaction in defence of the vital 
interests of the people87
Implicit in this statement by Kovalenko is a criticism of JCP policy 
and at the same time a more optimistic appraisal of the merits of JSP 
policy. This puts him at odds with Tamghinsky. Though, obviously for 
reasons of politics, Kovalenko fails to make his criticism more than
871.Kovalenko, "The struggle of the JCP for democratic reforms" in Far 
Eastern Affairs No.2 1980. pp.52-71. Quotation p. 62.
for detailing JCP success in the 1979 elections - makes no mention of JCP
activity after 1975. The reason for this omission is that post - 1975 JCP
relations with the CPSU became exceptionally acrimonious. That gulf had
not been significantly narrowed by 1980, at the time when Kovalenko was
writing, nor has it been ameliorated since.
To take the above points (salience of big business groups, divisions
in Japanese politics, role of the JCP) can we say that these have had any
role in Soviet policy? Have the Soviets sought to exploit these divisions
or sought to influence course of events in Japanese politics in their
favour? Here, unfortunately we have to concede that we are dealing with
imponderables - in most cases it is only the Soviets who can provide
answers. There is evidence, from the Soviet defector Levchenko who was
based at the Tokyo embassy, that there were by his estimate 200 Soviet
agents in Japan (mostly defined under that unsatisfactory heading of
’agents of influence’). Levchenko’s objective via them was
to create a pro-Soviet lobby among prominent Japanese 
politicians (through penetration of the Liberal Democratic and 
Social Democratic parties) leading to closer economic and 
political ties between the Soviet Union and Japan and the 
creation of a political monopoly in the Japanese parliament.
The Japanese government likewise was to be penetrated through 
the use of high ranking agents of influence, business leaders 
and mass media88
Even if we assume that any grouping which could legitimately be 
labelled a 'pro-Soviet lobby' had emerged in Japanese politics it would be 
safe to say that, outside individual business deals where it was motivated 
as much by self-interest as Soviet interest, it has not been an effective 
’pro-Soviet lobby’. If the Soviets have seriously tried to exploit 
divisions which they believe exist in Japanese politics then the results of
88See, R.Godson, R.Schultz, Dezinformatsia Pergamon, New York,1984. 
Quotation p.178. For a far longer description of Levchenko’s activities in 
Japan see, J.Barron KGB Today Hodder and Stoughton, London,1984.
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their efforts are not evident. Despite Soviet support for the JCP it is a 
party unlikely to achieve government or even coalition status and 
consequently the Soviets have never risked a permanent souring of relations 
with the LDP or the Socialists over Soviet connections with the JCP, or 
over the role of the JCP in Japanese politics. In several speeches, and 
during visits to Japan, the Soviets have made a point of courting the 
Socialist (JSP) but the results have been variable. Soviet moves at 
intervening in Japanese politics have not succeeded in changing the general 
climate of suspicion of them, at best what can be said is that the Soviets 
have influenced the outcomes of single events. It has been suggested that 
the Soviet "agents’ or lobby in Japan managed to get Belenko’s Mig-25 
returned faster than might otherwise have been the case.89 The Japanese 
circumvention of American sanctions over Afghanistan might arguably be 
another case where the influences of a ’pro-Soviet lobby’ within the 
business community might have played some role.
If there is one area where the Soviet ideological vision can be seen
89Lt. Belenko defected with his Mig-25 jet in 1976. The Soviets 
demanded the aircraft’s immediate return. However it was not handed back 
until American and Japanese experts had had the opportunity to examine it. 
The choice here of the term "lobby" is one which the author is somewhat 
unhappy with. It is an unsatisfactory term in itself and in a political 
context it is always difficult to gauge the extent of any such group, its 
influence or its motivations. In the examples of the Mig-25 and Afghanistan 
incidents the interested parties may have been constituted by different 
individuals in each case. The Afghanistan affair and sanctions clearly has 
more of a business aspect to it. The members of any "lobby" might 
presumably would be mainly comprised of those Japanese "associated" with 
Soviets, either indirectly through membership of organisations such as the 
USSR-Japan Friendship Society to those directly involved with Soviets such 
as Levchenko (e.g. socialist politician Shigeru Ito, ex-Minister Hirohide 
Ishiden, Takuji Yamane, editor in chief of the newspaper Sankei), and those 
who thought Japan had anything particular to gain from placating the 
Soviets. It would be overstating the case however, to suggest that the 
"lobby" is a fixed feature of Japanese politics or that any members 
are/were prepared to "go into bat" for the Soviet side on any or all 
occasions. Motivations sure far more complex and the association of any such 
group relatively loose. Qualifying influence with any certainty is also an 
equally elusive objective. See, L.Bittman, The KGB and Soviet 
Disinformation Pergamon, London, 1985. pp.21, 78.
to have application to Soviet relations in an internal Japanese context, 
this could be the case of Soviet dealings with the large business groups in 
Japan. In their trade relations with the Japanese the Soviets have only 
dealt with the large groups of Japanese firms : this could (economically) 
be explained by the fact that only the large companies were capable of 
providing the goods, on the scale and at the price, that the Soviets 
wanted. We could speculate that (politically) given the ideological 
supposition that the big business groups were a main source of influence in 
Japanese policy-making, it makes sense to direct efforts at trade, or at 
creating a pro-Soviet lobby in Japan, through those groups perhaps at the 
expense of any gains that might have been forthcoming from trading with 
smaller companies.
The Soviet interpretation of the worsening condition of the working 
class in Japan is probably the closest to a textbook evaluation of such as 
we would expect from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint. The evidence used to 
substantiate Soviet interpretations revolves around the figures showing the 
increasing number of unemployed, the greater frequency of industrial 
disputes and the rising trends in prices. Much as with the Soviet 
estimation of Japanese overseas development aid, the final picture depends 
on how we wish to compare the statistics. Compared to Japanese 
circumstances of earlier years, the 1970s were certainly not as dynamic. 
But this does not of itself make them 'bad* years, compared to other 
advanced industrial nations Japan fared particularly well overall. 
Japanese government figures for 1971-79 show a tripling of private 
consumption expenditure, an increase in real income by 2.4 times, and an 
increase in disposable income by 2.2 times. Statistics bear out the case 
that 1973-74 and 1975-76 were years in which unemployment rose 
exceptionally fast - from 730,000 in 1972 to 1,117,000 in 1979. This
represents an increase of 53% but taken in the context of total population, 
a figure of 1,117,000 unemployed out of a population of 116 million was not 
disastrous.90 (In the United Kingdom during the same time frame 
unemployment rose to 2. 5 times the Japanese level in a population only half 
the size of Japan's). When compared to the performance of Western 
economies in the same period, the outstanding durability of the Japanese 
economy speaks for itself.
The real significance of the Soviet point on the increase in 
frequency of Japanese labour disputes is similarly open to qualification. 
The highpoint was 1974 when they numbered 10,462. The largest number of 
participants involved in disputes was recorded in 1976 at 17,178,000. But 
these years of the middle 1970s proved to be a turning point as both 
figures have since declined dramatically, with the actual number of 
participants striking being very much less than that involved in disputes, 
i.e. disputes have increasingly been settled without recourse to strike 
action.
R.Buckley, Professor of International relations at the International 
University of Japan, is of the view that Japanese industrial relations have 
been less antagonistic than Western counterparts for two basic reasons : 
(a) the rights which the Unions secured, and (b) the fact that 'some of the 
harsher medicine can be handed out to subcontracting firms and part-timers 
who are not unionised'.91
The positions of unions are secure. Most large corporations possess 
an enterprise union which is empowered to negotiate for everybody. In 
general, Buckley is of the view
90See, The Oriental Economist, Yearbook of Japan 1980/81 pp.164-165, 
172-175.
91R.Buckley, Japan Today Cambridge University Press } 1985. Quotation 
p.119.
it should not be taken to imply that Unions in Japan are 
puppets of management, ...Unions, thanks to the encouragement 
of SCAP’s labour division, gained immense power during the 
occupation that neither the companies nor successive 
conservative governments have been in a position to alter 
substantially... Unionisation is part of the fabric of larger 
Japanese companies...the closed shop r u l e s . 9 2
In conversations with the author, V.Khlynov, now a resident analyst 
at IMEMO, posited that given their problems - the creeping collapse of the 
system that has served so well in the past - it was uncertain what would 
develop in Japan in the future. The rise of worker participation was one 
speculated option. Class distinction, he said, was very much a fact of 
life in Japan. Referring to frequent Japanese censuses Khlynov stated that 
although 90% of respondents had claimed to be "middle class’ there were 
many categories of ’middle class’ and that the majority of respondents were 
in fact in the lower echelons of the ’middle class’ bracket. Japanese 
workers were undoubtedly worse-off, but he was willing to speculate that 
perhaps the Japanese would work something out as ’they are a flexible 
people’.
The claims made by Khlynov with regard to this oft quoted ,,90%" are 
in a general sense probably true. This figure which has been repeated in 
Japanese censuses over many years is in dispute in the West also, as 
failing to represent the true distinctions which exist in Japanese society. 
Japan, its image apart, is still a nation of small businesses. The view of 
the economy as booming and successful is no more than one way of viewing a 
nation - there are always distinctions to be found beneath the surface. An 
example of this is given by Buckley who commenting on the image of the 
Japanese worker, suggests that it tends to be drawn from our image of the 
large corporation whereas the reality for the larger number of workers 
employed in the smaller businesses can be very different.
92Ibid.
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blue collar workers, those employed in subsidiary firms and the 
temporary staff get a rawer deal. These categories gain fewer 
benefits from their employer and are regarded as no more than 
adjuncts to the company for whom they work. Wages in smaller 
companies are lower, working conditions are less pleasant and 
safe, bonuses can be minimal and job security non-existent93
Social circumstances of Japanese present a mixed picture, with steady
improvements being made in areas previously held to be deficient. While
the stress in Japan has been placed on economic growth, little thought had
really been given to the social consequences of that growth, and the
effects of that became transparent in the 1960s. Social welfare at a level
commensurate with that in European nations was lacking throughout the 1960s
and did not start to make inroads until well into the 1970s but has made
great headway since. In some areas, such as health and education the
Japanese are world leaders.
The estimates, of which Khlynov's is a typical example, of the
effects of the structural reformation of the Japanese economy in the 1970s
and early 1980s and of the situation of the Japanese workforce are clearly
at odds with the typical Western assessment of the Japanese economy. Even
the British New Left Review wrote that while Japan has had problems from
structural recession things are far from bad
Although the 1973-75 recession forced a slow down in Japan's 
growth it has still managed to stay ahead of its main 
competitors. Japan's GNP now surpasses that of the USSR, while 
its per capita GNP is roughly equal to that of the US 
(depending on fluctuating exchange rates) and about 15 per cent 
higher than that of the EEC. Real GDP growth over the decade
1970-79 was 6 per cent per annum, nearly double the OECD 
average of 3.4 per cent and that of its chief competitor, West 
Germany (3.2 per cent). Furthermore, Japan is still much more 
agile than the other leading OECD countries at industrial 
reconversion and is also ahead in several areas of technology.
In addition, Japan enjoyed for a time a very large current 
account surplus ($25 billion in 1978) that was greater than all 
of the OECD countries combined...Japan is, in general terms 
well positioned to take advantage of the next phase of economic
93R.Buckley, o p .cit. p.86
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development in East Asia.94
And even if somewhat overenthusiastic, Vogel still sums-up the
general Western view of Japan when he writes that
At present, in political and cultural influence and even in 
gross national product, Japan is not the number one power in 
the world... Yet in the effectiveness of its present-day 
institutions in coping with the current problems of the post­
industrial era Japan is number one. Considering its limited 
space and natural resources and its crowding, Japan’s 
achievements in economic productivity, educational standards, 
health, and control of crime are in a class by themselves95
94J.Halliday, 'Capitalism and Socialism in East Asia' in New Left 
Review No.124 November-December 1980. pp.3-24. Quotation pp.13-14.
95E.F.Vogel, Japan as Number One Harvard University Press, 1979. 
Quotation p.22.
SOVIET - JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS
It is our intention in this part of the work to review the question 
of Soviet-Japanese economic relations. Soviet leaders have constantly 
emphasised that good trade relations between countries form the basis for 
the further expansion of relations. In the particular case of relations 
with Japan, both sides have claimed satisfaction with the state of economic 
ties throughout the 1970's but have subsequently lamented the deterioration 
of those favourable conditions. During the decade of growing trade 
relations the general state of overall relations between the two nations 
was, by common agreement, far from satisfactory. Japanese commentators 
almost uniformly refer to past circumstances as 'bad'. Soviet counterparts 
tend overall to be less damning but still contend that during these years 
there was 'room for greater development' in the scope of association 
between Japan and the Soviet Union. In this situation of uneasy diplomatic 
accommodation we should not be surprised to find, as was claimed, trade 
continuing apace : the depoliticisation of trade is not uncommon in 
international affairs.
Soviet pronouncements apart, it is not inevitable that a good trading 
partnership equates with good relations. Certainly there is room to doubt 
the validity of the often hyperbolic claims made with regard to both the 
content and prospects of Soviet - Japanese economic association given the 
static nature of other facets of relations and positively hostile content 
of the military aspects as evaluated by Western and Japanese commentators.
The mainframe of Soviet - Japanese economic relations involves the 
economic development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Siberia by the 
mid-1970's and more so by the turn of the 1980's was accounting for a very 
large share of the range of resources required by the Soviet economy.
PART II
Western Siberia by the present day has become the primary energy producing
region of the Soviet Union, producing more than half of the country's fuel
requirements. Consequently, the development of the region was a first
priority for the Soviet leadership. The presumed advantage for Japan in
helping to develop Siberia lay in its proximity, and consequent cost
advantage. Almost without exception Western economic observers
characterise Soviet - Japanese trade structures as 'complementary'-
reducing this to an equation of Japanese technology traded for Soviet
mineral resources.
Trade collaboration began in the late 1950's. Spandaryan, the Soviet
trade representative in Japan for many years, suggests that they have been
'developing dynamically since December 1957...'.1 Jain contends that this
situation came about at that time due to a Soviet search for new markets to
replace the Chinese, and so the Soviet approach to Japan changed from a
denunciation of Japan as an appendage of the American economic system to
one that stressed the complementary nature of the economies and the
proximity of a 'natural trading partner'.2
The 'proximity' argument, as we shall term it, returns again and
again as an explanation for Soviet - Japanese trade. Even in 1983, when
trade levels were falling, a leading Japanese economist and Director of the
Japan-USSR trade association could still write :
Japan and the Soviet Union are two neighbouring countries. 
Despite their different socio-economic systems, the 
geographical proximity alone is conducive to the development of 
close economic and trade relations between them. Moreover, the 
structure of trade activities and the nature of trade 
commodities between the two continue to be mutually 
supplementary and beneficial...This trading pattern, which will
IV.Spandaryan, 'Soviet-Japanese Trade Relations' in Far Eastern 
Affairs No.4 1980. pp.88-94. Quotation p.88.
2R.Jain, The USSR and Japan 1945-80 Harvester Press, Brighton, UK.
1981.
not change drastically through the 1980's basically fits the 
trade structures and economic needs of both countries3
Although the existence of a trade agreement is not necessarily a
prerequisite for trade, since 1966 trade between the two nations has been
regulated by five year agreements the first of which covered the period
1966-70. Until the middle 1970's the value of trade doubled almost every
five years. In 1961-65 : 1,300 million roubles ; 1966-70 - 2,600 million ;
1971-76 - 6,100 million roubles.4 Although trading has been carried-out
within the framework of these plans since the middle 1960's, the Soviets
have continually lobbied for a long term trade agreement of 10-15 years
duration. The Japanese for their part have consistently refused, and so
remain according to Spandaryan, the only major developed capitalist country
which has no long term economic co-operation agreement with the Soviet
Union. It would be legitimate to ask why this should be so. We shall
return to this question in the second part of this section.
The basic medium of Soviet - Japanese dealing has been trade via a
'compensation agreement', a system favoured by Brezhnev himself, and
utilised in dealings with other Western nations. Under a compensation
agreement the Western partner contracts to supply machinery or equipment to
the Soviet Union on usually long term deferred low interest credit. The
Soviets then repay the original loan plus interest in the form of finished
goods or raw materials.
The commodities covered by these agreements can principally be
classified as energy equipment and technology and lumber products, but
3K.0gawa, 'Japanese - Soviet Economic Relations : Present Status and 
Future Prospects' in Journal of North East Asian Studies Vol. II No.l March 
1983 pp.3-15. Quotation p.5.
4V.Spandaryan, 'A New Development in Soviet - Japanese Trade' in 
Foreign Trade of the USSR. Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moscow> 1977. No. 12 
pp.14-19. See p.14.
include a wide range of products varying from petroleum industry heavy 
equipment, timber, chemicals, mineral ores, and agricultural machinery at 
one end of the scale to clocks, radios, calculators, whale meat, 
handicrafts and 'products of Tibetan medicine' at the other. The Soviets 
export a more diverse range than they import, the balance (in terms of 
categories) being roughly 78-61 in their favour.5 However these latter 
commodities (clocks, radios, handicrafts etc) constitute only a very small 
percentage of both volume and value of overall trade. The significant 
orientation of trade is towards energy, whether petroleum, gas or coal. 
Japan is the largest market for Soviet timber and coal exports and in 1979, 
for example, it is estimated that some 45% of total Japanese exports to the 
Soviet Union were energy related. Among the many projects in which Japan 
is involved, the three most important are the exploitation of Yakutian 
natural gas, the extraction of South Yakutian coal and the Sakhalin 
offshore oil and gas project, and these will be briefly described.
For Yakutian natural gas the first contracts were signed in 1975 in a 
tripartite agreement between the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States. 
It was agreed then that production would not start until the end of 
exploration whereupon the gas discovered would be divided three ways at 
market prices. Japanese firms and the government advanced an initial $25 
million. The plan for development also included the construction of a 
pipeline to the new port of Olga on the Pacific, and of new facilities at 
the port site. Initial estimates for overall development placed the cost 
at $3.4 billion. Completion of the project would have involved the 
construction of more than 1700 miles of pipeline across a mountain range 
and otherwise rough terrain in appalling climatic conditions. (It is not
5See, 'Agreement on the Exchange of Goods and Payments Between the 
USSR and Japan From The Period 1981-1985' in Foreign Trade of the USSR 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moscow,No.11 1981 pp.52-54.
unusual for temperature in mid-winter in Yakutia to reach - 63*C.). In 
order to minimise the problems the Soviets suggested in 1978 constructing a 
pipeline to Magadan but had reverted back to the Olga location by 1980. 
The Japanese were, not surprisingly rather hesitant about committing 
capital to such an undertaking and the issue of who should bear the 
majority of the costs is still under negotiation.6
Known substantial reserves of coal in South Yakutia led to Japanese 
involvement in 1974 to provide $450 million in credit for its mining that 
would be repaid in coal exports beginning in 1983, resulting in Japan 
receiving 85 million tons of coking coal by the year 2000. The Japanese 
loaned another $42.5 million to the project in 1980. The general agreement 
also allows for the provision of one million tons of coal from the Kuznetsk 
basin annually between 1979-1999. Involved in the Yakutian project has 
been the construction of the 400 kilometre 'little BAM' (Baikal - Amur 
Mainline) railroad which joins the coal fields at Neriungri' with the new 
BAM line. A number of Japanese companies have been involved in the project 
selling a variety of mining equipment ; coal rotors, excavation machinery, 
transport vehicles and even electric locomotives. The full-scale 
development of the coal fields in Eastern Siberia is regarded as a 
priority by the Soviets and by 1982 50% of all investment in the BAM zone 
had gone into the South Yakutia territorial production complex,7 and the 
coking coal project has come to be regarded as the centre-piece of Japanese
6US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 'Japanese - Soviet 
Energy Relations' in Technology and Soviet Energy Availability Washington 
D.C., 1982. pp. 325-348.
7A 'territorial production complex' (TPK) is a form of regional 
economic organisation whereby interrelated and independent activities are 
located together in a specific territory. Various different enterprises 
jointly utilise the infrastructure, available labour pool, raw materials 
etc. The South Yakutia complex is the latest to be so designated.
involvement in Siberia.8
The Sakhalin Oil development Corporation (SODECO) is responsible for 
the exploration of oil off the continental shelf, begun in 1975 with $100 
million of Japanese credit it serves as a good example of co-operation 
between the two nations. In return for their investment the Japanese will 
receive for a period of ten years 50% of the oil and gas discovered at a 
discount price. Oil has already been found north east of Sakhalin in the 
Sea of Okhotsk. The Chaivo field deposit has reserves estimated at 630 
million barrels of crude oil, 140.5 billion cubic metres of gas and 142 
billion barrels of condensate. Further exploratory drilling has been 
undertaken in the Odoptu More field and there sure plans to explore in the 
Tatar Strait.
The Soviets have plans to build a special facility on Sakhalin to 
construct ice-resistant equipment for drilling.9 But it is far from 
certain when the first deliveries will begin, as the construction of a 
transport infrastructure will require further substantial outlays of 
capital.
Both parties also signed a scientific - technical agreement in 1973 
and the Soviets in particular pushed for a bilateral agreement on Atomic 
energy co-operation which was eventually signed in 1977. Under the terms 
of the agreement both parties undertook to send survey teams to each 
others’ countries and exchange researchers on power reactors. The Soviet 
Union would also like to sell enriched uranium to the Japanese in return
8Figure quoted from M.Guskin, N.Singur 'Iuzhno - Iakutskii TPK' in 
Planovoe Khoziaistvo No.1 1983 in L.Dienes, 'The Development of Siberia : 
regional priorities and economic strategy' Paper presented at Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique colloquium on La Siberie : 
Colonisation. Développement et Perspectives 1582-1982 Mai 1983 Paris, p.14
9See, "Big Boost to Offshore Oil Search" in Petroleum Economist April
1984. pp.145-147.
for Japanese equipment to be used in Soviet nuclear power facilities.10
Given the scope of negotiations, trade agreements often were made 
through semi-official Japanese government agencies. These for the most 
part are the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations), the Joint 
Soviet - Japanese Economic Committee (established 1965), Japanese Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, Japan Export - Import Bank and the Japan 
Association for Trade with Socialist Countries. The Soviets have 
effectively dealt only with major Japanese corporations, (by 1980 over 
twenty major Japanese firms had offices in Moscow); however, in recent 
years the Soviets have begun to propose smaller scale collaboration 
projects 'in which there are no compensation or financial problems and in 
which participation by medium and smaller businesses is feasible - for 
example, the production of aluminium from nephaline, lumber mills for 
making fuel (briquettes) from scrap lumber (sic), mobile facilities for 
processing scrap lumber into briquettes, and secondary raw material 
processing (e.g. the processing of cable scrap or used tirecord)'.11
The one exception to the pattern followed h'itherto of trading with 
major corporations is to be found in coastal trading. This is regional or 
local trade conducted, in this case, basically between the Maritime 
province and the Japanese main island of Hokkaido. The Soviet trade 
organisation 'Dalintorg' based in Nakhodka is the main agent on the Soviet 
side. The actual scale of trading is minimal ; its total value rose from 
$66.35 million in 1977 to $122.91 in 1981. It encompasses small scale 
agreements for the trade in timber, small machine parts and consumer- 
oriented goods. The Japanese mostly import timber and petrol, oil and
10See, USSR and the Third World 1 September - 15 December 1977. p.101.
13-K.Suzuki, K.Yokowo, ’Japan's Trade Mission to Moscow, February 1983 
: What Did it Accomplish?' in Japanese Economic Studies Fall 1983 Vol. XII 
No.l pp.54-70. Quotation pp.59-60.
lubricants and (sea) foods, they export mainly clothes and textiles as well
as a wide range of smaller products such as chemicals, paints, polyvinyl
sheets, shoes and wire t y r e s .12 In the opinion of one Soviet writer
coastal trade is particularly significant in that it meets 
consumer demands. A part of the funds received from coastal 
trade is channelled to meet the needs of those local industries 
which produce for export...coastal trade provides opportunities 
primarily for small enterprises which suffer the most from 
competition from the big firms. It is no exaggeration that 
many small businesses and co-operatives would be crushed by 
monopolies without the stable market for goods produced by 
coastal trade and this would mean unemployment and loss of 
substance for many working people13
By 1976 this trade was being transacted involving over 100 small and medium
sized Japanese companies and was the largest growth area in the sphere of
economic relations.
Aside from Siberia's resource significance, the region is also of
importance to Japan as the shortest transit route for goods to European
markets. In order to encourage the Japanese to utilise this service the
Soviets have constantly quoted lower transport rates than the alternative
water route charges. The Trans Siberian Container Service (TSCS) is the
world's longest land transport route. The Soviets and Japanese signed
their first agreement on containerised traffic in 1970 but arrangements
over the unloading and carrying were rather ad hoc and it was not until
1971 that an actual container freighter unloaded in a Soviet port. The new
port of Vostochnii is the principal container centre in the Maritime
province. Both partners operate specifically designed and built container
ships and all the profits from the freight carriage are 'pooled and then
divided in proportion to the time spent on the line by the ships of each
12See, Japan-Soviet Trade Association, Nisso Boeki Handobukku (Japan- 
Soviet Trade Handbook) Tokyo,1983. p.243.
13V.Alexandrov, 'Siberia and the Far East in Soviet - Japanese 
Economic Relations' in Far Eastern Affairs No. 2 1982 pp.21-32. Quotation 
p. 29.
side'.14 Table One illustrates the volume of containerised freight traffic 
carried on the trans-Siberian. From the figures it can be seen that growth 
in this trade has been fairly constant throughout the 1970s, a slight 
decline 1977-79, and a sharp increase in 1982. But Tavrovsky has stated 
that this level declined sharply in 1983.15 Japanese exports (Westbound) 
have always been at least two or three times the volume of imports carried 
by the line. Though seemingly impressive figures, we shall show that only 
a very small proportion of Japanese trade is carried by the trans-Siberian.
Japanese trade with the Soviets appears of immense value, but to 
gauge its true significance we should compare it to trade with major 
Western trading partners of the Soviets. Table Two provides a comparison 
of total trade values between Japan, West Germany and Finland. Tables 
Three and Four provide further comparative information on Soviet - Japanese 
trade.
The main emphasis of Siberian development has been on energy (oil, 
coal, natural gas) extraction. By 1975 the Soviets were involved with five 
major Western nations in natural gas projects alone. By that date Japan 
(in consort with the United States) had supplied $50 million in credit for 
such projects - yet Italy had supplied $190 million, France $250 million 
and West Germany $1,500 million. At that stage it was estimated that by 
1981-85 the value of their respective contracts would be worth $2,200, 
$1,462 and $5,700 million respectively.16 In fact the values of the 
contracts have increased since, while the projected Japanese figure ($5,000 
million) has not materialised due to delayed negotiations and changes of
14Yu.Tavrovsky, 'The Millionth Container’ in New Times Moscow. No.40 
1982 pp.25-26. Quotation p. 25.
isIbid.
16Figures quoted from R.S.Mathieson, Japan’s Role in Soviet Economic 
Growth Praeger New York 1979. pp.108-109.
Japanese Containerised Shipments on the Trans-Siberian 1971-81
TABLE 1
92a
Year Total Westbound Eastbound
1971 2,314 1,823 491
1972 12,458 9,601 2,957
1973 28,289 18,959 9,330
1974 51,500 34,400 17,100
1975 62, 600 50,100 12,500
1976 79,861 57,684 22,177
1977 - - -
1978 73,723 52,832 20,891
1979 81,669 56,216 25,453
1980 97,156 74,030 23,126
1981 Jan-Jul 63,563 51,113 12,450
(TEUs, 20-foot units)
Source : J.L.Scherer (ed.), USSR Facts and Figures Annual Academic 
International Press, Florida, 1982. p.327.
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF SOVIET TRADE WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
FINLAND AND JAPAN 
(Values in millions of roubles)
92b
Total
Year Country Trade Exports Imports
1971 Federal Republic of Germany 666 6 254 7 411 9
Finland 569 1 322 8 246 3
Japan 733 6 377 4 356 2
1972 Federal Republic of Germany 827 3 255 9 571 4
F inland 601 7 297 6 304 1
Japan 815 6 381 7 433 9
1973 Federal Republic of Germany 1 ,210 2 453 8 756 4
Finland 777 4 415 1 362 3
Japan 994 4 622 0 372 4
1974 Federal Republic of Germany 2 208 7 834 5 1,374 2
Finland 1 539 7 937 6 602 1
Japan 1 683 2 905 7 777 5
1975 Federal Republic of Germany 3 008 8 1 ,069 2 1,939 6
Finland 1 979 1 990 3 988 8
Japan 2 120 5 748 4 1,372 1
1977 Federal Republic of Germany 2 976 3 1,222 7 1,744 6
Finland 2 173 5 1 ,050 2 1,123 3
Japan 2 297 8 853 4 1,444 4
1978 Federal Republic of Germany 3 304 2 1 ,362 6 1,941 6
Finland 2 868 2 1 ,003 8 1,864 4
Japan 2 319 8 736 1 1,583 7
1979 Federal Republic of Germany 4 246 6 2 ,005 9 2,240 7
Finland 2 606 5 1 ,468 7 1,137 8
Japan 2 597 7 944 4 1,653 5
1980 Federal Republic of Germany 5 780 0 2 ,859 4 2,920 6
Finland 3 888 5 2 ,023 4 1,865 1
Japan 2 722 8 950 2 1,772 6
1981 Federal Republic of Germany 6 009 3 3 ,387 9 2,621 4
Finland 4 189 3 2 ,524 4 1,664 9
Japan 3 029 5 816 8 2,212 7
1982 Federal Republic of Germany 6 629 7 3 ,796 6 2,833 1
Finland 5 193 5 2 ,395 7 2,797 8
Japan 3 682 4 756 6 2,925 8
1983 Federal Republic of Germany 7 022 0 3 ,772 8 3,249 2
Finland 5 173 3 2 ,483 3 2,690 0
Japan 3 004 0 828 5 - 2,175 5
Source: Vneshniaia Torgovlia. SSSR (Foreign Trade of the USSR)
Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moscow.
Note: By 1982 both Italy and France had surpassed Japan in terms of the 
value of total trade. In 1982 their values stood at 4,086,1 
and 3,558,6 million roubles respectively. By 1983 these had 
risen to 4,434,7 and 4,149,9 respectively.
TABLE 3
SOVIET TRADE WITH JAPAN AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 
(Millions of roubles)
Year
Total
Trade
Japanese
Trade
%
of Total
1971 23,657,5 733,6 3.09
1972 26,037,4 815,6 3.13
1973 39,572,2 1,683,2 4.25
1976 56,755,0 2,120,5 3.73
1977 63,353,3 2,297,8 3.63
1978 70,224,1 2,319,8 3.30
1979 80,290,3 2,597,9 3.23
1980 94,010,0 2,722,8 2.89
1981 109,739,2 3,029,5 2.76
1982 119,576,1 3,682,4 2.66
1983 127,476,0 3,004,0 2.35
Source: Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR. Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Moscow.
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
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TABLE 4
SOVIET TRADE WITH JAPAN AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TRADE WITH CAPITALIST BLOC
Total
Trade
%
Exports
%
Imports
%
14.43 14.76 13.70
13.88 15.64 12.61
11.92 16.58 8.11
13.57 14.47 12.66
11.36 9.56 12.67
12.25 9.68 14.56
11.79 8.46 14.43
10.09 7.55 12.48
8.62 5.99 11.27
8.56 4.73 12.21
9.75 4.01 15.48
7.82 - -
Vneshniaia Torgovlia S S S R , 
Trade, Moscow.
Ministry of Foreign
mind on the South Yakutia development. West German imports of natural gas, 
for example, are far in excess of Japanese figures ; in 1980 these stood at 
10,000 cubic metres or 18% of West German requirements and all imports of 
gas to Italy, Finland, Austria and France are estimated to rise 
dramatically by the 1990s in return for greater investment by these 
countries in Siberian development projects.17
There are two areas where Japanese trade involvement differs 
significantly from that of Western nations ; one is the involvement in 
forestry development, the other the sale of large quantities of steel pipe. 
Since the early 1970s Japan constantly supplied credit to forestry projects 
in Siberia, either for timber, wood pulp or chip and timber mill 
construction. Investment in these schemes can be substantial (but divided 
over long term) - the second forestry resources contract (July 1974) was 
worth $500 million, for the third (March 1981) which covered 1981-86 the 
Japanese agreed to loan $1 billion. The European nations are not involved 
at a scale comparable with Japan in these projects.
The Soviet Union ranked in 1981 as the third highest importer of 
Japanese steel (after the United States and China). This is due solely to 
the sale of large quantities of steel pipe by Japan to the Soviets. The 
export of these 'pipes, tubes and fittings' by Japan in 1975-79 reportedly 
constituted between 34 to 53% of all trade in these goods between the 
European nations, Japan and the United States and the CMEA nations (almost 
wholly to the Soviets).18
17"USSR Energy Targets 3 - Gas” in Soviet Analyst Vol.10 No. 14 
July/August 1981.
18US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, o p . cit. p . 330.
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What is the Soviet view of foreign trade ? The early Bolshevik
leaders opted for the goal of economic self-sufficiency as necessary for
the independence and protection of the new Soviet state. Serious
dependence on any capitalist state was viewed as leaving the Soviets open
to pressure and subversion. That basic line has not changed.
V.Gruzinov, a Soviet writer on foreign trade has the following to say on
various aspects of trade :
Foreign trade is trade between countries. Its specific 
features, the way it develops, and its role in the economy are 
determined by the mode of production, as is the case with any 
other branch of the economy. ...(in capitalist countries) 
foreign trade does not accord with the interests and needs of 
the nation. Maximum profit, not the needs of the economy, is 
its driving force...under socialism the role of foreign trade 
is quite different. It serves as a means for utilising the 
advantages of the international division of labour particularly 
the international socialist division of labour, in the 
interests of strengthening the socialist system. But this is 
not its only distinctive feature. It also stimulates the 
intensification of production and helps to improve its 
technical level...Throughout the entire existence of the Soviet 
state, foreign trade was and is an important factor in the 
growth of our country’s economic potential. Its role in this 
respect has been guaranteed by the planned management of both 
the state monopoly of foreign trade and the related monopoly 
over foreign exchange, which on the one hand, have effectively 
protected socialist production from the chaos of the world 
capitalist market and, on the other hand, have enabled the 
state to concentrate its material resources on solving critical 
problems arising at different stages in the process of building 
socialism19
A contrary view which became prevalent in the West in the early 
1970s, can be typified by the writings of American economist M.Goldman in a 
seminal article on the subject of Soviet economic autarky.
Goldman attacks the rhetoric of the Soviet position on autarky 
stating that in reality autarky no longer exists, and further, he argues 
that the continuous erosion of autarky is a process which the Soviets can
SECTION II
19V.Gruzinov, The USSR’s Management of Foreign Trade Sharpe Inc. New 
York, 1979. pp.10-15.
do little to change. In the latter half of his paper Goldman asserts the
validity of the argument associated with the assumption of the decline of
autarky i.e. that the West has been endowed with a politically effective
trade weapon against the Soviets, as Soviet dependence on Western-
provided goods can be used as ’leverage’ to extract concessions.
For decades their economists boasted that the Soviet Union with 
its insular economy was immune to capitalist recessions...But.. 
whether they realise it or not, Soviet trade authorities are 
playing by the rules of the world trading system. They may 
have backed into such a position inadvertently, but there is 
clear evidence that the Soviets have had to alter their 
preferred way of conducting foreign economic affairs...(Soviet 
officials) are involving the Soviet economy in sin ever growing 
entanglement with the capitalist world...20
Goldman argues that this phenomenon has been encountered before in 
the 1920s and 1930s but was subsequently curtailed by Stalin. But the 
phenomenon this time is ’qualitatively different’. Now the Soviets are 
particularly dependent on petroleum exports, and on the importation of the 
latest technology for the exploration, drilling and pumping associated with 
petroleum exploitation. The cost to the Soviets of severing the ties which 
they have with the West increases as this process continues, according to 
Goldman, and thus implicitly any severance becomes less likely.
As alluded to above,these comments represent a view prevalent in the 
West, but it was not a view confined to political commentators alone, as it 
was also propounded by Western governments - in varying degrees - Goldman 
here is cited merely as one of the most articulate spokesmen of this 
general group.
The most strident advocate of these theses was clearly the United 
States. American hopes were enshrined in the Soviet - American trade 
agreement of 1972 which made provision for the Soviets to place
20M.Goldman, ’Will the Soviet Union be an Autarky in 1984?’ in 
International Security Vol.3 No.4 Spring 1979. pp.18-20.
’substantial orders in the United States for machinery, plant and 
equipment, agricultural products, industrial products and consumer 
goods...’ (Article 2, para.4 of the agreement). This agreement was 
backed-up by further accords on trade such as Nixon’s ten year agreement on 
economic and technical co-operation. The United States then proceeded to 
try to extract concessions from the Soviets in the misguided belief that 
they could utilise trade (especially grain sales) as a secure lever with 
which to pressure the Soviets. The most blatant attempt came in 1974 when 
Congress via the Jackson amendment attempted to directly link the granting 
of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status in trading for the Soviet Union to 
gaining an increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. As a 
result of American pressure the Soviets abrogated the 1972 agreement and 
turned inwards to expanding the co-operation between CMEA members in 1975.
The West Germans too used trade with the Soviets for political 
concessions during the years of Ostpolitik. In direct dealing with the 
Soviets the Germans utilised it to establish firm relations and in wider 
terms of Ostpolitik it was viewed as a way to encourage East European 
governments to ’demonstrate greater independence from Moscow and adopt more 
liberal policies towards their citizens’.21 Though West German pressure 
was arguably used more subtly and with more discretion than American.
These arguments represent one major school of thought on Soviet 
trade. However there are other Western commentators whose analysis of 
Soviet foreign trade trends has been proved by events to be more correct. 
Trading with capitalist countries is organised separately from the other 
activities of the Soviet economy and also from dealings with the Socialist
21See Congressional Research Service, The German Question Forty Years 
After Yalta April 20,1985. Quotation p.CRS-41.
bloc and developing nations. In his work,22 Turpin argues that in the 
1970’s Soviet foreign trading entered a qualitatively new stage, but he 
still holds to the belief that while the volume of trade may have increased 
the fundamental guidelines remained unchanged. In arguing this view he 
challenges the growing belief in the West that suggests that Soviet 
approaches to the nature and conduct of foreign trading changed through the 
1970’s as contacts with the West expanded.
The point to be made from this latter school of thinking is that 
those aspects of Soviet policies and actions which indicated a slackening 
of belief in an autarkic economy were overemphasised by Western and 
Japanese governments. Even though the signs that the Soviets had not 
changed policy were still there, Western governments chose, for whatever 
reasons to ignore them - or simply did not see them at all. It may have 
been that the Japanese government, encouraged by the warmer climate of 
overall relations between the two nations as well as the general 
circumstances of detente perceived a weakening of the Soviet position on 
trade. If so, future events show that it was a misperception. Another 
writer on Soviet trade has suggested that understanding how the Soviets 
approach and direct trade is akin to understanding a ’black box’.23 It is 
suggested that the Japanese, like other governments, failed to understand 
the workings of the ’black box’.
How can we characterise the essential policy guideline behind Soviet 
trading with capitalist nations ? In a survey of Soviet trade Turpin sums 
up the main concerns as he sees them as oriented towards the primacy of 
maintaining the industrialisation drive and minimising trade with
22W.Turpin, Soviet Foreign Trade Lexington Books, D.C.Heath and Co., 
Mass.; 1977.
23H.S.Gardner, Soviet Foreign Trade - The Decision Process Kluwer- 
Nijhoff, Boston, Mass., 1983. p.ix.
capitalists. On that basis foreign trade is conducted to obtain essential 
goods which are temporarily or permanently unavailable.24
This summation has been widely questioned by Western analysts but on 
the evidence available it would seem to describe accurately the premises 
behind Soviet trade policy. In summarising the essential points thus, 
Turpin shows that for the Soviet Union in conducting economic relations 
with the capitalist powers all that really needs to be considered is the 
question of imports as an autarkic nation, so defined, is free to export at 
its discretion.
Turpin (p.11) summarises the Soviet position as "determined to avoid 
dependence on foreign and particularly Western sources of supply so far as 
possible, while remaining free to use the Western market for tactical and 
strategic advantage, but without accepting any obligation to participate 
responsibly in the operation, improvement or the maintenance of that 
market’.
Foreign trade is used in this context to achieve the goals of the 
state. In the case of the Soviet Union, as Gruzinov pointed out, trade is 
not regulated by the State; it is the State itself which trades through 
subordinate agencies.25 As part of the structure of a command economy 
which functions according to goals and targets, trade is also operated on 
that same principle i.e. under a legal obligation to fulfil specific goals.
Due to increasing Soviet participation in the world economic process 
and the concomitant increase in Soviet trade revenues Western economists 
began, as we have indicated, to cast doubt upon the validity of the text 
book stance vis-a-vis trade proclaimed by the Soviets. Was the Soviet 
Union still adhering to a policy of autarky or had it been abandoned?
24W.Turpin, op.cit. p.6.
25V.P.Gruzinov, o p .cit. Chapter 1.
Adopting an approach of mirror-imaging, the West chose to appraise 
three Soviet objectives of trade policy in that they would try to procure 
certain goods which were (a) not produced in the country at all; (b) 
produced but not in sufficient quantity; (c) produced, but more expensively 
than they could be acquired overseas. The desire for these goods, so 
Western economists calculated, would be particularly acute in the context 
of the imperative to develop Siberia.
As one more example of Western perception of a slackening of Soviet 
rigour let us consider Marshal Goldman's review of Soviet behaviour on the 
international oil market. He contended that by the early 1970's the Soviet 
Union was no longer regarded as a nuisance or a threat by the international 
oil companies. It was viewed as having oil for export 'at a time of 
growing market tightness. Instead of being treated as a pariah, by the 
early 1970's the Soviet Union was being treated more and more as a 
partner'.26
Western oil interests never considered whether the Soviets in fact 
wanted to be a partner. Goldman passes over a central matter of contention 
regarding Soviet trading practices, that of achieving a balance of imports 
against exports. 'For Soviet officials in charge of the task', writes 
Goldman, 'the great values of petroleum and raw materials make the job of 
balancing exports and imports simple'.27 But Goldman is assuming points 
which are far from certain. It is a moot point whether such officials 
exist within the trade bureaucracy, not least as no such aim (balancing the 
books) appears in Soviet trade theory. Although a rough balance can be 
seen to exist in some cases of bilateral trade this is not the case
26M.Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum. Allen and Unwin, London-
1980. p. 88.
27Ibid. p.92
overall. It is one thing to observe the phenomenon another to explain it 
successfully. Concerning the cases of a balance in trade figures the West 
can only speculate. It may well be the result of official policy decision, 
administrative convenience or simply coincidence. We do not know.
The evidence shows that despite Western belief to the contrary the 
Soviet Union has never been taken by the 'mercantilist credo' as Goldman 
terms it, of exporting for export's sake. In 1974, when the oil crisis had 
increased oil prices dramatically Soviet earnings from oil sales doubled 
raising income to $2.26 billion. Yet at a time when they were not 
suffering oil constraints and could have made a massive export killing 
Soviet exports to the hard currency countries actually fell by roughly five 
million tons.
The illustration from Goldman contains all the classic Western 
erroneous interpretations of the Soviet position. He talks of Soviet 
authorities 'playing by the rules' - as if there were a set of objectively 
definable rules; of the Soviets being 'deeply entangled'; of Soviet 
'dependence' and 'particular need'; of 'imposing restraints’ on the Soviet 
Union. As events were to show the truth lay with the counter analysis 
provided by commentators like Turpin.
One qualification needs to be added. The Soviets have stretched the 
limits of autarky in their relationship with their fellow CMEA members in 
Eastern Europe to produce what amounts to a socialist division of labour. 
In practice throughout the 1970s the Soviet Union has given Eastern Europe 
preferential trade treatment in the form of trade subsidies, by exporting 
underpriced raw materials and energy resources to it in return for 
overpriced machinery and consumer goods. There are various reasons why the 
Soviets undertake to maintain these substantial subsidies. They all relate 
to the continued utility to the Soviets of maintaining the cohesion of the
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bloc, in some cases in the form of the Warsaw pact (military reasons), the 
propagation of Communist ideas (ideological reasons), and the maintenance 
in power of Communist governments which will support the Soviet Union 
internationally (political reasons).
There are also economic reasons. Soviet subsidies promote greater 
economic stability in Eastern Europe, and in return the Soviets receive a 
steady influx of technologically higher grade machinery than they can 
produce themselves in some cases. In some circumstances the Soviets have 
foregone a great deal of their own production capacity and effectively left 
the production of some goods to Eastern European industries. For example, 
much of Soviet railway stock is of East German or Czechoslovak make (East 
Germany supplies carriages and wagons, Czechoslovakia electric 
locomotives). Hungary supplies a significant percentage of the Soviet 
Union’s buses, and a sizeable proportion of Soviet merchant ships and 
trawlers has been constructed in Polish or East German shipyards.28
Before considering the wider backdrop of the economics of trade and 
the role of trade in Soviet economic growth, it is advisable to sketch the 
mechanics of the trade structure : how it is organised, how business is 
carried out, where the power of decision lies, etc, for the purposes of
28The issues of autarky and preferential trading with fellow CMEA 
members rather than Japan can be well illustrated by the example of the 
construction of merchant shipping. Given the constant Soviet demand for 
new merchant shipping it would have been natural to turn to one of the 
world’s leading producers of high quality shipping, : i.e. Japan, to fill 
orders, all the more so if this could be used as a lever to promulgate 
further trade links. In fact nothing of the sort took place. The only 
orders which the Soviets placed with Japanese yards throughout the 1970’s 
were in 1974-75 for two small woodchip carriers (23,606 dwt). The last 
Soviet order prior to that had been in 1966. In terms of a comparison, 
Finland in 1980-84 built for the Soviets 839,171 dwt. Between 1961-80 the 
Japanese constructed marginally more (839,362 dwt). Over the last 20 years 
the Greeks have built larger tonnages for the Soviet Union than have the 
Japanese. (Greece built 140,000 dwt in 1982-83). The mainstay of Soviet 
orders went to Eastern European yards e.g. East Germany for stern trawlers 
and factory ships. Figures taken from, A.Greenway, Soviet Merchant Ships 
Mason Publishing, Hampshire, UK. 1985.
future argument regarding the internal politicking that centred around
projected reforms to the trade structure intended to keep abreast of
projected changes in the directions of trade policy itself.
The importance of the role of foreign trade to the Soviet Union
should not be understated. V.Klochek, member of the Collegium and Chief of
the Main Economic Planning Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
wrote in Planovoe Khoziaistvo in 1978 that
After a sixty-year test the monopoly on foreign trade has 
performed protection, planning and organisational functions and 
has acquired the force of an international example. It has 
been and continues to be the basis for proper proportionality 
in the implementation of foreign policy and in the 
establishment of foreign economic relations...foreign trade has 
become an important branch of the national economy. It is 
difficult to find in our country a branch of the economy that 
is not associated with foreign trade, that does not make its 
contribution to the expansion of foreign trade, or that does 
not receive effective aid from foreign trade or practical 
assistance in its development29
The ’Nationalisation of Foreign Trade’ decree passed in 1918 
organised foreign trade structure in a form basically still in use today; 
’it set up a centralised foreign trade council* and it established 
’authorised agencies’ for supervising the ’sale and purchase of any type of 
product abroad’.3 0 This assessment by a Soviet writer tells us very little 
about the structure of the trade process, however to the extent that the 
West can glean anything concerning the decision-making processes involved 
it would seem that Soviet trade is in fact administered via several 
bureaucracies, centred mainly around internal economics, with the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade itself functioning as a co-ordinating agency. Below the 
Council of Ministers the trade structure can be divided into three types of
29V.Klochek, ’Soviet Foreign Trade’ in Planovoe Khoziaistvo No.7 1978. 
Translated in Problems of Economics March 1979 Vol.XXI No.11 pp.3-21. 
Quotation p.7.
30V.P.Gruzinov, op.cit. p p .20-21.
agencies; the physical planning bodies (Gossnab, Gosplan); the financial 
planning agencies (Gosbank, Ministry of Finance, Prices Committee); and 
those responsible for actual trading (Industrial ministries, State 
Committee for Foreign economic relations, Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Vneshtorgbank). Subordinate to these last are the foreign trade 
organisations themselves, involved in direct dealing in specific 
commodities or areas of marketing.
The Politics of Soviet Foreign Trade and the Development of Siberia
Having outlined the organisation of the trade structure we must now 
place this within the wider context of Soviet economic needs and the 1970s 
debate over those needs. Many assessments of the Soviet economy depict it 
as an economy perpetually in crisis, bureaucratically overburdened and 
inefficient to a degree unbelievable in the industrialised countries. Yet 
the fact remains that despite all the predictions of calamity the Soviet 
economy has, until fairly recently, achieved constant growth. By devoting 
large sections of available economic resources to investment the ability of 
the Soviet Union continually to expand its production capacity has been 
assured, though at the expense of other sectors such as consumption.
Let us simplify the strategy choices which confronted Soviet planners 
by the early 1970's. We can characterise the means of Soviet growth as 
lying with two measures : (a) the quantitative, involving more labour and 
more capital and (b) the qualitative, by improving the factors of 
production or production methods. The dominant Soviet approach before this 
date had been overwhelming reliance upon the first of these, and growth had 
been achieved by massive application of manpower and capital investment. 
The problem confronting Soviet planners by the early 1970's was that 
pursuing such a strategy would no longer suffice to achieve the desired 
goals especially since the demographically uneven distribution of the
population located the labour pool in Central Asia, whereas the resources 
lay in the Eastern regions.
Consequently, to ensure continuing growth more emphasis than hitherto 
had to be laid upon improving the factors of production. The goals could 
be met from two sources, first, by the application of technology- 
including the importation of Western equipment - and second, by reforming 
the organisation and administration so as to improve the efficiency of 
economic sectors. The only questions left were ones of how far these 
reforms could go, of where could the limits be set?
Since Japan features as one of the major Soviet trading partners for 
importation of technology and specifically for the development of Siberia- 
the driving force of Soviet growth - these questions and debates over them 
are of direct relevance to the conduct of Soviet - Japanese trade.
For various motives and rationales it was the inclination of Western 
and Japanese traders to base their dealings with the Soviets on hopes of 
some sort of economic liberalisation based on a transfer of capitalist 
trading principles to Soviet managers, on a negative appraisal of the state 
of the Soviet economy, and on a belief that the 'economic modernisers’ 
headed by Kosygin were sufficiently strong to prevail.
For example, Ogawa, argues that ’noteworthy’ developments in trade 
were triggered by 'the stagnation of the Soviet economy’ which showed no 
sign of rapid recovery. Thus ’it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will 
take any action which will jeopardise detente with the developed capitalist 
countries’.31 Hoffman and Laird contend that to the extent that Soviet 
economic and political development during the Brezhnev years was predicated 
on East - West co-operation and interdependent patterns of modernisation, 
’the Soviet economic modernisers’ influence was augmented'. Such that
31K.Ogawa, o p .cit. p.4.
’each of the critical trends in the Brezhnev period directly affected the 
role and significance of the policy group of Soviet economic 
m o d e r n i s e r s ’. 3 2  Belief in these outcomes fuelled an expectation of greater 
prospects and of more extensive contact.
In assessing the ’economic modernisers’, Hoffman and Laird, both 
analysts of the impact of science and technology on the Soviet system, 
depict them as representing different strands of Soviet economic sectors. 
They see them as ’both advocates of modernisation (a tendency of 
development) and a subgroup within the economic elites (a set of interests 
within various organisations or parts of organisations)’.33
The origins of these groups are varied : from Gosplan, the Academic 
Institutes, those managers of the domestic economy who direct ministries, 
associations and factories, theorists of management, managerial 
rationalisers (those specialists employed to plan and carry-out 
administrative changes), managers of foreign trade and analysts of the 
global economy. All to a greater or lesser degree have an interest in 
seeing some changes in various sectors of the economy.
An inaccurate appraisal of the motivation of these groups and of the 
extent of their influence by the Japanese led to misunderstanding of the 
goals at stake and overoptimism concerning what could be achieved. The 
debates within the Soviet leadership undeniably helped to fuel this 
misunderstanding by creating confusion and magnifying the significance of 
otherwise unimportant comment by members of the leadership or of the trade 
bureaucracy. It is not an uncommon phenomenon for policy makers to see 
only what they want to see or what they expect to see, and Japanese trade
32E.Hoffman, R.Laird, The Politics of Economic Modernisation in the
Soviet Union Cornell University Press, New York,1982. pp. 88-90.
33E.Hoffman, R.Laird, o p .cit. p.84.
representatives were no exception.
The debate over economic relations with the West naturally involved 
specifically the area of trading and the questions of diversifying economic 
activities centred on four main issues ; What kind of economic activities 
should be pursued ?; How extensive should they be ?; Which countries and 
businesses are the most desirable partners ? ; What changes are needed in 
the planning and management of foreign trade to facilitate this ?
As these questions were being settled by the Soviet leadership, 
outsiders sought to portray the situation as a clash of rivals. This is 
the tendency displayed by Breslauer, for example, in discussing 
’conservatism’ and ’reformism’ during the Brezhnev years. He defines 
’reformist’ policies as ’those which challenge core traditional values’ and 
Brezhnev he depicts as having led since 1973 a ’political coalition on 
behalf of conservative domestic policies and reformist foreign policies. 
He has avoided economic decentralisation and slashes of the defense budget, 
but has sought to increase economic efficiency’.34 Kosygin is pictured as 
very definitely ’the reformer’. ’Alexei Kosygin was not a vocal advocate 
of this approach...Kosygin now re-embraced reformist causes in response to 
Brezhnev’s conservatism, while simultaneously seeking to counter Brezhnev’s 
efforts to parry responsibility for failure’. On matters of light industry 
the Kosygin ’dissent’ was ’elaborate’. Overall, the breadth of the dissent 
of which Kosygin was the figurehead was ’striking’.35 By his own 
definition Breslauer sees Kosygin as challenging in some way ’core values’. 
But in fact the opposite is the case. Kosygin owed his position to the
34G.W. Breslauer, "Reformism, Conservatism and Leadership Authority at
the 26th Party Congress" in S.Bialer, T.Gustafson (eds), Russia at the 
Crossroads - The 26th Congress of the CPSU Rand Corp., Allen and Unwin, 
London,1982. Quotation p.65.
35Ibid. pp.65, 70, 71.
fact that he shared these core values with Brezhnev and the other top 
leaders as well as the party rank and file.
Mikhail Suslov, at one point had appraised Brezhnev as "the 
embodiment of collective reason and will". It should be noted that 
Brezhnev’s economic plans reflected to a large degree the views usually 
ascribed to Kosygin and certainly given Kosygin's position as head of the 
bureaucracy, policy could not have been developed without his co-operation. 
It would seem erroneous therefore to pursue Western arguments depicting a 
faction-fight between the two men or their offices too far. If we wish to 
portray, as a number of Western analysts seek to do, the main trend of 
internal politicking in the Brezhnev years as one of two ideas - either 
confrontational or consensual - then we should be careful to do so only 
with regard to certain specific issues. There was no overall opposition to 
Brezhnev per se, but depended on particular policies advocated by him. 
Much the same can be said on the issue of support for Brezhnev.
If we define power over policy as the ability either to enforce one's 
priorities or the ability to prevent inclusion of serious compromises in 
one's programme, then in a broad sense Brezhnev's line prevailed via the 
second of these methods. By the 8th five year plan (1966-70) agriculture 
and defence had received huge investments but it was recognised that there 
could only be sustained growth through heavy investment in the industrial 
sector and in order to achieve that the necessary funds were diverted from 
other sectors such as chemicals, housing, and foreign investments. This 
new programme failed and was modified by 1970 and the following five year 
plan. Reduction of domestic investment in Siberian development was 
broached as a means of finding the necessary capital for investment in 
other domestic sectors. If Siberian developments were not to be slowed the
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shortfalls would presumably have to be made up from overseas sources.36
Soviet leaders at the same time had made public statements concerning
the increasing Soviet participation in the international division of
labour. Accepting this we might then expect, in order to make-up for
needed investment, a rapid expansion of Soviet involvement in overseas
marketing. However from an internal bureaucratic viewpoint this was not
necessarily the solution. In touching on this issue Volten concludes that,
In sum, the Soviet leaders were not against trade, but against 
Brezhnev’s unbridled enthusiasm ; there were fears that it 
would result in too much interdependence and too much 
interference from both inside and outside the Soviet Union37
Couching the argument in these terms, as merely a backlash against
Brezhnev, oversimplifies a complicated series of factors. If Brezhnev can
be accused of "unbridled enthusiasm" numerous examples can also be cited of
Brezhnev making clear that there were limits to what would be tolerated in
the way of contact with the West.38 In the same vein we can testify to the
continual reaffirmation by Soviet leaders that contact with the West is a
matter for convenience not necessity. For example, Brezhnev's reply to the
editor of the Asahi Shimbun:
I don’t want to leave the readers of your newspaper with the 
impression that the Soviet Union could not develop the very 
rich resources of Siberia and the Far East on its own. It is 
quite obvious, and our country’s entire history bears this out, 
that we have every opportunity to cope with this task. We make 
use of co-operation with other countries only to speed up the
36See, G.W.Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders : Building 
Authority in Soviet Politics Allen and Unwin, London;1982. pp.246-250.
37P.Volten, Brezhnev’s Peace Programme : A Study of Soviet Domestic 
Political Process and Power Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1982 pp.115-6.
38J.Dornberg, in his biography Brezhnev Andre Deutsch, London,1974 
p.29, levels the same accusation, e.g. Brezhnev "is also a salesman. In 
talks with German industrialists he drew enticing pictures of limitless 
possibilities". But he also notes that when urged to do business with small 
German firms he replied "That's OK by me but only two or three firms. I 
won’t have the whole world coming in".
fulfillment of our plans to develop these regions39 
In his capacity as leader, and therefore chief spokesman, Brezhnev's 
remarks should have been noted, but the Japanese business community and 
government should have been more aware of the limitations placed upon, or 
the various motives behind, public comment by a Soviet leader.
No monocausal explanation of Soviet - Japanese misunderstandings does 
justice to Brezhnev and to the other leaders. The optimism with which 
Brezhnev regarded co-operative ventures had to be modified by the problems 
of conducting any large scale operations and long-term planning schemes, 
even those in which all parties have a genuine interest in their success. 
Some of these bureaucratic and planning hurdles will be discussed later. 
But what of those groups supposed to be opposing Brezhnev?
Kosygin - even if we accept that he personally favoured certain 
bureaucratic reorganisations which would enhance Soviet ability to import 
and utilise Western technology - was still head of the government and as 
such responsible for reconciling the differing tendencies within the 
government economic machine. Thus in his role as head of government his 
ability to undertake controversial measures, regardless of his personal 
views, was constrained.
The classic picture presented by Western analysts has been one of 
Brezhnev the centraliser trying to hold the line against Kosygin and the 
other decentralisers and modernisers.40 However the issues involved are
39V.Spandaryan, 'A New development in Soviet - Japanese Trade' in 
Foreign Trade of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moscow. No.12. 1977 
pp.14-19. Quotation p.18.
40See the comments made by Breslauer above for example, and E.Hoffman, 
R.F.Laird, op.cit. Chapter 6 which provides an outline of the 'modernisers' 
and pp.150-156. They comment on Brezhnev's 'penchent for incremental 
administrative changes rather than dramatic system reforms...without 
altering the essentials of planning, pricing and incentive structures' 
(P.155).
more diverse than a mere contest over acceptance of a more liberal trade 
policy but reflect a complex interaction of political positions. For 
example, Suslov was willing to grant the validity of entering into 
negotiations over the arms race with the United States but was far more 
qualified in his support for the extension of economic ties. Both these 
positions were backed by Brezhnev, so Suslov was a Brezhnev 'supporter’ 
over one issue but differed from him over the other. So it was with other 
Politburo members.
Both Brezhnev and Kosygin agreed that the Soviet Union faced economic 
problems, but by the early 1970’s Brezhnev had come to stress a solution 
more related to manpower management reforms not involving devolution of 
power rather than an emphasis on expanding foreign trade as a remedy.
An important proviso should be recognised with regard to differences 
of opinion within the Soviet leadership namely that advocacy of 
international policies often has as much to do with enhancing a leader's 
domestic prestige as with the conduct of successful foreign policy. In 
that light the conviction with which policies are advocated will fluctuate 
over time. For example, while it was useful for Brezhnev to pursue an 
increase of trade contacts in the short term, it was not so in the medium 
and long terms, because the policy had come to threaten domestic programmes 
he wished to advance. Thus while perhaps the shifting balance in 
leadership support facilitated some experimentation with foreign economic 
relations, its very nature constrained the duration and extent of 
experimentation. Behind that was the belief that the Soviet Union had 
solved past economic problems unaided, and could continue to do so in the 
future. The message to the West and to the Japanese should have been 
clear, that the reasons for maintaining economic impetus were unchanged, 
that Western aid might have a contribution to make in solving economic
tasks sooner, but it was otherwise dispensable.
The Limits to Trade : Bureaucratic and Organisational
The inertia and lack of co-ordination associated with large 
bureaucracies and large co-operative development projects had its part to 
play also in hindering planning between the Japanese and Soviets in 
Siberia. It also functioned as a means of limiting trade expansion. The 
causes were magnified in the Soviet case by the particular requirements of 
a planned economy in which each Ministry or department is held responsible 
for fulfilling specific targets.
As we have tried to show, the support at top leadership level for a 
technology import policy was kept within ideologically and politically 
acceptable bounds. Support for it fluctuated due to both international 
changes and domestic convenience. In these circumstances the tendency is 
for departments to continue to function as they have in the past, even 
while supposedly the object of reforming legislation. As mentioned earlier 
most Soviet ministries involved in projects in Siberia were domestically 
oriented and consequently placed their internal responsibilities before 
their contribution to foreign-related projects. The reforms proposed in 
1976 did little to alleviate unbalanced and unco-ordinated approaches to 
development in the Siberian and Far Eastern regions. The same problems 
which had flowed from the independent approaches of parties involved 
(centred around the need to fulfil a system of planning indicators) 
continued to beset project development.
Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta protested in 1982 that 'ministerial 
niggardliness in relation to infrastructural investment has made the 
maintenance of a stable working population (in Siberia) all the more
difficult’.41 Continuing criticism of deficiencies in Siberian
construction projects permeates the Soviet press. The overall
responsibility for the construction of BAM42 lies with the Ministry of 
Communications, with other ministries involved with specific tasks. With 
an ’overlord’ responsible for the planning we would expect some sort of 
overall co-ordination. But this is not the case as Dyker once again points 
out in one example : ’At the end of 1978, for example, on the Tynda-Chara 
section of the line, earth moving teams had got 510 kilometres out of 
Tynda, the bridge-builders 386 and the general construction only 130’.43 
Two Pravda correspondents reporting on the projects at Vostochnii port in 
Wrangel Bay, detailed how only 60% of the available port capacity was being 
used and how long periods (months) had to be spent eliminating and 
correcting appalling mistakes made by design and development ministries. 44 
Gardner’s comment on the processes of decision-making on Soviet 
foreign trade is worthy of note. He described the problems involved as 
akin to understanding the workings of a ’black box’. While we can 
delineate a structure of the organisations involved we cannot tell, for 
example, to what extent decisions are subject to political rather than 
economic influences. Much of the difference in emphasis between Brezhnev 
and Kosygin fluctuated around questions of bureaucratic inertia. As early
41Quoted in D.Dyker, ’Technological Progress and the Development of 
Siberia and the Far East’ in Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty Research RL 
443/82 November 5 1982 p. 2
42Baikal - Amur Mainline. The second trans-Siberian railway. It runs 
from Ust-Kut on the Lena river to Komsomol’sk on the Amur with an outlet to 
the Pacific, and is 3,145 kilometres long. Construction on it began in 1973 
and the line was declared completed in 1985.
43D.Dyker, ’Planning in Siberia on the Wrong Track’ in Soviet Analyst 
Vol.9 No.2 23 January 1980. p.5.
44See, N.Bratchikov, G.Yastrebtsov, ’Facing the Ocean’ in Pravda 
December 6 1980 p. 2. Translation in CDSP Vol. XXXIII No.49 1981 p.11.
as 1966 Kosygin had been suggesting reforms to counter departmentalism. 
The trend of pushing ahead with some sort of reform of the foreign trade 
structure began in 1976 with a decree from the Council of Ministers. 
However a follow-up decree of May 1978 was substantially a re-run of the
1976 decree, indicating that the earlier proposals had had little effect.
The original idea had been to enhance the role of the foreign trade 
organisations vis-a-vis the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Paradoxically, as 
these organisations were essentially middle-level sections of the 
bureaucracy, strengthening their position was a centralising move which 
solidified branch monopolisation. These reforms can be seen as 
characteristic of the trend in approach to changes during the Brezhnev 
years whereby institutional adjustments were legitimised without actually 
altering the essentials of the planning, pricing and incentive structures.
The main centre of Soviet decision making on foreign trade is 
officially the Council of Ministers, but much as with the functioning of 
other large governing bodies the real power lies with the Praesidium of the 
Council. The Praesidium during these years was really the bastion of 
Kosygin and Tikhonov who had proportionally more supporters there than on 
the larger Council.
The Limits to Trade : Costing Problems and Technical Difficulties 
Despite the enthusiasm for development and for application of 
technology as the best means to fulfil development tasks both the 
implementation of Soviet - Japanese agreements and the general development 
of Siberia were significantly limited by Siberian conditions and by the 
abilities of the Soviet economy to absorb and utilise the technology at a 
pace acceptable to the Japanese.
As Dienes, one of the foremost Western commentators on the economic 
development of Siberia, argued in one of his articles, ’Despite the
enormous impact of Siberian development on the whole USSR, previous 
enquiries into the economy and industrial structure of the trans-Urals 
provinces have had to be descriptive, intuitive and limited in nature’.45 
These would seem not to be a sound basis for judgement on policy for the 
region, and the lack of such a basis has been reflected in the problems 
that have occurred in costing projects and applying technologies in harsh 
and variable climatic conditions.
Because Siberia and the Maritime province constitute a vast area, 
they have very varied resource combinations and accessibility and hence 
divergent development prospects. Western Siberia has the strongest links 
to European Russia, is the primary energy supplying region of the Soviet 
Union and priority in Soviet development funding and capital investment was 
allocated to it, particularly to the Tyumen oil-gas complex. In interviews 
with the author, Dienes commented that in 1980 for example, Soviet sources 
stated that Tyumen oblast alone accounted for 18.3% of the net value of all 
Siberian construction work.46
The role of the more distant regions, east of Lake Baikal is somewhat 
different. Economically or geographically they do not form a less cohesive 
whole than Western Siberia. It is only in those zones which lie along the 
BAM and Trsms-Siberian railways that we can, in any sense talk of 
accessibility to the Pacific. On the north-east side only the immediate 
coastal districts are developed and then only in certain areas. In both 
tonnage and value, the movement of goods to and from the Far East amounts 
to only a small fraction of that of West Siberia. In a paper unpublished
45L.Dienes, ’The Development of the Siberian region : Economic 
Profiles, Income Flows and Strategies for Growth’ in Soviet Geography 
Review and Translation, April 1982 pp.205-244. Quotation p.206.
46Interviews conducted with L.Dienes at the Slavic Research Centre, 
Hokkaido University, while he was in residence as visiting fellow, August 
1984.
at the time of writing, called ’Siberian Economic Development and Strategic 
Importance’ Dienes argues that inshipment exceeds outshipment in volume by 
2.5 times and in value by 1.8 times and that despite the region’s extensive 
natural resources, Siberia east of the Yenisei ’is heavily subsidised’.
As on most large scale, long duration projects construction and 
development costs in Siberia spiralled enormously between planning and 
implementation. Costs at all levels increased, often dramatically, 
especially at the extraction end of a project. In a region where materials 
have to travel 5,800 kilometres on average to their destination - 6.7 times 
the average for the rest of the USSR - even shipping costs escalated 
dramatically. Projected costs for the Yakutian gas complex project have 
risen from an initial $3.4 billion to $8 billion, according to a Japanese 
estimate.47 Quoting Soviet economist Shinyar,48 Dienes contends that 
investment in Siberia was even more wasteful than elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union, ’By 1975 the value of unfinished construction in Western and Eastern 
Siberia in fact exceeded total capital investment (in East Siberia alone) 
by 24% : in the country as a whole it reached ’only’ 75% of total 
investment in that year. Since 1975 ...the literature implies no 
improvement in Siberia to date’.49
Overall the trans-Urals districts are net beneficiaries of the 
geographical redistribution of national income. The investment subsidies 
are often on scales unimaginable in the West. In Eastern Siberia and the 
Far East every administrative unit appears as a net recipient of income 
flow. This income ’exceeded 700 million roubles in 6 of the 12 provinces
47US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, o p . cit. p.339.
48Tendentsii Ekonomicheskovo Razvitiia Sibiri 1961-75 gg. (Trends in 
Siberian economic development 1961-75), Moscow,1979.
49L.Dienes, ’The development of the Siberian region : Economic 
profiles, income flows and strategies for growth’ in o p . cit. p.209.
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It is not only the costing and construction problems associated with 
the major developments such as BAM or the Urengoi gas complex that were, 
and are still, bedeviling progress in Siberia. All the projects are short 
of workers, and the provision for facilities, housing or services for them 
lagged behind even more than the actual projects. This is because the 
priority of investment lies with the actual construction project rather 
than with necessary infrastructure for the labour force. Much the same can 
also be said regarding the attention given to the support infrastructure 
around project developments, roads being particularly susceptible to 
neglect.51 Transportation outlays more than doubled the cost of goods 
produced in Yakut ASSR, for example.52 The construction of sites for 
workers and of towns involves the use of special high pressure steam 
machines to melt the permafrost long enough for the supports to be sunk 
into the ground then refrozen. An alternative method is to scatter 
expensive coal across the ground and set it alight. Ice has to be broken 
up by special high powered drills. Drilling for oil off Sakhalin Island
of these two regions’.50
50L.Dienes, ’The Development of Siberia : Regional Priorities and 
Economic Strategy’ in o p .cit. p. 7.
51Reports in the Soviet press on construction in Siberia are literally 
legion. A few illustrations which detail the construction difficulties 
are, N.Bratchikov, G.Yastrebstov, ’Facing the Ocean’ in Pravda December 6
1980. Translated in CDSP Vol.XXXIII No. 49 1981. p.11. Iu.Kuzmin, ’Long 
Kilometres’ in Pravda July 14 and July 16 1977. Trans, in CDSP Vol.XIX 
No.28. "Baikal - Amur Mainline : People, Experience, Problems" in Kommunist 
No.7 May 1977. pp.47-56. JPRS Translation. See also, Radio Liberty Reports 
RL 256/78 ("Working and Living Conditions of Baikal - Amur railroad 
builders") November 16, 1978. RL 194/77 ("Imported Pipe fails to reach 
pipeline builders") August 11, 1977.
52Writing on the same area one analyst states that ’building costs in 
Yakutsk today are three times higher than elsewhere in the Soviet Union. 
Modern buildings must be huddled together to permit water supply and 
plumbing. A metre of plumbing, water pipes, gas pipes and telephone lines 
protected by a concrete sheath 15 foot thick, costs about 1,000 roubles’ 
See, N.Ushakov, ’Yakutia - Frozen gem of the USSR’ in Soviet Analyst Vol.7 
No.25, 21 December 1979 pp.5-7. Quotation p.6.
can only be undertaken for four months of the year due to ice problems.
Low worker productivity also adds to costs. Overall the labour force 
is still basically a migratory force on what has been referred to as the 
’tour of duty" method of earning a good salary. Earnings are roughly three 
times the national average, but productivity very much below it. The 
industrial worker in Siberia spent 163 days at work in 1975 (in the Far 
East 162) and construction employees spent only 140 days (the Far East 
figure was 150-60), whereas the average figure for European Russia was 230- 
40 days.53
General Causes
Soviet trade with Japan is part of trade with the West and except for 
features peculiar to it, such as coastal trading, is formed and carried-out 
according to the same guidelines. Its original expansion paralleled the 
growth in ties with the West and the general amelioration in foreign 
relations. In that sense we would expect it to be just as susceptible to 
the fluctuations in the nature of that relationship as to fluctuations in 
particular Japanese - Soviet circumstances. Thus to attempt to depict the 
slackening of Soviet - Japanese trade as due to only two or three causes, 
as some analysts have done, would seem to be of doubtful validity. It is 
through the interplay of numerous factors, domestic and international, that 
the trade became limited.
The deterioration in relations with the United States by the mid- 
1970*s may well have created a general climate within the Soviet leadership 
of ’suspicion’ over the desirability of foreign trade. This is one of the 
arguments that Hanson has put forward.54 However this would seem to be
53L.Dienes, ’The development for Siberian Region : Economic Profiles, 
Income Flows and Strategies for Growth’ in op.cit. p.225.
54See, P.Hanson, Trade and Technology in Soviet - Western Relations 
Columbia University Press, New York,1981. p.81.
speculative. It is questionable whether dissatisfaction with the United 
States has the consequence of stimulating dissatisfaction with other 
capitalist trading partners. The United States was advocating a more 
politicised trading policy - grain sales excepted - than either the 
European allies or Japan, which, apart from grain sales, trade far more 
with the Soviet Union than does the United States.
Hanson cites as another contributory factor in the deterioration of 
trading conditions a perception by Moscow that by the end of the 1970' s 
the Eastern European economies would be in need of financial support. He 
suggests that in order to be prepared for that eventuality, the Soviets by 
1977-78 had taken the decision to stabilise and reduce hard currency debt, 
the easiest way to achieve this being through a reduction of technology 
imports. This move may also have been prompted by a Soviet fear of 
becoming more indebted to the West, losing its high credit rating and 
becoming more vulnerable to Western pressure.
The most convincing argument put forward by Hanson is in another 
article and is what he terms the 'backlash against technology imports'. 
This was due to, he suggests, growing economic concerns over a decline in 
the hard currency balance of payments in 1975-76 and a rise in outstanding 
hard currency debt. Consequently Soviet importation of machinery fell from 
c.$6 billion (1976) to $3.8 billion (1977) to $2.5 billion (1979-80). This 
continued 'despite the fact that the current account of the Soviet hard 
currency balance of payments quickly recovered after 1976 and despite the 
fact that the outstanding Soviet debt to the West had been reduced'.55 
Table five illustrates the fluctuations in imports and their tendency to 
decline as a percentage of domestic equipment investment from the highpoint
55P.Hanson, 'Backlash Against Technology Imports' in Radio Free Europe 
Research RL 453/81 November 12, 1981.
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of 1975. Brezhnev summed up the attack on imports at the XXVI Congress in
March 1981 when he said that
We must look into the reasons why we sometimes overlook our 
leading position in technology and spend large amounts of money 
to buy abroad such equipment and processes as we are fully able 
to produce ourselves, and moreover often of higher quality56
The Soviet Economic Slowdown as a Contributory Factor To Trade Limitation 
The continual investment in the high cost Siberian developments had 
to be balanced against the continual successful performance of the Soviet 
economy. In the second half of the 1970s (the tenth Five year plan 1976- 
80) economic growth had declined to 3% whereas it has been 6% during the 
first half of the decade (by 1982 it had declined to 2.5%). GNP growth 
declined to c.2.7% during the same period.57 In these circumstances the 
massive subsidies channelled into Siberia at the expense of other sectors 
had to be called into question. The continual favourable performance of 
the Siberian region lay entirely with oil and gas exploitation projects and 
that was reflected in the allocation of subsidies which strongly favoured 
these projects even compared to investment in timber and mineral extraction 
operations. Certainly by comparison the allocation to infrastructure and 
service facilities was particularly poor. The opportunity costs involved 
saw projects cancelled outright, existing delays increased and new ones 
created. Even priority developments in oil and gas and mining were not 
free from retrenchment to some degree, causing the Soviets to admit to the 
Japanese that in some cases they would not be able to fulfil their 
contractual obligations, for example, in the delivery of coal from the
56Quoted in R.Byrnes, After Brezhnev. Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1983 p.102.
570ffice of Soviet Analysis, CIA, Joint Economic Committee Briefing 
Paper - USSR : Economic Trends and Policy Developments 14 September 1983. 
pp.2-6 and Appendix B : Selected Economic Statistics.
Soviet Imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment from the West 1970-73
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TABLE 5
Year Value in Current Est. Value in Soviet Imports as % of domestic 
Prices ($mn.) 1969 Roubles (mn). Equipment Investment of
Next Year
1970 905 913 3.4
1971 840 792 2.8
1972 1126 979 3.1
1973 1574 1166 3.4
1974 2094 1378 3.6
1975 4184 2476 6.1
1976 4259 2462 5.7
1977 4571 2393 5.1
1978 4994 2254 4.6
1979 4851 2037 4.1
Source : Data selected from information presented in P.Hanson, ’Foreign 
Economic Relations’ in A.Brown, M.Kaser (eds^ Soviet Policy for the 1980’s St. 
Antony’s, Oxford,1982. pp.65-97. Data p.80. *
Neriungra field in South Yakutia. 58
Dependence As a Force for Trade Maintenance
Associated with the issues of cutting-back on the scale of trading 
have been the arguments - from both sides - of dependence and opportunities 
in each others’ markets which would serve as a natural brake to a decline 
in trade. More radical commentators have suggested that each side was 
trying to manoeuvre the other into a position of dependence in at least 
certain sectors of trading, for example, in Japanese dependence on Soviet 
oil and gas.
We have two generally accepted definitions of dependence : a state of 
being determined or affected in some major way by external forces or ’a 
relationship of subordination in which one thing is supported by something 
else or must rely upon something for a fulfillment of a need’.59 How does 
the state of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan fit into these 
categories ?
Let us consider the Soviet position first. At base the problem for 
Japan (and for the West) was that they paid too little attention to Soviet 
conceptions of trade, which had always been more modest than those shared 
by the Japanese. Let us posit the question : what exactly does imported 
technology do for the Soviet Union ]? Either the Soviets utilise it in 
combination with their own technology or they concentrate it in a specific 
area in which they lag seriously behind. Two good examples of each of 
these approaches are the automotive industry (a combination of
58Socialisticheskiia Industriia June 7, 1982 p.2. See also, BBC, 
Summary of World Broadcasts SU/6653/A3/3 February 19, 1981. As a cause for 
the delays Soviet officials cited ’extremely severe weather conditions and 
a breakdown of Japanese - supplied mining equipment’.
59D.Baldwin, ’Interdependence and Power : A Conceptual Analysis’ in 
International Organisation Vol.XXXIV No.4 Autumn 1980. pp.471-506. 
Quotation p.475.
technologies) and the chemical industry (almost solely based on Western
skills). The incidence of the latter sort of application was rare and as
the Soviets quickly discovered was a counterproductive strategy for
development. Summing up, one trade commentator has written
The greater the Soviet existing level of skill in a 
particular industry, the more they are able to profit from 
technology transfer, and the harder it is to prevent them from 
doing so. The corollary is that the Soviets’ ability to profit 
from technology transfer can be expected to increase over time 
provided that the Soviets have not handicapped their own 
innovators (as in the chemical industry) through an excessive 
reliance on foreign suppliers60
A national technological ability is such a wide concept that it 
cannot be quantified. But this is exactly what the Japanese tried to do. 
If there was an area where the Soviets could be said to lag behind overall, 
it could well have been in the realm of technology diffusion rather than in 
R and D or in innovative ability. But even here the Soviets had tried- 
though we might question their success rate - to improve their 
deficiencies.
In particular, the areas of trade involving Japan were those which 
featured a higher than average participation by foreign investors, 
specifically the oil and gas industries, timber, paper and pulp concerns. 
Even here Japanese investment should be seen in its proper context. During 
talks in Moscow in 1981 on the Japanese position towards sanctions over 
Afghanistan, I. Grishin, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, 
pointed out to the Japanese that while there was Soviet interest in co­
operation ’Japanese credits in the past five years had accounted for only 
1% of Soviet spending for the development of the region’.61 The further
60T.Gustafson, Selling the Russians the Rope? Soviet Technology Policy 
and the United States’ Export Controls Rand report, April 1981. R - 2649- 
ARPA p.25.
61BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts SU/6712/A3/2. May 1,1981.
proviso should be made however that Japanese assistance to these projects
comes under the heading of contributions to "existing plant'.62 Investment
in ’new plant' construction was more effective in promoting and channelling
technology but investment in 'existing plant' projects applied Japanese
technology to existing Soviet techniques. In these areas most analysts are
agreed that the Soviet Union profited most, however these areas were not
the main areas of foreign technology influx nor were they areas of
excessive dependence on foreign inputs. Being able to profit from the
application of Japanese technology does not imply dependence upon it.
R.Campbell, in a case study of the Soviet pipeline industry voices the
opinion that Soviet dependence on imported pipe was overestimated, as
Today the Soviet steel industry can itself produce, and is 
producing 1020, 1220, and 1420mm. pipe. One might therefore 
contend that the Soviet Union imports pipe not out of 
technological incompetence but to avoid production capacity 
bottlenecks or high costs at the margin from expanding domestic 
output63
For these reasons the Soviet - Japanese relationship was not necessary, 
ineluctable, inevitable, inextricable or unavoidable.
A particular feature of Soviet - Japanese trade has been the central 
importance of compensation agreements and the large scale of credit funding 
made available through them. This peculiarity subjects the final trade 
figures between the two to particular fluctuation and hence 
misinterpretation. Either the signing of a new massive contract or the 
expiry of an earlier one can make significant differences to overall trade
62See P.Hanson, Trade and Technology and Soviet - Western Relations 
Columbia University Press, NY; 1981. This is a concept advocated by him of 
investment being channelled into 'new plant' or 'existing plant'. It is 
slightly different to Gustafson's two investment strategies but basically 
the same idea. See p. 66.
63R.Campbell, Soviet Technology Imports : The Gas Pipeline Case 
California seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, Paper 19 
Feb. 1981. p.13.
balances. As an Izvestiia correspondent pointed out when commenting on the
decrease in trade by 1983 :
What has caused this slide? There are several reasons. One of 
them is the completion of the procurement of Japanese goods for 
the Urengoi-Uzhgorod gas pipeline. As well as this there is no 
longer any large scale undertaking involving co-operation 
between the two countries...64
How did the Japanese view their business with the Soviets? Japanese 
dependence on international trade with the Soviets was less than half of 
that of the major European nations. Yet at the same time Japan and the 
United States were the most important trading nations because of their 
absolute size of GNP and trade values. While in past years the growth in 
world trade had acted as a motor for Japanese growth, its decline by the 
turn of the 1980's was also having an adverse effect on the Japanese 
economy. Orders for Soviet timber were reduced due to the slump in the 
Japanese timber industry. Japanese members of the Japan - Soviet economic 
committee meeting in Moscow in September 1979 were willing to admit to that 
decline and expressed reservations about Japanese ability to fulfil their 
end of contracts. The decline in Japanese growth has by itself often been 
cited as the reason for a fall in trade levels but it is apposite to ask
whether trade would have fallen anyway due to other factors ;?
i
The Japanese have voiced discontent over a loss of substantial orders 
due to the sanctions imposed after the invasion of Afghanistan and have 
blamed the drastic decline in trade on these events. However the fact is 
that in Soviet trade with advanced industrialised countries, Japan had 
already slipped to fourth (Soviets say fifth) place in 1979 before 
sanctions had been imposed. The Japanese have always ranked highly; 
however if that rank is transformed into a total trade value comparison 
Japan’s performance does not seem as impressive when compared to her main
64Yu.Bandura, Izvestiia June 28,1983 p.4.
rivals in the Soviet trade market. Table Two shows the trends and values
in trade between Japan and the Soviet Union in a comparison with West
Germany and Finland. Since 1972 the Japanese have always lagged behind
West Germany and since 1978 even behind Finland. Tables Six and Seven
provide some data on Japanese energy-related trade with the Soviets; from
these it can be seen that Japan fares very poorly as an oil purchaser from
the Soviet Union even in comparison to Greece. By 1979 Japan was only
taking 0.48% of Soviet oil exports. Japanese imports of Soviet coal (9.9%
of Japanese needs) are the only significant area in an otherwise
unimportant relationship, whereby by 1979 only 0.8% of Japanese energy
requirements came from the Soviet Union.
Throughout the history of Soviet - Japanese negotiations there have
always been problems over credit and interest rates. The Soviets tended to
gloss over the problems faced by the Japanese in having to put up vast sums
of money, especially when the pay-back period might be fifteen years in the
future. In some cases, Sakhalin oil exploration being a case in point, the
capital put forward by the Japanese was the only capital at risk. The
peculiarities of compensation deals also caused their own sort of friction,
as one economist has suggested
The Russians believe that joint partnership compensation deals 
should warrant low interest loans and credits, since foreign 
investors receive substantial benefits by way of low-cost 
energy sources and other raw materials. The Japanese answer 
this criticism by stating that their interest rates on Soviet 
loans are well below prevailing commercial levels for 
international trade65
As a general trend Mathieson concludes in his otherwise very positive
review of Soviet - Japanese trade that
The co-partner’s interests run counter to each other. On the 
one hand, the USSR’s interest lies in obtaining the maximum 
amount of finance for each given project on very long period
65R.Mathieson, o p .cit. p.112.
TABLE 6
Soviet Oil Exports to Selected Countries 1971-79 (thousand b/d)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Total 2,110 2,140 2,380 2,340 2,600 2,970 3,130 3,300 3,280
France 75 66 95 23 57 72 95 104 128
F.R.G. 113 118 116 132 148 175 154 178 182
Greece 20 18 16 20 38 40 60 47 16
Japan 27 21 41 24 16 19 16 14 16
Source : Directorate of Intelligence,CIA,International Statistical Review GI - IESR 
82 - 007. July 27. 1982.p.24.
12l;b
TABLE 7
JAPANESE ENERGY DEPENDENCE - 1979 
(million tons of oil equivalent)
Oil/oil
products Gas
Hard
coal
Nuc­
lear
Impor­
ted
elect­
ricity LNG
Total
energy
Requirements 242.3 2.0 50.7 4.4 4.9 23.2 327.5
Imports from world 256.7 39.9 - - 12.0 308.3
Imports from USSR i•
o
2.0 - - - 2.7
Imports from USSR as per 
cent of total imports 0.3% 5.0% - - - 0.9%
Imports from USSR as per 
cent of requirements 0.3% 9.9% - - - 0.8%
Conversion factors: 1 kiloliter = 6.269 barrel = 0.1248 thousand metric tons oil
equivalent; 1,000 mtce = 0.6859 ratoe
Source: US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technology and Soviet Energy Availability, Washington D.C. 1982 
p.327.
deferred payments at low rates of interest...the Japanese rely 
on keeping credit extended as low as possible, with interest 
rates pitched at world levels...they want to recoup as fast as 
possible their very onerous financial commitment66
Let us now consider the issue of Soviet - Japanese coastal trade. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, coastal trade was the most 
rapidly expanding sector of overall trade between the two nations. But in 
spite of its impressive growth, it is relatively unimportant. It comprised 
approximately 2.5% of the total value of Soviet - Japanese trade in 1981 
and by 1983 this had fallen to 1.6%, or in terms of value from roughly 90 
million roubles to 50 million. (See Table Eight for absolute values of 
coastal trade). Thus the involvement of "small and medium sized" Japanese 
companies, as sought by Soviet commentators, was very limited indeed. From 
the Soviet side the main medium of transacting business was through the 
foreign trade organisation Dalintorg (established 1965). It operated under 
a barter agreement which limits the number of goods it may trade in. The 
lack of desirable products, poor Soviet quality control and their 
relatively high prices effectively put the brake on trade beyond certain 
close limits. Given Soviet pricing policy - whereby Soviet selling 
agencies only receive the domestic price for goods destined overseas - any 
incentive to produce better quality goods for export is removed. That also 
had its affect on the market.
The myth of the complementary nature of the two trading economies is 
nowhere better illustrated than with the question of coastal trade. Japan 
had hoped to sell the Soviets primary products but they were not 
interested. The largest value commodity exported by Japan in 1981 came 
under the heading of "clothes' ($14.03 million), the largest import
66Ibid. p.235.
Japanese Coastal Trade with the Soviet Union
TABLE 8
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Imports 34.74 39.74 50.62 54.32 54.17 
Exports 31.61 34.94 43.46 54.79 68.75
(millions of dollars)
Source : Nisso Boeki Handobukku 1984. p.243. Nisso Boeki Kyokai, 
Tokyo. 1984. (Japanese - Soviet Trade Handbook 1984. Japan - Soviet 
Trade Association, Tokyo).
commodity was ’food’ ($23.61 million).67 In practice the economic activity 
on Hokkaido is least complementary with the structure of the Soviet 
Maritime province. Soviet imports in fact originate mostly from the Tokyo- 
Osaka region. Japanese economists the author talked with at Hokkaido 
University speculated that, while there was a rough balance overall in 
coastal trade, Hokkaido imported seven times as much as it exported.
The involvement of the Japanese in containerised shipment across 
Siberia similarly was constrained by Japanese involvement in other, more 
important markets that could not be served via the Asian landbridge. On 
closer examination the actual figures for containerised traffic are not as 
impressive as might be thought. Tavrovsky68 claims that the four Japanese 
ships which carry the freight can carry a total of 1,690 large containers 
i.e. 400 each. (The four Soviet ships have the same capacity). In 1981-82 
a total of 138,000 containers were carried : this represents a maximum of 
345 shiploads. From the figures it can be seen that approximately two- 
thirds of container traffic carries Japanese exports, this would represent 
230 shiploads. Thus, at best one small (by Western standards) 400 large 
container capacity ship would dock in a Soviet far east port every one-and- 
a-half days. This figure must in turn, call into question Scherer’s 
contention that this traffic represents 25% of Japanese containerised 
traffic to Europe.69
The benefits of relations have to be defined not in absolute terms 
but in terms of likely alternative solutions. For both parties involved
67Japan - Soviet Trade Association, o p .cit. p.243.
68See, Yu.Tavrovsky, o p .cit.
69See, J.L.Scherer, o p .cit. p.327. N.Shylk, o p .cit. claims that volume 
on the Trans-Siberian "land-bridge" increased seventy-five times between
1971-82. However in 1982, shipments had declined by 12% in comparison to
1981. The opening of BAM reduces transit time to c.20 days. See p.121.
there always was an alternative. For the Soviets it involved either 
finding another supplier or closing the doors entirely to foreign 
creditors. For the Japanese, as the accompanying Table Nine shows, the 
total sums invested by individual companies were often a marginal 
percentage of their total capital; the losses themselves would not have 
been catastrophic, other customers might have been found elsewhere, or most 
of the sum involved in Soviet dealings could have been compensated for by 
increased sales of other commodities or by diversification into supply of 
other goods.
As one economist has argued
The ’benefits" of interdependence should be defined in terms of 
the values of the parties and the likely effects on those 
values of breaking the relationship. If there is little or no 
effect, or if the parties would actually be better off the 
relationship should not be described as interdependent. It is 
in that sense, and in that sense only, that interdependence 
involves mutual benefits70
In two of the main long-term projects that the Japanese are involved 
in, Yakutia gas and the Sakhalin shelf, the United States is also a party, 
in Yakutia directly, and in Sakhalin indirectly as most of the technology 
utilised by Japan there is American. In both cases the recalcitrant 
attitude of the United States towards aspects of trading has complicated 
the Japanese involvement making negotiations more difficult and lengthening 
delays.
This last point begins to touch upon the politics of trade. There 
sire other factors yet to be considered which influenced these developments 
: from the effects of abstract ideas, such as how two very different 
cultures view each other, or how the clash of different negotiating styles 
affected decisions. From the Japanese side, the functioning and
7°D.Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power : A Conceptual Analysis" in 
International Organisation Vol. XXXIV No.4 Autumn 1980. pp. 471-506. 
Quotation p.438.
TABLE 9
MAJOR JAPANESE COMPANIES TRADING WITH THE SOVIET UNION 
(million dollars)
1980 1981 1982 1983
Companies Total Exporta Imports Total Exports Imports Total Ex po r t s Imports Total Exports Impo rt R
1 Sumitomo Shojl Italsha I.td 650 875.5 789.1 86.4 748. 1 550.0 198.1 496.0 268.6 227.4
2 Nlssho Iwal Co Ltd 461 700.5 569.8 130.7 510.7 407.3 103.4 476.3 371.5 105.3
3 Mitsui & Co Ltd 487 666.6 588.9 77.7 693.1 513.1 180. 1 427.4 330.3 97.1
4 C. Itoh & Co Ltd 707 810.4 685.5 124.9 661.8 523.8 138.0 357.3 281.8 75.5
5 NI chimen Co Ltd 332 705.4 522.3 183.1 685.8 27 3.9 411.9 322.4 234.4 88.0
6 Marubeni Corporation 464 623.0 539.9 83. 1 656.0 574.4 91.6 290.0 231.7 58.3
7 Mitsubishi Corporation 526 675.7 522.3 153.4 570.9 318.0 252.9 225.1 101.7 63.4
8 Toyto Menka Kalsha Ltd 153 133.9 75.1 58.8 168.2 73.9 94.3 138.9 90. 1 48.8
9 ttanematsu-Gosho Ltd 241 174.8 96.8 78.0 169.9 68.0 101.9 134.8 77.8 57.0
10 Chorl Co Ltd 167 169.4 49.3 120.1 169.4 49.3 120.1 96.8 42.4 54.4
11 Tokyo Boekl Ltd 74 73.5 51.6 21.9
12 Kyoho Tsusho Co Ltd 171 287.7 270.0 17.7 66.3 33.6 32.7
These companies account for approximately 95 per cent of all trade.
Source: Nlsso Boekl Hand^bukku 1984. Nlsso Boekl Kyokal, Tokyo. (Japanese - Soviet Trade Handbook, Japan - Soviet Trade 
Association, Tokyo, 1984).
TABLE 10
JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
AND THE SOVIET UNION 
(Thousands of dollars)
PRC USSR
1976
Exports 1,662,568 2,251 ,874
Imports 1,370,915 1,167,441
Total 3,033,483 3,419,315
1977
Exports 1,938,643 1,933,877
Imports 1,547,344 1,421,875
Total 3,485,987 3,355,752
1978
Exports 3,048,748 2,502,195
Imports 2,030,292 1,441,723
Total 5,079,040 3,943,918
1979
Exports 3,698,670 2,461,464
Imports 2,954,781 1,910,681
Total 6,653,451 4,372,145
1980
Exports 5,078,335 2,778,233
Imports 4,323,374 1,859,866
Total 9,401,709 4,638,099
1981
Exports 5,095,452 3,259,415
Imports 5,291,809 2,020,706
Total 10,387,261 5,280,121
Source: Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), 
White Paper on International Trade, Tokyo.
limitations of their bureaucratic organisations also had an impact on the 
course of relations. All of these factors we shall examine in part four 
under the heading of Soviet foreign policy and Japan.
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THE SOVIET MILITARY AND JAPAN
What has been termed the "national security consciousness" of the 
Soviet military-political leadership has a decisive influence upon their 
perception of relations with the rest of the world. Military power is 
unquestionably of central importance for the Soviet Union in maintaining 
itself as a Superpower ; in this sense it is clearly an "incomplete 
superpower".1 In the particular context of relations with Japan, many 
analysts contend that Soviet policy is overdependent upon the military 
aspects, to a degree where it has become counterproductive and merely acts 
to exacerbate the divide between the two nations.2 Intimidation has not 
worked as a policy for the Soviets in North East Asia.
Inherent in such a critique of Soviet behaviour is a rejection by and 
large, of the suggestion that in other dealings with the Japanese the 
Soviets have sought to adjoin military power to a political purpose and 
goals. The utilisation of military power, it is argued, has become (or 
indeed always was) an end in itself that had led, by the end of the 1970"s, 
to a sharp perception on the part of the Japanese of a looming "Soviet 
threat" to their future security. Thus one Japanese analyst has concluded 
that "the answer to the question why Soviet Japanese policy has been self- 
defeating seems to lie in the fact that there is no other effective 
instrument of influence at the Soviets" disposal but the strategy of threat
PART III
1I am indebted to P.Dibb of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University for the use of the term.
2For example see, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian 
Security 1980. Tokyo 1980. p.45., "Soviet build-up worries Japan" in Soviet 
Analyst Vol.8 No.24 6 December 1979, H.Kimura, The Impact of the Soviet 
Military Build-up on Japan and Soviet Aims Paper presented for the Workshop 
on "Reducing Nuclear Threats in Asia" part of the Security Conference on 
Asia and the Pacific, April 13-15 1984. San Diego, California.
by military superiority".3
We shall examine later whether this widespread claim can be 
substantiated. First, let us turn to some general propositions on Soviet 
defence policy as a whole and then in particular some likely theatre plans 
of operation in the Far East.
The Research Institute for Peace and Security based in Tokyo in the 
1979 edition of its yearly survey of the military situation in Asia, Asian 
Security, wrote that "The primary aim of Soviet strategy is the same as 
that of any other nation : (a) to defend the country, (b) to ensure its 
survival, and (c) to protect her interests".4 This statement is 
unexceptionable but where contention arises is on the question of what 
level of defence is necessary for the Soviets to achieve these objectives. 
The debate throughout the 1970"s concerning the idea of "how much is 
enoughi?' will continue, the problems involved in comparing Western-Soviet 
force levels and capabilities are numerous and fraught with methodological 
difficulties by now well known. For the moment it is not our purpose to be 
drawn into these considerations as they affect North East Asia but rather 
to try to picture how the Soviets view their security needs in the region.
Any consideration of Soviet strategic planning for the Far East has 
to confront four questions :
(1) Which enemies will the Soviet Union have to face in the event of a 
war, either global or regional ?
(The enemies the Soviets may well have to face in a global war may be 
different from those it might have to face in a regional conflict).
(2) What sort of war is it likely to be - nuclear or conventional ?
3H.Kimura, "The Impact of the Soviet Military Buildup on Japan and 
Soviet Asia", Paper presented to the Workshop on "Reducing Nuclear Threats 
in Asia", part of the security conference on Asia and the Pacific 7 April 
13-15, 1984 at San Diego, California.
4Research Institute of Peace and Security, Asian Security 1979 Tokyo, 
1979. p.29.
(3) What are the goals and missions of Soviet forces involved ?
(4) What level and deployment of armed force is necessary to achieve
these goals ?
The Soviet Union, unlike the United States, is faced with the 
particular problem of being confronted by ’ enemies" on all sides. It has 
accordingly, as it sees it, to match and be able to counter the 
capabilities of each of these enemies in turn and provide itself with the 
wherewithal to defeat, or at least defend against, each in any potential 
confrontation. In the specific case of Soviet planning for the Far East 
the Soviets must assure themselves that they have the capability to fight 
on the second of two major fronts (the other, more important, being in 
Europe). In the East they will have to face possible nuclear attack from 
the United States and perhaps also from China ; conduct a distant and 
possibly prolonged war on land against China and Japan and perhaps against 
amphibiously-borne American forces. At sea the Soviets will have to 
consider conducting warfare in the vastness of the Pacific against a wide 
array of naval powers perhaps also including Australia and New Zealand. 
These formidable tasks require formidable force levels and equally daunting 
forward planning.
In fighting a nuclear war, the objectives for the Soviets in the East 
would be of dual nature, both offensive and defensive. They would seek 
from bases in the East to destroy the main heartlands of the enemy while 
preserving as much as possible Soviet resources that would contribute to 
their recovery and help them to emerge victorious over the long haul. 
Given the presumed list of Soviet priorities for nuclear missions Europe 
and the war against the NATO alliance must figure as number one and 
operations in the East as a secondary imperative. However throughout the 
1970"s the distinction in priorities has become less straightforward as the 
Soviets at both a nuclear and conventional level have taken steps to
upgrade the organisation and technical efficiency of their forces in the
Far East and to integrate them more fully into overall doctrinal planning.
The GK (High Command) of Soviet forces in the Far East was re-created in
1969, and it has been speculated that in 1979-80 General V.L.Govorov was
appointed to head a new body in the Felt East responsible for co-ordinating
the operation of the Far Eastern and Transbaikal military districts as well
as Soviet forces in Mongolia.5 The significance of this reorganisation was
emphasised by the highly unusual, and well publicised visit of Brezhnev and
Defence Minister Ustinov to Siberia and the Far East in April 1978.
Since then it has become clear that this re-organisation of the Far
Eastern Command was a part of a wider Soviet doctrinal and organisational
revision that had taken place through the 1970's and is still in the
process of implementation. Major strategic theatre commands were created
for central Europe and the Far East. The aim of creating these commands
has been summarised by one group of noted commentators as to
form a vital intermediate echelon which links central strategic 
control (exercised by the General Staff) with major operational 
field forces at theatre level, thus meeting the urgent 
requirement for both flexibility said effective command and 
control - facilitating the deployment of one “force package"
(or several such packages) in a particular crisis or 
operational area. This is the essence of peregruppirovka. 
strategic and operational redeployment, a theme explored in 
inordinate length in Soviet military writing.6
Associated with the refinement of the peregruppirovka concept has been the
parallel development of the idea of the "theatre strategic operation" which
envisages large scale military operations co-ordinating Soviet forces from
5See, V.Suvorov, "Strategic Command and Control : The Soviet Approach" 
in International Defence Review No.12 1984 pp.1813-1820. Radio Liberty 
Research, "More Evidence that General Govorov Heads All Forces in Far East" 
Radio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 78/82 February 17, 1982.
6J.Eri'ckson,L.Hansen et al, Organising For War : The Soviet Military 
Establishment Viewed Through The Prism of The Military District College 
Station Paper 2. Center for Strategic Technology, The Texas A & M 
University System, College Station, Texas, September 1983 p.3.
various fronts or armies into a major combined arms, multi-level offensive.
In this respect the Far Eastern theatre command (GTVD) encompasses 
not only the Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikal and Far Eastern military 
districts and Mongolia, but also the naval forces assigned to the maritime 
(MTVD) or oceanic (OTVD) theatres of military operations. The Sea of Japan 
and the Kamchatka Sea have been designated as MTVD’s, the Pacific as an 
OTVD. The Indian Ocean OTVD is also part of the structure. Each of these 
naval theatres may be further sub-divided into various zones according to 
the function and objectives of the military forces operating in them.7 It 
is important to emphasise that actions envisaged in naval theatres are seen 
as not independent of actions in continental TV’s or TVD’s but rather as 
complementary to them.
Apart from a list of targets in the United States and China which 
would be attacked from bases in the Soviet Far East, targets in Japan would 
presumably be selected on the same criteria as those in Europe. There are 
advocates of the theory that the occupation and defeat of Japan would be a 
secondary objective to be accomplished after a main exchange designed to 
leave as much of Japanese resources intact (industrial, economic, 
agricultural) as possible so as to assist in rehabilitating the Soviet 
homeland after the cessation of conflict. Soviet targeting of Japan would 
therefore be what is euphemistically referred to as 'selective'. This 
argument while depicting a possible scenario should not be taken as 
definitive.
7 In the Soviet organisational breakdown the Indian Ocean has an 
attached "adjacent area" i.e. the Arabian Sea. The Pacific fleet is 
responsible for operations here also. ’TV' 1 is the Soviet abbreviation for 
"theatre of war", a larger scale concept than ’TVD’. A ’TV’ is usually 
comprised of two or more "TVD’s". ’GTVD’ is a main theatre of military 
operations. The Sea of Japan is referred to by the Soviets as a "zakritii" 
MTVD i.e. an "enclosed" maritime theatre of military operations. For basic 
definitions see Ministerstvo Oboroni SSSR, Voennii Entsiklopedicheskii 
Slovar’ ’Voennoe' Izdatel’ stvo, Moscow 1983 p. 732.
Various interpretations of the content of Soviet military doctrine 
are proposed by Western analysts. The differences mainly lie in the 
emphasis given to certain aspects of Soviet doctrine, perhaps the main area 
of difference concerns Soviet concepts of escalation. Some analysts tend 
to emphasise more the subtle nuances of Soviet thought which suggest that 
the Soviets conceive of escalation and thresholds in similar terms as 
Western strategists. However the other major school of thought on this 
question argues on the same lines as Lambeth when he '• sums-up the whole 
Soviet approach thus : "For the Soviets, the key threshold is not nuclear 
employment but war itself".8 William Lee, an American expert on Soviet 
nuclear strategy, suggests that although generally the Soviets do not 
accept thresholds in the Western sense this might be subject to 
qualification as 'just as individual TVDs present different target arrays, 
Soviet politico-military objectives are not uniform for every TVD'. Thus 
in particular circumstances there might be ’practical considerations’ which 
would limit a Soviet nuclear strike.9
Although Lee’s views are shared by a wide body of opinion, they are 
far from generally accepted. On balance, the most persuasive
interpretations still lie with that group whose views are represented by 
Lambeth
Perhaps the main point to be emphasised regarding Soviet 
attitudes towards thresholds is that Soviet defence planners 
simply do not preoccupy themselves with - or, in many cases, 
even recognise - the sort of refined distinctions among levels 
and varieties of armed conflict that so heavily pervade Western
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8B.Lambeth, 'On thresholds in Soviet military thought' in Washington 
Quarterly Vol.7 No.2 Spring 1984. pp.69-76. Quotation p.71. For a good 
summary of the different schools of interpretation of Soviet military 
doctrine see, D.Hart, 'The Hermeneutics of Soviet military doctrine' in 
Washington Quarterly Vol.7 No.2 Spring 1984. pp.77-88.
9From a manuscript by W.Lee, "Soviet nuclear targeting strategy' in 
D.Ball, J.Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (forthcoming) 1987. 
'TVD' is the Soviet abbreviation for 'theatre of military operations'.
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strategic discussions. More to the point, they regard such 
notions as escalation ladders and comparable artifacts of 
Western discourse with a combination of bemusement and 
contempt...For them, the purpose of military power is not to 
manipulate perceptions, manage crises, or otherwise play games 
at the edge of war but simply to underwrite key Soviet national 
security interests for which lesser means - such as diplomacy 
and coercive persuasion - have proven unavailing. In practice 
this means that the Soviets are not likely to be much inclined 
to respect thresholds governing the intensity of military 
commitment, even though they may be perfectly prepared to 
recognise distinctions among various objectives for which 
military forces might be employed10
In another article Lambeth details the dissimilar rationales behind 
Soviet and American economic targeting in war. The major thrust of his 
argument is that if the Soviets ’spare’ economic targets it is not 
necessarily because they can be of use in the post-war reconstruction, but 
rather because of the ’fundamentally countermilitary orientation of Soviet 
doctrine and operational planning’. In other words, ’those economic and 
industrial targets will be included in Soviet operational plans not so much 
because of whatever postwar significance they might have for the adversary 
as because of their tangible relevance to more immediate Soviet combat 
objectives’.11
The ’Lambeth school’ reflects accurately the orientation of public
statements by leading Soviet officials. Minister of Defence Ustinov in an
interview with Pravda stated on the subject of limited nuclear war that
Would anyone in his right mind speak seriously of any limited 
nuclear wari? It should be quite clear that the aggressor’s 
action will ’ instantly and inevitably trigger a devastating 
counterstrike by the other side. No one but completely 
irresponsible people could mention that a nuclear war may be 
made to follow rules adopted beforehand, with nuclear missiles 
exploding in a ’gentlemanly manner’ over strictly designated
10B.L a m b e t h ,  o p .cit. p. 73.
^B.Lambeth, G.Lewis, ’Economic targeting in nuclear war’ in Orbis 
Vol.27 No.l. 1983. pp.127-150. Quotations pp.143, 144.
targets and sparing the population12
In an interview with Krasnaia Zvezda in May 1984, Marshal Ogarkov echoed
the same sentiment
The calculation of...waging a so-called 'limited' nuclear w e l t  
now has no foundation whatsoever. It is utopian...arguments 
about 'limited nuclear strikes without retaliation' against the 
enemy’s main centres and control points are even more 
groundless. Such arguments are pure fantasy13
What or where would these likely nuclear targets be in Japan? Any 
suggestions we make can only be tentative at best but in terms of a list of 
priorities of targets in and around Japan we can present an approximate 
picture as comprising : nuclear submarines, strategic air bases, naval 
bases, nuclear weapons sites, C3I centres. At a tactical nuclear level- 
nuclear equipped battle groups (US carrier task forces) and weapons 
systems/platforms capable of utilising nuclear weapons. Conventional 
targets which might be attacked with nuclear weapons would include 
weapons/fuel centres, smaller naval bases and airfields and logistic 
centres. Depending upon the extent to which the Soviets might want to 
spare Japan the worse effects, we can add economic and administrative 
targets. Government centres, crucial industrial facilities and 
transportation nexuses. A basic list of these targets is presented in 
Table 11.
It is axiomatic that the Soviets are gravely concerned about the 
prospects of a two-front war in Europe and Asia. The war in the West would 
be the decisive encounter and given that? there is a danger that operations 
in the East would be a drain on Soviet ability to win that decisive war. 
In this context even at a nuclear level, Soviet operations in the Far East
12As quoted in Strategic Review Winter 1982. p.83. Pravda 25 July
1981.
13As quoted in Strategic Review Summer 1984. p.85.
POSSIBLE NUCLEAR TARGETS IN JAPAN
The following is an outline of a potential Soviet nuclear target list 
for any attack on Japan. The JSDF and United States forces share many 
facilities making them probably more of a likely target. Air training 
bases have been excluded from the list - there are 5 main bases used for 
purposes of such training. Also, GSDF mobile headquarters which might be 
targets, except for regional command HQs, have been excluded on the grounds 
that presumably in the lead-up to war they will move from their known 
locations. Nevertheless should their positions become known they would be 
high priority targets given their importance in the C3I network.
The regional command headquarters are : Northern army - Sapporo : 
North eastern army - Sendai : Eastern army - Ichigaya : Central army- 
Itami : Western army - Kengun. An important target for any Soviet attack 
will be American C3I facilities and electronic monitoring systems which are 
supporting and co-ordinating strategic systems. Some of these are located 
within American base areas but many are not. Consequently the target list 
should be expanded to include such targets also. Okinawa has not been 
included on the list but is without doubt a high priority target. 
Including bases on Okinawa unclassified sources list 118 American 
facilities in Japan.
JSDF bases 
MSDF
Yokosuka Command HQ
Sasebo fleet HQ
Maizuru fleet HQ
Kanoya fleet air force base
Hachinohe fleet air force base
Atsugi fleet air force base
Naha fleet air force base
Tatsumi fleet air force base
Iwakuni fleet air force base
Kure Submarine fleet HQ
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iæ b
Shimofusa
Ominato
ASDF bases
Chitóse
Misawa
Komatsu
Hyakuri
Iruma
Gifu
Nyutabaru
Tsuiki
Kasuga
Naha
Miho
Fuchu
Major naval air training base 
fleet HQ
Wing + air defence missile group 
Wing + air control and early warning 
+ air defence missile group
Central air control and early warning, 
air defence missile group 
Air defence missile group
Western air control and early warning, 
air defence missile group 
Squadron and air control and early 
warning facility 
Tactical airlift command 
Air traffic control centre
The Japanese BADGE air control and early warning system consists of 28 
radar installations - all potential targets. A small number of ASW 
listening posts such as Cape Nosappu on Hokkaido might well also feature as 
important targets.
Maior American bases
Yokota
Zama
Yokosuka
Sasebo
Kamiseya
Atsugi
Misawa
Iwakuni
Yosami
HQ Japan, HQ 5th Air force, base 
fighter wing.
US Army Japan HQ. HQ Fleet air force 
US fleet HQ, submarine fleet HQ 
US fleet HQ. Main base US SSN's 
HQ and command base of air patrol 
and reconnaissance force 
Naval air base, fleet air force 
command base
Wing + Japanese air patrol group, 
naval air base, location Electronic 
security group 
USMC HQ, air wing 
C3 centre for US SSBN
Sources : Defense of Japan 1983 Defense Agency, Tokyo.
A comprehensive listing of C3I facilities - of which there are 
a significant number - can be found in W.Arkin, R.Fieldhouse, 
Nuclear Battlefields Ballinger Publishing, Cambridge, Mass., 
1985 and in D.Ball, J.Richelson, The Ties That Bind Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1986.
have to be seen as oriented towards a strategic defensive war to limit the 
ability of the United States and China to inflict damage on the Eastern 
territories of the Soviet Union. In such a scenario the real enemy to be 
matched would be the United States as the Chinese forces are no real match 
for the Soviet strategic arsenal.
Soviet Conventional Warfare Plans
The waging of conventional war in the East alone or as part of a 
wider conventional global war would be a significant undertaking for Soviet 
planners. In the context of a wider war it could also well detract from 
the Soviet abilities to win that war - as maximum effort must be devoted to 
the European theatre. Even allowing for the prepositioning of stocks and 
the completion of the BAM line, the logistical tasks involved in sustaining 
any part of a prolonged campaign in the East while NATO forces were being 
engaged elsewhere would, realistically, be beyond the capacity of the 
Soviet Union.
A recognition of this by Soviet planners has resulted in the belief 
that any undertaking would undoubtedly be accompanied by the use of nuclear 
weapons, not least because the Soviets have never expounded publicly any 
plans in which the use of nuclear weapons has not been foreseen as an 
integral part of a combined arms offensive. There is evidence of division 
of opinion between Soviet planners and Soviet officers who will have to 
operationally implement doctrine concerning the feasibility of 'selective' 
targeting or the ’limited’ use of nuclear weapons in certain 
circumstances14 but it would be unwise for Asian countries to conclude from
14See for example, Tank and Tank Troops 'Voenizdat*. Moscow, 1980. The 
book is written by various high ranking officers connected with the tank 
arm of the Soviet forces. They are talking of events which describe the 
performance of tanks in situations where nuclear weapons are utilised in a 
battlefield environment. Excerpts from this book can be found in Strategic 
Review Winter 1982. pp.87-90. A more recent work which implies that the 
Soviets should pursue the limited use of nuclear weapons is V.G.
this that the Soviet Union will omit to use nuclear weapons as an integral 
part of its conventional warfighting strategies in the Far East. More so 
as the dividing line between a regional/theatre system and a strategic 
system has become more blurred due to the deployment by the Soviets of 
advanced conventional weapons systems with the ability to carry nuclear 
warheads over longer ranges.
Depending upon the scenario the waging of conventional war against 
Japan could be greatly circumscribed. The Soviets stress the importance of 
carrying the battle on to the territory of the opponent. How does this 
concept relate to the Japanese case!? Any attack on Japan depends upon 
Soviet ability to move forces and supplies amphibiously. Even in the best 
circumstances imaginable in any land war - when China was not involved and 
the Soviets only deploy 'holding' forces along the Chinese border - even an 
invasion of Japan limited to the purpose of holding the straits open for 
Soviet fleet operations, would be a high risk undertaking and perhaps 
altogether unfeasible. Consequently, apart from naval operations (to be 
discussed next) Soviet conventional operations against the Japanese 
homeland are likely to be confined to major air attacks against crucial 
installations. This would be carried out both as a means of limiting 
Japanese/American ability to inflict damage on Soviet forces (particularly 
naval) and as a 'softening-up' for eventual occupation of Japan.
As we illustrate in the following section the Japanese MSDF and ASDF 
possess a significant anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and air capability 
respectively. These capabilities are being steadily improved by the
Reznichenko, Taktika (Tactics) ' Voenizdat', Moscow, 1984. W.E. Odom, in 
"Soviet Force Posture : Dilemmas and Directions’ argues that the 
development of Soviet force structure and advances in technology have led 
them to realise that a ’limited’ nuclear battle is more feasible than they 
have ever publicly admitted. See Problems of Communism Vol.XXXIV July- 
August 1985. pp.1-14.
Japanese. Both of these constitute a threat to Soviet naval forces and are 
a particular threat to the successful defence of the submarine bastion in 
the Sea of Okhotsk (see below) and thus also to Soviet anti-carrier 
operations. It is therefore likely that Soviet attacks will be 
concentrated on destroying or immobilising these Japanese assets. 
Airfields and communication facilities are undoubtedly high priority 
targets.
The United States' air forces (50 F-16s) that are to be based at 
Misawa from late 1985 onwards represent a formidable ground attack force. 
These high performance aircraft have the ability to carry a considerable 
weapons payload to Soviet bases. At a conventional level, this group of 
aircraft constitute the single most potent attack force based in Japan. 
The Soviets have presumably taken this fact into account and planned 
accordingly.
Soviet Naval Operations in the Pacific
The Soviet Pacific Fleet has been designed primarily for operation 
against the United States' naval forces. Its principal mission, the 
fulfillment of which has influenced naval developments throughout the 
1970's, is to secure the Sea of Okhotsk where Soviet SSBN operate as an 
important component of the Soviet strategic strike force. It is in this 
area that the two considerations of offensive/defensive strategies overlap 
and the resultant complexity has caused Soviet planners difficulty.
The changes in mission requirements for the Soviet fleet have over 
the years generated an operational structure based on the requirements to 
carry-out long range missile strikes and counter Western ASW technology. 
In striving to fulfil both requirements Soviet maritime defence zones have 
expanded.
Any attempt to construct a list of Soviet naval targeting priorities
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for global war can only be speculative. In summing-up the various 
objectives, Soviet military commentators rarely rank them in explicit order 
of priority though one can sometimes be inferred, for example, it is 
reasonable to assume that those missions directly related to Soviet 
strategic strike plans have the highest priority. The problem comes in 
ranking other missions.
Sokolovskii stated that
Nuclear rocket attacks against objectives in enemy territory, 
mainly against their nuclear devices, will create conditions 
favourable for the operations of other services of the armed 
forces. At the same time the strategic rocket troops, long 
range aviation and rocket carrying submarines will strike 
strategic objectives in the theatres of military operations as 
well, destroying simultaneously both enemy troop units, 
including reserves, and the bases of operational and tactical 
nuclear devices communications, the military control system 
etc...finally, military operations in naval theatres directed 
against groups of enemy naval forces to destroy his naval 
communications and to protect our naval communications and 
coast from nuclear attack from the sea must be considered an 
independent type of strategic operation...thus the theory of 
military strategy determines the following types of strategic 
operations by the armed forces during a future nuclear war : 
nuclear rocket strikes to destroy and annihilate objects which 
comprise the military-economic potential of the enemy, to 
disrupt the system of governmental and military control, and to 
eliminate strategic nuclear devices and the main troops units : 
military operations in land theatres in order to destroy the 
enemy forces; protection of the rear areas of the socialist 
countries and troop groupings from enemy nuclear strikes; and 
military operations in naval theatres in order to destroy enemy 
naval groups15
Admiral S.G.Gorshkov in his major work on naval power expanded upon
the role of the navy in certain scenarios of war :
Today, a fleet operating against the shore is able not only to 
solve the tasks connected with territorial changes but to 
directly influence the course and even outcome of the war. The 
most important of them has become the use of the forces of the 
fleet against the naval strategic nuclear systems of the enemy 
with the aim of disrupting or weakening to the maximum their 
strikes on ground objectives. Thus the fight of a fleet 
against the fleet of an enemy in the new conditions since
15Marshal V.D.Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy (3rd. ed.) (ed.) 
H.F.Scott, Macdonald and Jane’s, London,1975. Quotation pp.284-285.
nuclear weapons have appeared has become a secondary task as
compared with the operations of a fleet against shore16
Vice-Admiral K.Stalbo in Morskoi Sbornik concerned with ’Some Questions on 
the Theory of development and Uses of the Navy' talks of it being 
’incorrect to underestimate the theory of the strategic utilisation of 
fleets, whose military might is based on submarine nuclear missile 
systems’.17
From these comments, particularly those by Gorshkov, we can infer 
that the Soviet navy’s contribution to the strategic aspects of a nuclear 
war must be their paramount preoccupation - both through use of Soviet 
SSBNs in strategic strikes and through protection of this SSBN force as 
part of a retaliatory second strike force. The Soviet navy’s concept of 
’SSBN bastions’ is designed to fulfil both these aims. It is arguable that 
Gorshkov’s ’enemy strategic nuclear systems’ include American carrier 
battle groups. Gorshkov pointed out earlier in his work (p.185) that 
development and creation of forces capable of fighting aircraft carrier 
battle groups has been a prime preoccupation of the Soviet navy since 1945. 
A further indication that attacks on nuclear - capable battle groups would 
be of high priority is the probability that these groups would be assigned 
a major role in the assault on Soviet submarine bastions in either a 
nuclear or conventional war. Their strength, which makes them dangerous to 
the Soviet Navy and to shore targets, and the concentration of so much US 
naval strength in relatively few ships render them both necessary and 
tempting targets for Soviet naval operations, and likely therefore to be 
accorded high priority.
16Admiral S.G.Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State Translated by Naval 
Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland 21402. Pergamon Press,1982. Quotation 
P .  221.
17As quoted in Strategic Review Fall 1981. p.106. Morskoi Sbornik No.4 
April 1981.
As we stated above another major threat to the SSBN bastion and to 
Soviet anti-carrier operations will stem from ASW and air-to-surface attack 
units. Ideally the Soviet fleet will have co-ordinated action against 
these targets in Japan with the Soviet air force.
What more can we assume concerning Soviet naval operations j? Both 
Gorshkov and Sokolovskii had very little to say on aspects of naval 
operations such as support of ground operations or interdiction of an 
enemy’s sea lines of communication, other than to stress their importance. 
Gorshkov argued however that traditional operations of fleet against fleet 
retained relevance only in terms of their contribution to success in 
operations of fleet against shore.18
From comments made by Sokolovskii and Gorshkov we can outline 
specific Soviet naval missions as : (1) strategic nuclear strike; (2) 
strikes on carrier battle groups, perhaps as part of action undertaken in 
heading (1); (3) securing of contiguous waters; (4) support of ground 
operations; (5) interdiction of enemy sea communications.
We are still left however, with the question of which priority to
t  f
assign to each •!? To a large degree the first three missions are 
interdependent. So while the strategic strike must be considered first 
priority we should recognise that its success could be contingent on the 
other missions. Defence of the SSBN bastions must be seen as the vital 
mission for the Soviet Pacific fleet and all other missions secondary.
Naval co-operation with Soviet ground forces in a global war would be 
important. Such co-operative ventures are a possibility for Soviet forces 
in the Far East, specifically with regard to Japan and the seizure or at 
the least denial to the enemy of ’choke-points’ to facilitate fleet 
operations. The Soviets would have the alternatives of nuclear attack
18S.G.Gorshkov, o p .cit. p.222.
and/or in the Japanese case limited invasion of Hokkaido. Should China be 
involved in any war the Soviets might also wish to undertake small scale 
amphibious operations against objectives on the north east Chinese coast in 
support of ground forces. It is also possible that the Soviets might 
undertake limited amphibious operations on the Korean coast. The final 
Soviet concern, that of interdicting Allied sea lanes, can be seen as of 
comparatively low priority.
In the foregoing sections we have sketched an outline of Soviet 
planning and targeting contingencies for possible war scenarios in the Far 
East. In the following we intend to examine in particular the 
circumstances which might in practice constrain the implementation of 
Soviet strategies and operational plans in the Pacific theatre. Also we 
intend to examine the political aspects accruing from the Soviet 
interpretation of Japanese revanchism, the Japanese military build-up and 
then finally consider the important question of how - if at all - Soviet 
military power in East Asia has been used coercively against Japan to 
achieve political ends.
In considering why the Soviets are active in Asia it is important to 
stress that they not only claim historical status as an Asian power but 
have throughout the 1970’s been asserting their claim as a Pacific power 
also. The Soviets see their claim to this title as wholly legitimate as 
until the latter half of the nineteenth century Russia had far more 
substantial interests in the Pacific than had the United States and had a 
longer period of involvement in Pacific affairs than America.
The major Soviet security objective in the Far East has been to 
prevent the formation of any sort of alliance between China and the United
States and its allies, principally Japan. Bearing this in mind we can see
\
that Soviet expressions of concern over Japanese militarisation relate not 
merely to the militarisation itself but to the fear that any real growth in 
Japanese military status will bring such an alliance closer to formation. 
Equally, it could be argued that Japanese armament could appear as much a 
threat to China as to the Soviet Union, (indeed some of the latter Soviet 
pronouncements after the Japan-China treaty of 1978 were quick to suggest 
this) but for the most part Soviet public utterances have been eager to
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depict Japanese militarisation as directed against the Soviet Union alone. 
The Chinese, for their part, do not seem to see any serious threat to 
themselves from Japanese rearmament.
Writing some eight years ago Dzirkals in her Rand study suggested
that
In keeping with the characteristic sparseness of Soviet public 
pronouncements on the military aspects of Soviet security, 
there exists little in the way of media output that 
specifically treats the military dimension of Soviet policy 
towards Asian security. However, there do exist hints of 
possible active Soviet military measures as contingency options 
in support of Soviet security interests in Asia. Suggestions 
of such include (1) threats of retaliatory action against Japan 
in the event that United States' forces stationed there on 
Japanese territory should engage in unspecified armed action in 
Asia; (2) declarations stressing the critical importance of 
Soviet military assistance and successful military efforts on 
the part of Soviet allies and national liberation forces in 
Asia; (3) occasional advocacy of increased Soviet military 
force levels to meet the threat to Soviet security posed by 
possible adverse military developments in Asia.19
While the second of these features has diminished in salience since 
the mid 1970's, we can add a new category to the list in the form of 
increasing commentary on Japanese revanchism. Also we can cite a 
noticeably increased emphasis on statements stressing the necessity of 
Soviet counter-measures. Particularly, as a consequence of recent American 
deployment plans for Tomahawk cruise missiles in the Western Pacific and F- 
16 nuclear capable aircraft at Misawa airbase in Japan,Soviet threats of 
retailiatory action against targets in Japan have similarly increased.
The best example of this was the Soviet response to Premier 
Nakasone's remarks in Washington in January 1983 concerning Japan's 
position as an 'unsinkable' or 'big' aircraft carrier. TASS replied on 
January 19 that ' ...it is plain that there can be no 'unsinkable' aircraft 
carriers - and that by deploying aboard it arsenals of armaments, including
19L.Dzirkals, Soviet Perceptions of Security in East Asia : A Survey 
of Soviet Media Content R - 6038 November 1977. p.3.
US ones, the authors of such plans make Japan a likely target for 
retaliation. For such a densely populated island country as Japan this 
could spell a national disaster more serious than the one which befell it 
37 years ago'. 20
Soviet concern over regional military developments is sharp, as may 
be expected in a region where the strategic interests of three major powers 
overlap.
In approaching the problem of ensuring stability in the area the 
Soviets have adopted various plans. Believing it politically impossible 
and militarily dangerous to acquiesce in stability based on a 
preponderance of US-Japanese forces the Soviets have sought to involve (at 
least publicly) a wide number of Asian countries in their abortive 
collective security scheme. Japan has been approached at various levels 
concerning participation in, or bilateral association with this but has 
rejected all Soviet proposals. Undeterred by Japanese reticence on the 
subject the Soviets continue to advocate that collective security is the 
only real path to security for the region, arguing that the Western 
approach, based around a 'balance of forces' idea can only lead to trouble 
and inevitable miscalculation. Indeed the Soviets note the relevance of 
the concept to Japanese expansionism, for they point out that Japanese 
commentators talk less and less about the 'defence of Japan' and more in 
terms of 'the Japanese contribution to the balance of forces in Asia'. The 
point which Soviet commentators are wary of raising is that this change in 
the Japanese view of their role in the region has been influenced by their 
perception of a growth in Soviet military power in the Pacific.
20Quoted in USSR and the Third World 7 November 1982 - 6 March 1983. 
p.9. For other threats of retaliation see for example, N.Shashkolskii, 
'Dangerous mirages : Japan in US naval strategy' in Krasnaia Zvezda 3 
November 1983. p.3. Translation in FBIS, USSR Daily Report III 8 November
1983. pp.C4-6.
More to the point for Soviet analysts, the concern with the balance 
of forces concept is that it assigns the pivotal position to Japan. This 
in Soviet eyes is the evidence of and rationale for, the expansion of 
Japanese military and political influence. Judging by frequency of press 
statements Soviet commentary on Japanese rearmament reached a turning point 
in 1978.
That year saw a noticeable increase in frequency of comment on 
Japanese association with the West. The Soviet press carried, amongst 
others, reports on the visits by Shin Kanemaru, Chief of the Japanese 
Defence Agency, to Washington (Pravda 25 February); Kanemaru’s talks with 
NATO chiefs (TASS 12 June, Pravda 23 June); Japanese participation in US 
manoeuvres (Pravda 11 July); Kanemaru’s talks with Defence Secretary Brown 
in Washington (Pravda and TASS 5 August).
By this time it had become obvious that Japan’s weight in the 
political and military sphere was growing significantly and was reflected 
in particular by ’the unprecedented frequency of US-Japanese summit 
meetings’21 especially as these involved Japanese military chiefs.
The exact nature of the US-Japanese relationship in the military 
sphere is a matter of speculation for the Soviets who find themselves in a 
classic dilemma. Ideally they would wish to see Japan distanced from the 
United States, but they are also aware that an independent Japan might
\
become more assertive in pursuit of its security, to the Soviet detriment.’
Thus the Soviets are aware of the problems involved in the broad 
sweep of Japanese policy formulation but are hesitant to decide on the 
consequent policy to follow. This has led to a more noticeable than usual 
difference of emphasis of Soviet statements on the trends in Japanese-
21Prof. D.Petrov, ’Japan’s Place in US Asian Policy’ in International 
Affairs No.10, October 1978. pp.52-59. Quotation p. 53.
American military relations. How do the Soviets then view Japanese 
military links '■?
We can make the obvious distinction between public and private Soviet 
comment, but it is possible to make a further distinction based on which 
branch of the media is the source of comment. The most hard-line 
statements on Japanese revanchism, and in particular on the growth of a 
Japanese-United States-China alliance, can be found in Krasnaia Zvezda and 
in Radio Moscow broadcasts tailored for a particular Asian audience. 
Domestic publications and those intended for an English-speaking or 
Japanese audience, axe less forthright in attributing blame or intent. 
Japan is sometimes depicted as an active partner of American imperialism in 
the Far East and sometimes presented as its passive victim.
As outlined above,1978 seems to have been a turning point in comment 
not especially because of the China-Japan treaty of that year, but because 
of a new awareness that Japanese military growth really was beginning to 
take on substance. Japanese build-up through the 1970’s and in particular 
the first half of the 1980's gave rise to substantial criticism and Soviet 
attacks began to be directed not merely at instances of Japanese co­
operation with the United States in manoeuvres but at a sharing of defence 
technology with the United States and, as the Soviets saw it, at Japan 
becoming a de facto Asian member of the Atlantic Alliance. The rise in 
volume of Soviet press criticism indicated growing concern but still no 
clear policy was enunciated to counter the problem.
Soviet commentary generally expresses the belief that Japanese 
policy-makers retain an awareness of self-interest but circumstances have 
changed somewhat since Dzirkals wrote in 1977 :
(Soviet commentary on Japanese self-interest)... has been 
couched in reference to Soviet military power and has included 
explicit threats to employ that power directly against Japan, 
specifically in retaliation for action by US forces stationed
there. Such statements are relatively rare however, and Soviet 
commentary generally does not go beyond depicting the potential 
threat that Japan’s military preparations present to the Soviet 
Union and other Asian states...Soviet commentary is still 
regularly presented (particularly in the daily military press) 
depicting Japanese military policies as stemming primarily from 
United States' pressures22
Explicit threats have become more frequent as a result of both the
growth in Soviet capability to inflict damage on Japan and of the
increasing probability of this occurring because of American nuclear
deployments in and around Japan (cruise missiles and the proposed Misawa
deployment). An illustration of this was a broadcast to Japan by the Tokyo
correspondent of Radio Moscow, V.Tsvetov, who commented that
Prime Minister Nakasone's remarks at the Williamsburg summit 
signify a new stage of Japan's association with the NATO bloc.
To be more precise, they mark a new step towards Japan's 
participation in the NATO aggressive bloc, an act which may 
entail many possible consequences, such as the deployment of 
medium-range missiles in Japan and Japan being turned into a 
theatre of nuclear war.23
Gromyko could claim on 2 April 1983 that the deployment of Soviet SS- 
20 missiles in Asia was to help to counter the presence of American nuclear 
systems in and around Japan. At the same time Izvestiia drew an analogy 
between Japan’s position in any future war in Asia and that of West 
Germany's in a war in Europe and threatened Japan, suggesting that it would 
make a particularly good target due to the density of habitation, with a 
greater disaster than occurred in 1945.
In similar vein the Soviets were more determined to suggest the 
independence of at least ’certain circles’ when it came to Japanese 
military developments.24 That closer co-operation with the United States
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23FBIS, USSR Daily Report III. 2 June 1983. p.CC12.
24See for example, A.Biryukov, ’Dangerous Role of Reagan’s Visit’ in 
FBIS, USSR Daily Report III. 8 November 1983. pp.C3-4. V.Bunin, ’Nakasone’s 
Military Policy’ in Far Eastern Affairs No.2 1984. pp.64-74. Also see Part
by the 1980’ s was taking place was not in doubt but more stress was 
attributed to the Japanese developing their own momentum in this field. 
The potential inherent in Japanese advances into ’dual technology’ fields 
is a case in point. In January 1983 Japan agreed to lift its ban on the 
export of military technology to the United States. Japanese electronics 
firms have a large share in the world market in micro-electronic circuitry 
and advanced telecommunication equipment. For a few years they have been 
’racing’ the United States in the development of the next generation of 
computers, the so-called ’super computer’. Keal argues that ’were Japan to 
gain a significant lead over the United States in the development of the 
fifth generation computers it would at the same time lessen its dependence 
on the United States and might achieve similar results in other core 
technologies’.25 He continues to argue that Japan already produces a wide 
range of systems which ’enhance Japan’s own military potential and are in 
demand by armed forces of other countries’ (p.30). This is of vital 
significance for it is Japan’s possession of these dual technologies which 
gives it the ability to develop its own arms industry.
Growth of Japanese Forces - Soviet Comment 
The manpower of the Japanese self-defence forces has actually 
declined over the last fifteen years. The basis of Soviet attacks on the 
course of Japanese militarism lies not with the numbers involved but rather
-
with the substantial improvements in quality of the equipment of the 
Japanese forces.
Comparison of present-day figures with those of 1970 shows a dramatic 
upgrading of the artillery component of the Ground self defence forces and
1 of this work : section headed ’Japanese Remilitarisation’.
25P.Keal, Japanese Defence and Australian Interests Seminar paper 
presented in Department of International Relations, Australian National 
University. 26 September 1985. p.30.
also of the Anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW) element. A significant 
improvement has also been made in the force's air-defence capabilities.26
These are improvements in the defensive sphere, which could only 
contribute to making any Soviet invasion of Japan more difficult. But 
improvements which have taken place in the quality of the air and maritime 
self defence forces cannot be dismissed as having no applicability outside 
Japanese territory, and these are worrying to the Soviets.
Since 1970 the Japanese naval forces have been re-equipped with more 
modern ships and equivalent weapons systems, such as the US-designed 
Harpoon surface-to-surface missile system and the anti-submarine ASROC 
system, both of which are standard NATO armaments. Constant emphasis on 
the development of anti-submarine capability throughout the 1970's has 
produced a highly formidable force, while the upgrading of the air force to 
some 270 combat aircraft many of latest US designs, also marks an 
impressive advance on its 1970 position. The Self Defence Force also has a 
significant construction and procurement programme in hand. Its requests 
for the 1985 budget, for example, excluding purchases of tanks and 
artillery, sought to lay-down three destroyers and one submarine as well as 
purchase 11 P-3C Orions (ASW and surveillance aircraft) and 13 HSS-2Bs (ASW 
helicopters).27
These developments are the source of Soviet concern. Numerically the 
Japanese self-defence forces are of significant size and formidably 
equipped. However, major doubts have been expressed in Japan about the
26Comparisons made on figures provided by The Military Balance
(yearly) 1970-85. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
Also US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Japan's Contribution to 
Military Stability in North East Asia prepared for the Subcommittee on East 
Asia and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. USGPO, 
Washington D.C. 1980. pp.30-38.
27Financial Review 22 October 1984.
efficacy of Japanese forces and their likely performance in war.
A general complaint is that the Japanese defence effort has lacked 
shape and direction - the Japanese are unsure about the kinds of missions 
they want to accomplish and the nature of the threats they want to counter. 
Nakasone's ’commitment' to the naval defence of a ’1000 mile zone’ is a 
good example of the gap between capability and objectives. Such an 
undertaking was far beyond the resources of the huge Imperial navy of the 
1940's and is thus beyond those of the Maritime Self Defence Force. 
Admiral Long, former CinC US Pacific Fleet, has commented that while the 
Japanese defence forces are substantial 'there are serious deficiencies in 
the sustainability of their forces, in their ability to conduct combat over 
an extended period of time'.28
Criticisms have been made of the decentralisation of the command and 
control systems of the forces, lack of thorough training, infrequency of 
exercises, low stocks and low issues of equipment.
A report undertaken by the Centre for Strategic Studies in Tokyo, an 
organisation with strong affiliations to the military and staffed in the 
main by conservative analysts, entitled The Defence of Japan - An 
Alternative View from Tokyo stated the opinion that both the Self defence 
forces and the Japanese government have been overly optimistic with regard 
to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and that in consequence the Self 
defence forces leave 'much to be desired in both quantity and quality'. 
The Centre characterised the major deficiencies as :
- an inadequate intelligence apparatus
- an insufficient air defence capability, lacking depth
and endurance as well as bases, particularly in the North.
- an insufficient ability to maintain control of the sea, 
and to secure and blockade the straits around Japan.
- land forces unable to check, counter-attack or undertake 
tactical/strategic manoeuvres.
28As quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review June 16, 1983. p.76.
- a dangerously low level of readiness. Insufficient 
reserves, no mobilisation system established. Virtual 
lack of fortification of strategic locations.
- Stockpiles of munitions, fuel, food, extra equipment, 
spare parts and reserve material all low. Thus bringing 
into question the factor of sustainability.29
Much of this criticism is of a general nature; its validity depends 
upon the particular scenario, the nature of the initial attack, duration of 
action and level of Soviet forces committed. More telling specific points 
can be made on the abilities of the Self Defence forces to conduct 
operations.
Although by the end of 1981 the Ground self defence forces were some 
14% undermanned this has no real significance of itself. Against a high 
level sustained attack, even a larger force could not defend Japan without 
extensive American assistance. The main contingency which Japan has to 
plan for (and one which we shall later dismiss as being beyond the present 
capability of Soviet forces in the East) is an invasion of Hokkaido. In 
defending against this specific scenario the Japanese forces may have major 
obstacles to surmount. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency summed-up the GSDF's overall problem as being that 'It is presently 
limited in its mobility and ability to concentrate forces rapidly. 
Transport assets are inadequate for moving large numbers of troops and much 
of the equipment, such as artillery, is not readily transportable. Anti­
tank and air-defence capabilities in support of ground forces are not 
impressive judged by contemporary standards. Further compounding all of 
these difficulties are inadequate logistics'.30
29Centre for Strategic Studies, The Defence of Japan - An Alternative 
View from Tokyo. Published by The Heritage Foundation. Washington D.C. 
August 7, 1981. pp.12-14.
30US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Japan's Contribution To 
Military Stability in North East Asia prepared for the Subcommittee on East 
Asia and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. USGPO, 
Washington D.C. 1980. pp.38-39.
Criticisms of the SDF’s capabilities have sometimes been overstated, 
circumstances seldom being quite as bad as the critics would have us 
believe. The problem of transport support is a case in point. While a 
case can be made that the GSDF lacks organic transport, Japan’s extensive 
civilian communications networks and transport resources could probably 
provide sufficient transport for SDF requirements in an emergency.
As indicated above, the primary mission for which the Japanese have 
planned is to counter the Soviet fleet. In operational terms this has 
meant developing a significant ASW capability. Of the 32 destroyers 
available in 1984 four could carry three helicopters each; four were 
equipped with two helicopters each and seven with one each. Where the 
fleet is deficient is in its quotas of surface-to- surface missiles : only 
13 of the fleet’s destroyers and three of the frigates axe equipped with a 
surface-to-surface or ship-to-ship missile. The main armament of the 
remaining ships is guns, though most are also armed with an air-defence 
missile system (Sea Sparrow), now somewhat dated.31
Although the ships axe amongst the most modern, nearly 30% of the 
fleet is confined to minesweeping operations, and the surveillance 
capabilities of the fleet axe similarly constrained. The submarine fleet 
is by and large obsolescent, and limited to coastal operations, although in 
the enclosed seas where the Japanese will be mostly operating this may not 
prove a serious deficiency. It is also a diesel-powered fleet; this is to 
some extent advantageous in these enclosed waters, as the submarines are 
more difficult to detect than nuclear submarines. Much of the fleet’s 
reconnaissance capability lies with the ageing P-2J’s aircraft but modern 
Orion P-3C are being acquired. The maritime defence force lacks organic 
tactical air power as it has no carriers, and is also deficient in ship-
31Jane’s Fighting Ships 1984-85. London.
based air defence systems. Given the high priority the Soviets will likely 
assign to air attack protection of MSDF surface ships would in large part 
fall upon an air force already heavily engaged in carrying out its other 
tasks.
The Air self defence forces suffer from lack of an electronic counter 
measures (ECM) ability but their largest drawback stems from their 
orientation to air defence i.e. they are an interception force not designed 
to undertake ground attack missions. Its ground attack capabilities are 
marginal and revolve around the indigenously designed F-l aircraft. This 
deficiency may be compensated in future by the fact that the American F-16s 
to be deployed on Misawa from 1985 onwards will be equipped for a ground 
attack role, not interception. Questions have been raised concerning the 
early warning system's ability to pick-up low level penetrations - but this 
may well be somewhat alleviated with the introduction of the F-15J which 
has a look-down shoot-down capability. There has also been an apparent 
failure to train ASDF pilots in the conditions likely to be encountered in 
attacking targets at sea, partly because of a lack of the appropriate 
surface attack technology and partly through bad planning by the command of 
the SDF. These limitations must call into question the ability of the ASDF 
to support the maritime self defence force. The ASDF Nike ground-to-air 
missile system, deployed in 1962, is widely held to be inadequate against 
modern aircraft. Their BADGE, aircraft control and early warning system, 
operational since 1967, is similarly constrained by obsolescence, though it 
has been somewhat updated.
The conclusions suggested above are mixed. Japanese forces, while 
relatively large, and equipped in some respects with very up to date 
weapons systems and platforms, are not capable of offensive operations 
outside Japan, and are still suffering in the 1980's from deficiencies
which the very recent acquisition of modern technology (P-3C for example) 
may begin to put right; but the benefits of the modernisation will not 
begin to materialise for perhaps another five years or more.
Soviet Capabilities in the Region : Military Competence or Military
Omnipotence?
An estimation of Japanese defence capabilities cannot be made in a
vacuum but has to be related to the potential threats perceived by
policymakers. The circumstances of the outbreak of war, its duration, its
geographical location and the strength of forces committed by the Soviet
Union all have relevance to the Japanese ability to fight successfully.
We stated at the beginning of this section that military power is the
pivotal component of Soviet status as a superpower. We also stated that
the Soviet Union was an 'incomplete superpower'; the rise of military
capability which has carried it to, and assured it of, that status has been
dramatic in certain areas. Many Western analysts would agree with a
summation of this rise to power given by Levin in his Rand report :
...this change in status is particularly noticeable in East 
Asia, where a remarkably rapid build-up of Soviet military 
capability over the course of the 1970's was accompanied by a 
concomitant diminishing of those of the US... this build-up 
took place in two broad stages. The first, from the late 
1960's to the early 1970's, emphasised the rapid build-up of 
Soviet ground forces deployed primarily against China. After a 
hiatus of some five or six years, the Soviets resumed their 
build-up. This second stage involved the deployment of a new 
generation of intermediate range nuclear weapons, the major 
expansion and qualitative improvement of the Pacific fleet, and 
the development and extension of Soviet bases in the 
territories north of Japan32
This growth, Levin concludes, serves wider interests which are the 
interdicting of air-sea communication in the region : giving the Soviet 
Union the ability to operate in Europe and the Middle East without 
sacrificing their position in the Far East : an ability to tie down US
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Security Relations in the 1980's Rand Note, March 1983. N - 1960 FF.
forces and impede their move elsewhere : attainment of global power 
standing (the Far East has become the focal point of these efforts).
Levin’s conclusions can serve as a good benchmark for our following 
section which will examine Soviet capabilities within the region. For 
while representing accurately the general trend in the development of 
Soviet capabilities, Levin’s remarks do not tackle the fact that the actual 
abilities of Soviet forces still have to be measured against the tasks set 
them by military circumstance. It is apposite to ask what is militarily 
within the ability of the Soviet Union to accomplish in North East Asia and 
the Pacific [?
Nuclear Warfighting 
We have argued above that at a strategic nuclear level the Soviet 
Union needs the capacity to counter, or to attack first, the nuclear 
capabilities of an array of enemies and a widely dispersed range of targets 
in the United States, Europe, China, Japan and elsewhere. We have also 
outlined - in terms of mission priorities - a list of targets that Soviet 
planners would probably desire to attack.
For those targets in Japan the Soviets have sufficient warheads to 
devastate any series of potential targets. However, on a regional basis, 
whereby the Soviets have to take into consideration the survivability of 
their own systems and their ability to attack, with a reasonable 
probability of success, targets in China, Southern Asia and the Pacific, 
success becomes more problematical.
Throughout the 1960’s and then into the 1970’s the limitations of SS- 
4 and SS-5 missiles curtailed Soviet chances of success in such a scenario. 
The replacement of these systems by mobile SS-20’s, armed with three 
warheads and a range sufficient to reach Guam from Soviet territory 
undeniably constitutes a major alleviation of the uncertainty about
achieving targeting objectives in difficult circumstances. At present 
there are reportedly 136 SS-20’s deployed against Asian targets.
Throughout the 1970’s the Soviets have also enhanced their capability 
to fulfil regional nuclear missions by deploying more varied nuclear- 
capable systems : SU-24 and TU-22M aircraft are good examples of these. 
These modernisations replacing suspect systems with better ones, are 
however, occurring at a time when the United States and to an extent China, 
are themselves diversifying their nuclear delivery systems thus causing 
Soviet planners recurrent problems of having to attack more diversified and 
perhaps better protected targets.
The position and involvement of the two Koreas in Soviet strategy is 
uncertain. Immediate North Korean involvement on the Soviet side could 
have disadvantages for the Soviets, particularly in terms of nuclear 
escalation as American forces on the peninsula are geared to defending the 
South with nuclear weapons. Further, North Korean involvement may have 
ramifications for the Chinese position. Should China decide to remain 
initially neutral in any Soviet-American/Japanese confrontation North 
Korean intervention may precipitate Chinese intervention under 
circumstances not favourable to the Soviets (i.e. when they were not 
prepared for it). Even in circumstances of co-ordinated Soviet-North 
Korean action, Soviet support for the North Koreans is likely only to be 
limited to air support and possibly assistance in amphibious operations on 
a small scale. Ultimately the eventual occupation of South Korea is a 
likely Soviet goal as it would enable them to secure the southern end of 
the Sea of Japan from American penetration. But this goal should be seen, 
realistically, as very much a long term proposition.
Questions raised with respect to Western Europe about the feasibility 
of ’selective’ targeting are equally, if not more, valid in the
circumstances of any attack on Japan, where industrial and population 
centres are not only geographically more concentrated but also more densely 
populated. The Yokosuka port complex is only 40 kilometres from the centre 
of Tokyo : an estimated 30 million people inhabit the greater Tokyo area, 
at present this constitutes the largest concentration of people in the 
world. The world's third largest concentration of population lies along
the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto axis. Thus the question remains how can a ’selective’
i
nuclear targeting strategy be implemented in such an environment ?
Conventional War and Japan
The scenario of conventional warfare involving Japan and the United 
States, and possibly China, against the Soviet Union can be seen either as 
a straight conventional war in its own right or as the conventional phases 
of a nuclear conflict.33 In the Far East the major mission of Soviet 
conventional land forces would be the defeat and occupation of certain 
sections of China; certainly the north and perhaps Western sections also. 
It seems unlikely that any further operations would be undertaken further 
into China, because of demands those operations would place on Soviet 
forces. Rather the likely Soviet approach would be to deliver a rapid 
’knock-out blow’ in a geographically limited operations context sufficient 
to leave Chinese potential for waging war at an absolute minimum. In a 
situation where China is neutral the Soviets might choose to deploy 
’holding forces’ and utilise remaining forces elsewhere.
In interpreting Soviet strategy in the East we must be aware of the 
’big picture’ as seen by Soviet planners. In a global war - according to 
Soviet theory quite possibly a prolonged war - the Soviets would have to
33We should note that, as pointed out above, theoretically the Soviets 
do not see the distinction in such terms for more so than in Western eyes 
the Soviets see the use of nuclear weapons as an integral part of any major 
warfighting situation.
fight on two major fronts (Europe and the Far East) and on a third front in 
the south (the Gulf/Indian ocean region) probably having to undertake 
operations against American forces that could threaten Soviet success 
elsewhere. A successful war on two fronts, and a possible third, may well 
be beyond the capabilities of Soviet conventional forces.
In waging war in the East the Soviets have to consider the effect of 
American and (possibly Chinese) strikes upon the transportation network in 
what is termed a 'broken-backed' scenario when Siberia is 'detached' from 
the European districts of the Soviet Union by destroying its communication 
links. To serve to counter this the Soviets have given constant attention 
to improvements in the communications infrastructure as well as in 
stockpiling and prepositioning material for forces in the East so that they 
can conduct at least a defensive battle as independently as possible, not 
least because Soviet planners are aware that the demands of any war in the 
East could detract from Soviet abilities to win the crucial battle against 
NATO.
The past Soviet historical experience of the problems of conducting a 
war against Japan, 1904-5, 1938-39, and 1945 involved major logistic 
efforts. Not surprisingly the Soviet military have been constant 
supporters of the BAM development. Placed at an average distance of 250 
kilometres from the Chinese border it is a far more defensible line than 
the trans-Siberian. According to Pentagon estimates up to one-fifth of all 
the military material for the Far Eastern military district (a total of 11 
million tons) is prepositioned along BAM. The Pentagon suggests that this 
material is sufficient to sustain operations for up to two months for 
Soviet forces.34
34US Department of Defence, Soviet Military Power April 1984, USGPO 
Washington D.C. p. 7 9.
However we should be careful not to exaggerate the impact of this new 
development. Whiting summarises its real significance when he suggests 
that it has "more value in a pre-military combat situation than in an 
actual war...".35 Looking at things overall in the Far East he contends 
that "Soviet development offers only a limited increase in Soviet strategic 
capability... its greatest contribution is in its strengthening of the 
region’s logistic and support capacity before hostilities begin. Once a 
war starts, however, the defensive liabilities appear to outweigh the 
offensive advantages".36 Despite the benefits to be gained from the 
construction of BAM, Soviet communication and supply to the Far East is 
still tenuous. Though large Soviet air-forces are interposed between China 
and BAM it is not inconceivable that low-level intruding aircraft could 
still attack the railroad. Conventional missile attacks, especially on 
’choke points’ (e.g. there are three major bridges of 400 metres length and 
numerous smaller ones as well as two major tunnels on the line), could pose 
serious threat of disruption.
Let us now consider in detail the Soviet threat to Japanese security. 
In this context the principal focus would be on Soviet naval power and the 
Pacific fleet. The major threat to the Soviet Far East stems from the 
nuclear capabilities of the American 7th fleet but a secondary, 
conventional threat, which the Soviets cannot dismiss lies in the 
substantial amphibious capability of the fleet. Moreover the increasing 
emphasis of Western navies on offensive operations against the Soviet 
submarine bastions, in this case the Sea of Okhotsk, have worried Soviet 
strategists sufficiently for them to develop through the 1970’s a capacity
35A.Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia : Threat or Promise?
Stanford University Press, Stanford,1981. p.101.
36Ibid. p.108.
for the Soviet navy to push out its defensive barriers as far from Soviet 
coasts as possible.
The requirements of operating in distant waters led to changes in 
naval strategy and ship design towards systems capable of maintaining 
command of selected sea areas over an extended period of time. To this 
end, new types of frigates, destroyers and ship-borne aircraft units were 
deployed in modernisation programmes through the 1970's while shore-based 
air capacity was also increased with the introduction of more advanced, 
longer range aircraft, the most obvious of these being the TU-22M.
Estimates of Soviet fleet strength in the Pacific vary considerably. 
Table Twelve, compiled by Tritten, is based on a comparison of unclassified 
figures from various sources. Table Thirteen presents Soviet force levels 
and deployments in the Far East.
We have said that the first Soviet priority is to maintain the 
survivability of the submarine component of its strategic nuclear arm. 
However it is generally accepted by western naval analysts that at any one 
time only approximately 15% of the Soviet SSBN fleet is ever on station. 
(This compares with 55% of the American force). The average number of 
Soviet SSBN boats on station for 1980 was 13 out of approximately 60. 37 
Thus in a Soviet worse-case scenario, when war is instigated by the United 
States and the Soviets are caught relatively uprepared, a major portion of 
the Soviet SSBN fleet may lie vulnerable. An estimated 35% of Soviet SSBN 
are based with the Pacific fleet. While the Delta class of boats may have 
the range to attack the continental United States from Soviet coastal 
waters, their survivability would be greatly enhanced by deployment outside 
the Sea of Okhotsk.
37I.Bellany, 'Sea Power and Soviet Submarine Forces' in Survival 
Vol.XXIV No. 1 Jan/Feb. 1982. pp.2-8.
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STRENGTH OF SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET 1983
Assumed total
Percentage Number 
of Total 
Fleet
Strategic Forces
All SSBN
Active Long Range Maritime Forces*
35 22
SSGN 41 20
SSG (J) 22 3
SSN 33 19
SS 33 25
Surface Strike
CVHG 33 1
CGN/CG 4
CG/CL Sverdlov 33 2
Surface ASW
CG (Kara, Kresta II) 6
Surface Escorts
DDC 10
FFG 1 1
Amphibious
LPD 1
LST 10
Long Range Aircraft
Bombers (TU-22M) 20
MPA<ASW (Bear F) 25
Active Theatre Maritime Forces**
SSBN (H II) 35 2
SSB (G II) 53 7
Attack Submarines
SS 28 20
Theatre Surface
DD (Kotlin, Skory) 31 8
FF/FFL 30 43
Mine Warfare
MSF/MSC 24 62
Amphlblous
LSM 19 10
Theatre Aircraft
Bombers 33 103
Fighter bombers 18 14
MPA/ASW 39 55
Reserve Attack Submarines
SS/SSC 25 27
Reserve Surface
CC/CL, DD, FF 10
* Active Long Range M a r i t i m e  Forces In general refers to 
those units capable of distant water operations - generally 
ships In excess of 1,000 tons and amphibious transports and 
long range aircraft.
** Active Th e a t r e  M a r i t i m e  Forces generally refers to units 
llkely'^to operate under a protective umbrella of land based 
av i ation. The tabic does not Include coastal
defence/patrol units, KGB forces patrol ships.
Source: J. Tritten, Soviet Navy Data Base: 1982-83, Rand Paper 
p-6859 April 1983, p p . 14-16.
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TABLE 13
SOVIET BASES AND DEPLOYMENTS IN THE FAR EAST
Prior to consideration of the information presented below it is necessary 
to place it in a wider context. The Soviet Far Eastern Military District 
is part of the "Far Eastern Strategic Theatre" (GTVD) which comprises the 
Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far Eastern military districts as 
well as Mongolia and the Pacific and Indian ocean "Oceanic TVDs". In the 
Siberian and Transbaikal military districts and Mongolia the Soviets deploy 
a total of 4 tank divisions, 18 motorised rifle divisions, 2 artillery 
divisions and just over 520 combat aircraft. These forces are normally 
counted in the Soviet-Chinese balance; however it is important to register 
their existence as a ready-to-hand reserve to provide elements for any 
campaign against Japan depending upon the scenario. This is a particularly 
appropriate consideration in the case of aircraft, where the Soviets have a 
geographically proximate large reserve on which to draw but where the 
Japanese and Americans basically do not. For them air-reinforcement of 
Japan is a far more complex and time consuming problem.
Armv strengths
In the Soviet Far Eastern military district there are deployed two tank 
divisions, 18 Motorised rifle divisions, 1 airborne division, two motorised 
rifle brigades and two independent air-mobile brigades. The majority of 
these land-forces are of course earmarked for operations against China. In 
evaluating the numbers likely to be involved in the scenario of war against 
Japan there are many variables to consider : bearing that in mind and with 
the proviso that the Soviets can of course reinforce those forces which 
they choose to utilise against the Japanese and American forces in North 
East Asia the following table outlines, from unclassified information those 
forces deployed mainly in the Far Eastern military district.
Kamen-Rybolov 29th Motorised Rifle Division
Komsomolsk-na-Amure 73rd Motorised Rifle Division
Ussuriisk HQ 5th Army, Motorised Rifle Division
Poronaysk 79th Motorised Rifle Division, 1st
Artillery Division
Slovania Motorised Rifle Division
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk HQ 15th Army, 342nd Motorised Rifle
Division, 1 Artillery Division
Barabosh-Kraskino 17th Motorised Rifle Division
Petropavlovsk 22nd Motorised Rifle Division
Magadan Independent Motorised Rifle Brigade
Kuril Islands 3rd Motorised Rifle Division
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Lesozhavodsk
Khabarovsk
Svobodnii
Belogorsk
Birobidzhan
Motorised Rifle Division
194th Motorised Rifle Division 
HQ Military District
Motorised Rifle Division
6th Guards Airborne Division
Air Assault Brigade, Spetsnaz 
Brigade.
Pacj.fic Flegt
The fleet is based around two squadrons, the 5th and the 7th.
Vladivostok 60-70% of all vessels (mainly surface)
HQ of 5th squadron. 2 naval infantry 
regiments also deployed.
Petropavlovsk 
(Talinskaia Bay)
Nakhodka
Sovetskaia
Gavan
Vladimir
Olga
Korskov (Sakhalin) 
Magadan
HQ of 7th squadron. 75% of 
submarines - most of the SSBN, SSN. 
18-20 major surface combatants.
Base for 
combatants.
submarines, frigates, minor
Second largest base for surface fleet, 
7-10 major surface combatants.
Frigates.
Frigates.
Destroyers and frigates.
Submarines (5-6).
Comment Most of the Siberian Far Eastern ports tend to be frozen for 
up to 6 months of the year. Peter the Great Bay (Vladivostok) is greatly 
hampered by ice in winter. Magadan is usually ice bound from November 
until April.
Naval Aviation (HQ Sovetskaia Gavan)
Total of 350 - 360 aircraft.
Anadyr Forward Staging base Tu-22m.
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Sovetskaia
Gavan
Kamchatka (South)
Kamchatka
Korskov
Alexandrovsk
(Sakhalin)
Alexsyevskaia
Khaka
Khabarovsk
Carrier-borne 
aviation
(on the Minsk and Novorissisk)
Mixed squadrons of patrol, reconnaissance 
and bombers. Estimated at : Tu-22 M (30- 
35), Tu-22 Recce. (10-15), Tu-142 ASW (20) 
Tu-16 EW (15-20).
Tu-16 (60-70).
M-12 ASW(10), 11-38 ASW (15-20).
ASW patrol and helicopters.
ASW patrol, TU-22M, Su-17.
Bomber base TU-22M.
7
?
Yak-36 (24), Ka-25 ASW (60)
Soviet Air Forces : Far Eastern Military District (HQ Khabarovsk)
US intelligence reports suggest that up to 90% of the aircraft 
deployed in the region are now (1984) third generation as compared to only 
50% in 1978.
Total air strength 1000-1100 (includes 200 helicopters).
Vladivostok
Nikolayevska
Dolinsk/Sokol
Provideniia
Ussuriisk/
Spassk-Dalnii
Khaka lake
Sandagou
Khabarovsk
Velikaia
Sovetskaia Gavan/ 
Komsomolsk
3 large bases
2 bases (Voyska PVO/Frontal aviation)
Base complex. Voyska PVO (SU-15).
Staging base, long-range bombers.
2 bases Tu-16 Bombers(130-140)
3 bases 
2 bases
VA - VGK base (formerly long range aviation) 
Voyska PVO base
162 e
Nikolayevsk-na-Amure
Okhotsk
Blagoveshchensk 
Petropavlovsk 
Sakhalin South
Sakhalin North 
Kuril Islands
Major concentration ; Voyska PVO
6 bases. Korskov, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 
Dolinsk (Voyska PVO) SU-15s.
Leonydovo (Voyska PVO)
2 bases, Burevestnik (Iturup) (20 Mig-23, 10 
Mig-21, SU-15).
From these bases Frontal aviation deploys an estimated :
Mig-23 : 120-180 Su-7/17/20 : 75-100
Mig-25 : 100-120 Su-15 : 120-180
Mig-27 : 50-75 Su-24 : 70-80
Yak-28P : 40 Tactical Recce : 70-80 aircraft
Long Range Missiles
SSM's deployed which have the range to hit Japan if launched from 
areas of the Maritime Province are SS-22 said SS-23 (number unknown).
Transport Aviation
It is estimated that the VTA deploys 100-130 aircraft in the Far East 
based principally around the Sovetskaia Gavan and Komsomolsk-na-Amure 
complex of bases.
Comment It should be pointed out that neither Anadyr, Magadan nor 
Petropavlovsk are linked by either railway or sealed road. They are 
totally dependent, as is Sakhalin, upon supply by sea or air 
transportation.
Sources : Various, major works are; Jane's Fighting Ships 1984-9.5. 
N.Polmar, Guide To The Soviet Navy 3rd. edition. Naval Institute Press, 
Annapolis,Maryland, 1983. The Military Balance 1984-85. 86-87. IISS, London
1984, 1986. Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1980 
Tokyo, 1980. W.Arkin, R.Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields Ballinger 
Publishing, Cambridge,Mass.rl985. Jane's Defence Weekly Vol. I No.4, 14 
April 1984 pp.560-562. 19 January 1985 p.89. 'Soviet Air Power', in Asian 
Aviation April 1983 pp.44-59. 'Soviet Air Defence Systems Showing 
Increasing Sophistication' in Defence Electronics May 1984 pp.75-86. Jane's 
Defence Weekly Vol.Ill No. 10. 9 March 1985 pp.406-407.
In the event, or likelihood of a major war it is probable that the 
Soviets will pursue a strategy of deploying as many submarines to sea in as 
short a period as possible, not merely to coastal sea areas but also out 
into the wider Pacific. This may well take place as a "surge 
mobilisation". Certainly it is plausible that Yankee class boats would be 
deployed to forward positions in the Eastern Pacific ("politically 
desirable as an escalatory statement and as a demonstration of resolve"); 
certain analysts also believe it possible that a number of Yankees might be 
held back in relatively closer waters to act as a theatre nuclear strike 
reserve. There are arguments which are supportive or dismissive of both 
hypotheses. Tritten sums-up the position on deployment patterns by 
suggesting that
From the evidence of the hardware alone, it is impossible to 
conclude with certainty whether Yankees retained in home waters 
would be used in theater strikes or as part of the theater or 
strategic reserve 38
Delta and Typhoon class boats, as suggested above, would also 
probably be deployed to sea as quickly as possible in order to maximise 
their survival chances. There are again both political and military 
reasons for this in that they can act as naval contributors to any overall 
strategic reserve in the context of Soviet strategic theory which includes 
the potential for an initial conventional phase or a total conventional 
war.
Hence the long range of SLBMs and deployment in home waters 
maximises submarine survival. Coupled with their lack of 
accuracy which limits use against hardened targets, this tends
38J.J.Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado,1986. While it is politically and militarily (enchancing 
first strike threat) advantageous to deploy Yankees forward there are the 
drawbacks of losses likely to be suffered in transition to the Eastern 
Pacific and the question of whether it is worthwhile as the number of 
warheads added to Soviet strike capabilities by an increased deployment of 
Yankees is not significant in terms of overall numbers that can be launched 
by other classes (e.g. Deltas and Typhoons).
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to support a reserve vice immediate use role. The one main
advantage of the Delta/Typhoon is that it further guarantees a
Soviet "assured destruction" strike against the US no matter 
what else happens to other Soviet strategic forces
This reserve role does not necessarily mean only for inter- or 
post-war bargaining or coercion but also as a hedge against the 
possible but unlikely destruction of Soviet bombers, submarines 
in port, and ICBMs. No matter what happens sufficient 
capability remains at sea to make a nuclear response 39
Western superiority in ASW makes the long term survivability of these
submarines, and certainly the older and ’noisier* classes (Yankee)
doubtful. The Soviet problem has been compounded by the Western response
to the development of bastion areas, which has been the evolution of a
counter strategy designed to carry the attack right into the secure areas
relying on superior Western technology and ECM ability. This has been
pursued to the extent that "the growing importance of naval strategic
assets and concern about the budding US determination to wage offensive
operations in Soviet home waters have prompted Soviet military planners to
opt for an even more rigorous and systematic pro-SSBN strategy".40
Thus Soviet strategy has evolved throughout the 1970’s. But even
though more of the fleet has become SSBN oriented, the task of defending
the bastions has become more problematic and more of a preoccupation for
39J.J.Tritten, o p .cit. p.155.
40N.Rivkin, 'No Bastion For the Bear’ in US Naval Institute 
Proceedings April 1984, Vol.110/4/974. pp.37-43. Quotation p.39. See also, 
J.S.Breemer, ’The Soviet navy’s SSBN bastions : Evidence, Inference and 
Alternative scenarios’ in RUSI Journal Vol. 130 No.l March 1985. pp.18-26. 
For a good summary of the Western response to the development of bastions 
see J.Mearsheimer, "The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe" in 
International Security Vol. XI No.2. Fall 1986 pp.1-36. Interestingly 
enough comment on the mechanics of implementing "The Maritime Strategy", 
has concentrated almost exclusively on its role in Northern Europe with no 
details provided on Pacific operations. It would be misleading to view the 
Soviet "bastion" strategy as operationally a "defensive" concept. Bastions 
will not be passively defended but will be protected by offensive action 
carried-out far from the Soviet coast if necessary, the idea being not 
merely to protect Soviet fleet assets but also to protect the integrity of 
Soviet territory itself.
Soviet planners. In otherwords we can still pose the question that
planners asked in the 1970’s : how secure and survivable can the Soviet
SSBN component be?
Included in the strategy for SSBN survival in the Pacific is the need
to seize and control - possibly for a long period - parts of Japanese
territory, or at least deny its use to Japanese and American forces. We
shall consider the mechanics of this in a following section, and speculate
on actual Soviet assault plans for such an operation. But let us first
examine other missions the naval forces will be required to undertake.
The second priority for Soviet naval forces would be the destruction
of opposing forces. The main objective in this category is the detection
and destruction of Western SSBN and American carrier battle groups. While
the detection of battle groups would not pose a significant problem, their
intrinsic defence capabilities - high ECM ability, air and air defence/ASW
forces - mean that their actual destruction would require the commitment of
sizeable Soviet naval resources and readiness to incur significant losses.
The Soviets might seek to counter American carrier battle groups by
using nuclear weapons against them. Two American analysts see the forces
in these groups as being at risk in a nuclear scenario,
In preparing for nuclear war at sea, Soviet planners have 
sought to exploit the fundamental weakness of the US navy - an 
extreme concentration of combat power...given the relatively 
low number of major US combatants, each battlegroup is an 
important percentage of the Navy’s aggregate capability41
The targeting of Western naval forces by the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
(SRF) is an historical declaratory policy dating from the late 1960s-
although it has been mentioned very little since, especially after the
early 1970’s. More hypothetical is the question of Soviet naval forces
4XG.McCormick, M.Miller, ’American Seapower at risk : Nuclear weapons 
in Soviet naval planning’ in Orbis Vol.25 No.2 Summer 1981. pp.351-367. 
Quotation p.357.
utilising nuclear weapons against Western naval elements. One 
commentator's view of this is that
the author must conclude that once nuclear weapons are used 
ashore, they will be used at sea as well. The decision to 
initiate tactical nuclear war at sea appears to be neither a 
Soviet navy decision nor one that will hinge upon naval 
matters. Rather it will depend upon the political context, 
such as participants in and the desired length of the war 42
The Soviets are aware that if they wish to 'win' at sea they must win
quickly. That belief alone indicates that the use of nuclear weapons at
sea must be considered a distinct possibility.
In contrast to American battle groups, the detection of American SSBN
would pose a very difficult problem. American SSBN are far quieter in
operation than their Soviet counterparts and are more geographically
dispersed. In the Pacific theatre they are capable of operation in remote
waters, thus making it very difficult for the Soviets even to reach them to
conduct ASW operations. Even then it is generally recognised that Soviet
ASW technology lags far behind that of the West.43
Hence both these tasks (attacks on carrier battle groups and ASW
operations) are 'resource intensive' and would constitute a major drain on
the numbers of available Soviet naval units. The trade-off in terms of
likely Soviet losses might well prove to be crippling. Given the relative
fleet strengths in the Pacific it is not unreasonable to suggest that in
this high attrition environment the Soviets are not well placed to emerge
42J.J.Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado 1986. p.101. See also pp. 99-101 and p. 159. Tritten argues 
that "although according to open sources there is apparently no role for 
ballistic missiles to be used against naval forces at sea, the lack of such 
information is not such to make the analyst discount its very real 
possibility" (p.159).
43Though Soviet technology with regard to ASW and to quiet running 
lags behind Western technology it is generally accepted that it is a 
narrowing gap. See J.E.Moore, R.Compton-Hall, Submarine Warfare Michael 
Joseph, London,1986 pp. 139-153.
the victors.
As we suggested in our list of Soviet naval mission priorities, the 
disruption of Japanese-American communications across the Pacific via the 
interdiction of sea lines of communication (SLOC) would probably rank low 
compared to other tasks for Soviet forces in the Pacific. Reinforcement of 
Japan with American troops or supplies is not likely to compare in scale or 
urgency with reinforcement and supply of Europe across the Atlantic, and 
consequently the Soviets are unlikely to devote sizeable forces to counter 
it.
The Soviet Pacific fleet is neither strong enough nor well equipped 
enough, with organic air-power for example, to conduct a sea-denial 
campaign in the wider Pacific. This would involve the denial of sea areas 
to all enemy shipping, including warships but implies that one’s own forces 
would not necessarily be able to operate successfully in the contested 
areas. In the Sea of Okhotsk the Soviets would not merely seek to deny the 
area to enemy operations but to actively control it for their own purposes. 
We should note therefore the differences between sea control, sea denial 
and sea (SLOC) interdiction.
Given the vastness of the Pacific any interdiction operation would 
require a large input of resources to have any real chance of success. 
Obviously sea traffic has to become concentrated in the approaches to Japan 
thus making it particularly susceptible to attack, but equally we can 
expect Japan and the United States to put a maximum effort into defending 
traffic at that point precisely for that reason. Presumably in the run-up 
to confrontation the Soviets would try to put as many of their submarines 
to sea as possible but their ability to remain at sea for long periods - as 
would be required by an interdiction campaign - is doubtful. Soviet air- 
cover is unavailable outside a limited distance, and any Soviet submarines
on long-range station will be particularly susceptible to ASW 
countermeasures. Given the other Soviet priorities what Soviet forces in 
the Pacific could be spared for an interdiction campaign ? Bearing in mind 
that the Pacific fleet also supplies out-of-area forces for deployment in 
the Indian ocean and South China sea (the China Sea squadron consists, on 
average, of two submarines, 3-4 cruisers/destroyers and one assault LCM; 
the Indian Ocean deployment is usually about five submarines and six major 
surface units) and that the defence of the submarine bastions holds an 
overriding priority, that any attacks on American surface battle groups 
will be high attrition, we can realistically only expect a small number of 
submarines to be available for allocation to the task. Moreover, it is 
probable that these submarines will be predominantly older class boats- 
thus more easily detectable. Assigning a figure to this can only be 
speculative, but some Western assessments, such as the Atlantic Council, 
have put the number of available submarines as low as 15 boats. The 
accompanying table (fourteen) from a study by the Atlantic Council depicts 
what they envisage as the division of roles for Soviet forces in the 
Pacific and Indian oceans.
There are likely to be further problems in that Soviet submarines, 
especially in any prolonged war, could well have their performance impaired 
by disruptive attacks on the Soviet C3I system. Even in the age of 
technology ships and convoys still have to be "found“ and tracked, 
submarines have to be guided to an intercept point and attacks with other 
submarines co-ordinated. The secure communications and information flow 
that are a necessary prerequisite cannot be guaranteed, and the 
availability of the latter tends to decline with greater distance when the 
Soviets would lose, for example, the support provided by high powered 
coastal search radars. At a tactical level many Soviet attacks on shipping
TABLE )4
THEATER ALLOCATION BY MISSION PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN 
Current/Obsolescent
w
OJ C
u o
u •H
o ■U
u, ftJ
c
r—i Cn
iTJ •H
> in
03 d)
2 a
Soviet Navy
Class of Assets
Fleet 
Allocation
o
4J
■H o
u <u
•—^
a. lu
Primary Mission Allocation
Strategic
tp<u 0)
4-1
tJ u 
jC -u 
E-> to
Counter Navy
U Ui<u (1)
ou u
0)u
c z
3 CQ
O  t oU Vj
U) i in
1
OJ 4-1 U C 0 cU c <u u  o , 4J m>4-1 U O 4J O h <u0 o U <0 ,-J 4-1 1 otu 2 to u 0) o
•U ■a •H I»-( T3 c tn T ) 1 <3 cO C <tJ 3 W u <T3
a, 3 § o 4-> 0) o ■Ha  o e 3 ^ 4-1 -^1 T)
3 H O O' 0 c C
IO u u a, m < *-«
SSBN
SSB/N
DELTA, YANKEE 
HOTEL, GOLF
20/0
0/8
20/0
0/8
SSG/N
SSGN
CHARLIE, JULIETT, LONGBIN 
ECHO II
8/2
1M/0
8/2
SSN VICTOR 6/0 ¡ ! 3/0
SSN NOVEMBER, ECHO 0/9 ! I 
1
1 0/6 
i
SS TANGO, FOXTROT, ZULU 1M/M 1
.  . .  _  i
i
! 6/0
13/0
3/0
0/2
6 / 1«
SS B . , R . , W . , Q CLASS 1/10 1/10
1/0
0/1
2/0
l-i <4-1 
•H nj 
< U 
U
BACKFIRE 
BADGER, BLINDER 0/95 0/60 0/35
<uu
Id  Ifl 
<4-1 4J
u c
3 «J 10 4J Ifl
K XI
o e
r-i O* U 
X
CLG/M
DDG
CLGM
CLG
DD/DE
FF
PM
KARA, KRISTA II 
KRIVAK, KASHIN, KANIN, KOTLIN 
KRESTA I, K YNDA, KILDIN 
SVERDLOV
KOTLIN, SK0RY, RIGA
New, GRISHA, MIRKA, PETYA
NANUCHKA
2/0
1H/0
M/0
0/1
0/15
19/0
6/0
2/0
12/0
3/0
10/0
0/3
0/5 0/10 
7/0 
6/0
2/0
1/0
0/1
2/0
Small Patrol Craft 70/35 70/35
Amphibious Support Ships 73/0 73/0
Source: P. Nltze, L. Sullivan, Atlantic Council Working Group, Securing the Seas Westvlew. Boulder, Colorado^ 1979, p . 115.
CT\
00
CD
will be carried out at long range by cruise missile carrying submarines 
(SSGNs). Many of these missiles require mid-course guidance to target; 
this can be done by aircraft, more often by helicopters. Here the Soviets 
are hampered by a lack of mobile naval airpower and once again the distance 
factor has a role to play in mitigating against physically being able to 
deploy such co-ordinating aircraft to a combat zone lying to the south or 
east of Japan. 44
Some analysts point to Japan's particular vulnerability to blockade. 
Available statistics on Japanese oil reserves and consumption show that to 
be significant any blockade would have to be sustained over a long period. 
The statistics show that Japan has oil stocks adequate for at least 100 
days. This is a figure higher than the West European average. (See Table 
Fifteen). The rationing that would be instituted in wartime could extend 
this period considerably. Commenting on the blockade scenario one analyst 
suggests that "the passive solution is to reduce wartime import 
requirements. By one calculation this could be done for a six month 
emergency...by austere standards ship arrivals could be reduced by 80%".45 
To counter any Soviet campaign would undoubtedly require sizeable naval 
forces which might better be used elsewhere, but - it seems within Japanese 
and American capability to at least limit the threat if not nullify it
44See, M.Vego, "Submarine Surveillance Soviet Style" in Jane's Defence 
Weekly 28 July 1984 pp.117-121. For an overview of Soviet submarine 
operations and tactics see the appropriate chapters in J.E.Moore, 
R.Compton-Hall, Submarine Warfare Michael Joseph, London,1986. Soviet SSGN 
can obviously resort to attacking shipping (of all sorts) with torpedoes but 
this necessitates closing with the target and weighing the dangers 
attendant in that. C3I disruption is a potentially serious problem for 
both sides and could equally affect Allied abilities to hunt down Soviet 
submarines, but here its importance for us is in affecting Soviet abilities 
for attack - the crucial point is the likelihood of shipping surviving 
regardless of whether Soviet submarines are sunk or not.
45R.Betts, 'Washington, Tokyo and North East Asian Security : A 
Survey' in Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. VI. No.4, Dec. 1983. pp.5-30. 
Quotation p. 22.
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Year
TABLE 15 
JAPANESE OIL CONSUMPTION
Average Consumption Oil Stocks at End of Supply Period
(Thousand b/d) Month (Thousand bar.) Stock (Days)
1972 4,311 - -
1973 5,000 322,000 64
1974 4,872 - -
1975 4,568 335,000 73
1976 4,786 350,000 78
1977 5,015 390,000 78
1978 5,115 394,000 77
1979 5,171 420,000 81
1980 4,674 480,000 102
1981 4,444 480,000 108
1982 - 460,000 -
Source : Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, International Energy Statistical
Review Gl IESR 82 - 007 , July 27 1982. pp.14, 18.
The International Energy Agency Oil Market Report (June 1986) claimed that 
as of March 1986 Japan held an oil stock sufficient for 127 days. The 
average West European stock supply stood at 96 days.
entirely. Attacks on shipping (particularly on shipping in waters close to 
Japan, as opposed to for example, attacks conducted on shipping at the 
extremities of the South China sea) by Soviet aircraft could only be 
conducted at heavy loss to Soviet aircrews and the danger from this source 
is therefore likely to diminish the longer the conflict lasts.
The effects of attacks by submarines on shipping in Japanese waters 
are problematic. As we indicated above, Soviet attacks in the area, given 
the concentration of shipping, may prove very damaging but the losses 
incurred by submarines could be prohibitive and force them to operate 
further out from the concentrations of ASW technology.
A possible Soviet tactic would be the disruption of SLOCs, in the 
indirect sense, by attacking shipping terminals with nuclear weapons. This 
is in fact Soviet declaratory policy and a recent major survey of 
declaratory policy on the uses of the Soviet navy has concluded on this 
point that
There is only modest evidence of a declaratory Soviet SLOC 
disruption mission associated with traditional at-sea 
operations rather than by missile strikes against terminals. 
Occasionally, the Soviets state they intend to use aviation, 
surface ships (missile boats, especially) and submarines 
against SLOCs but some of this commentary has specified coastal 
areas and closed seas. It appears that the declaratory 
strategy, to disrupt distant SLOCs is by fleet versus shore 
missile strikes46
We have already speculated on possible nuclear attack on Japan and 
its consequences but what are the conventional options open to Soviet 
forces/? First, it must be said that it is difficult to conceive of any 
situation outside a general war in which the Soviets would invade Japan- 
the most likely point being Hokkaido. The obvious disadvantage of such an 
attack in a general war situation stems from the limited Soviet amphibious
46Commander J.J.Tritten USN, Declaratory Policy For The Strategic 
Employment of the Soviet Navy Rand Paper P-7005 September 1984. pp.137-138.
171
capability which places constraints on the initial lift and the subsequent 
reinforcing and supply of the landing force. Demands might also be pressed 
on available Soviet resources by plans to mount small amphibious operations 
against the Chinese, and possibly Korean, coasts.
The most probable scenario envisaged is invasion and attempted 
seizure of areas of Hokkaido. A main landing is anticipated on the 
Wakkanai-Sarafutsu-Teshio peninsula followed by a subsequent advance over 
the rest of Hokkaido to secure the bridgehead supported by air assault 
troops and heavy air attack. A second landing might possibly be undertaken 
along the Nemuro-Kushin axis adjacent to the Soviet occupied islands north 
of Japan. 47
The largest of the SDF armies has been deployed on Hokkaido to 
counter this contingency ; four of the thirteen divisions of the SDF, 
supported by formations such as missile and helicopter groups and a tank 
brigade. One of the divisions, the seventh, is the only fully mechanised 
division in the GSDF.
The accompanying table (sixteen) lists the available Soviet 
amphibious lift capability in the Far East. The spearhead of any assault
47A note on scenarios would be in order at this point. In considering 
operations planners have to proceed on the basis of situations most likely 
to occur, rather than those least likely. They should however be aware of 
the less expected contingencies. This has been the approach taken 
throughout this section with regard to scenarios. There are two major 
’what-if’ scenarios to be considered the outcome of which would affect the 
direction of conventional war : what-if the Soviet air force launches 
preemptive strikes against ASDF/USAF airbases, and what-if the American 
carriers are destroyed or immobilised early-on in any conflict? While 
willing to accept that they are possibilities - with dire consequences- 
the author is not convinced that they are achievable. It is unlikely that 
a Soviet air attack on the scale necessary to gain the desired result of 
neutralising the ASDF/USAF could achieve the surprise necessary. 
Destruction of American carriers is more open to question. Chance has a 
greater role to play in this case; as there is only one target that is the 
focus of any attack, the Soviets might only have to be ’lucky’ once to 
achieve their objective. The assumption underlying the arguments in this 
section has been that the formidable defensive capabilities of American 
carrier battle groups minimise any such Soviet opportunities.
TABLE 16
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Soviet Amphibious Lift Capability in the Far East
Class/Type Combat personnel Vehicles Cargo Number
Ivan Rogov/LPD Naval Inf. Btn. 20 Tanks 13,000t.(l) 1
Ropucha/LST 250 35 Tanks 2,000t.(c) (8)
Alligator/LST 125 - 250 25-30 Tanks 1 ,700t.(c) (7)
Polnochny/LSM Vehicle crews 6 Tanks 350t.(c) 10
Kiev/CV Airlift of c.20 helicopters.(Ka-25:12 man capacity) 2
Sources : Figures in parenthesis are quoted from G. Jacobs, ’A Soviet War for 
Northern Japan’ in Asian Defence Journal 1/83 pp. 6-17 .Jane's Fighting Ships 1984 
gives a total number for these LST as being 10. See also, B. Hahn,’The Soviet 
Union's RDF’ in Pacific Defence Reporter April 1984. pp.17 - 21. 
P.Young,'Soviet Amphibious Capabilities' in Defence Update No.54. 1984. 
pp.35-40. The vehicle figures represent maximum loads : composition of loads 
can therefore vary. Cargo tonnages are given as either loaded (1) or as 
capacity (c).
would presumably be the Naval infantry of which there are at present some 
6,000 deployed based at Vladivostok. Army formations would also be 
utilised supported by airborne assault troops. Where necessary the 
available shipping capacity would be supplemented by standard merchant 
ships or by passenger cruise liners (there are approximately 20 of these in 
the East) and Ro/Ro ferries. However these could probably not be fully 
utilised until a major port had been captured. Except for a heliborne 
assault - likely only to be of regimental size - the Soviet air 
contribution would be confined to air attack and escort patrol for the 
invasion fleet. Although at its closest point Hokkaido is only 180 
kilometres from Soviet air bases at Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (and of course even 
closer to the Northern islands) the main Soviet air cover and air supply 
forces will have to launch their sorties from the Maritime province over 
700-800 kilometres away. For combat aircraft this would only leave them a 
loiter time over target of roughly 20 minutes or less if engaged on their 
way to the ground combat zones by enemy aircraft. To give an impression of 
the problems involved Table Seventeen gives some selected distances between 
Soviet bases and Hokkaido.
Such an operation could not be mounted with any degree of surprise 
and it can be assumed that Japanese and American forces would try their 
utmost to deplete the amphibious forces while still afloat. The main 
force’s journey from Soviet ports to Hokkaido would take in excess of 35 
hours allowing ample opportunity for attacks on it. Even if Hokkaido were 
successfully invaded the Soviet forces would then face their greatest 
obstacle, that of supply and logistical support. In a high density combat 
zone over which the Soviets could not be sure of air superiority, 
logistical capacity could prove inadequate to supply the initial landing 
force. No adequate supply of a major follow-up force could be ensured
Selected Distances Between Soviet Bases and Hokkaido
TABLE 17
Korsakov - Sarafutsu (Wakkanai peninsula) 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk - Sarafutsu 
Khabarovsk - Wakkanai peninsula 
Vladivostok - Wakkanai peninsula 
Sovetskaia Gavan - Wakkanai peninsula 
Petropavlovsk - Wakkanai peninsula 
Vladivostok - Sapporo 
KunashirCKuril islands) - Sapporo
1 65kms. 
198kms. 
700kms. 
770kms. 
420kms. 
I430kms. 
710kms. 
380kms.
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unless a major port and airfield were captured in reasonably usable 
condition; these would then have to be successfully defended and kept 
operable in the middle of a combat zone.
Soviet study of amphibious operations is a massive subject in itself 
and it cannot be hoped to do justice to it here. Suffice to say in 
conclusion that all of the above provisos contradict main guidelines 
derived from Soviet experiences during World War II of amphibious 
operations. The Soviets claim to have undertaken more than one hundred and 
ten amphibious operations during the war and learned that : the greatest 
success is achieved when amphibious operations are combined with a land 
offensive (which meets-up with the amphibious force within a few days); the 
most important prerequisite for success is surprise; large amounts of air 
support are needed for protection, suppression, and air superiority; 
generous provision must be made for logistical support. One final point 
needs emphasising - Soviet amphibious operations during the war were very 
small scale affairs and were basically "coastal-hopping" activities. Even 
current Soviet rehearsals of amphibious operations, for example, in the 
Zapad-81 and Shchit-82 exercises, were on the same scale. The Hokkaido 
operation would be a massive undertaking the like of which the Soviets have 
never experienced before.
The point has been raised48 that it is plausible - given the Soviet 
preoccupation with the American threat, and since American combat forces 
constitute the overwhelming majority, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, in the region - that in a conventional phase of any war 
Soviet forces will give priority to neutralising and destroying US assets 
over those of the SDF. Implicit in such suggestions though would be the 
proviso that dealing with US forces would absorb such a large proportion of
48Conversation with Mr. Mackintosh, Oxford, June 1986.
Soviet conventional resources that direct major attacks on solely Japanese 
installations and military targets may be few and far between. Numerous 
small scale, limited operations would thus be envisaged. Should this prove 
to be the case it must have an impact on any plans for invasion of Hokkaido 
as the resources to mount a complex multi-arm invasion might be committed 
elsewhere; thus any invasion would be an affair limited to a small holding 
operation to secure passage from the sea of Okhotsk to the Pacific.
Soviet Forces as a Political Instrument
It is often stated with regard to Soviet-Japanese relations that the 
Soviets have pursued a counter-productive policy in choosing to forego 
normal diplomatic interactions and pursue instead a deliberate policy of 
coercion to encourage Japan to adopt a more acquiescent position. This 
line of approach has, it is argued, produced an adverse reaction in Japan 
which has encouraged increased Japanese defence efforts and fuelled a 
bitter resentment against the 'Soviet threat’.
The Soviet Union’s rise to military parity with the United States has 
been its greatest achievement, that the capability of Soviet forces has 
greatly increased cannot be doubted. However what cannot be deduced from 
this observation is whether this growth in power is the product of a 
deliberate policy or is the result of other variables. Theses on the 
nature of military procurement patterns, opportunism, action-reaction 
relationships etc are well known and need not be gone into here. 49 
Furthermore, even if we accept that acquisition of more capable forces has 
been the product of conscious decision we cannot extrapolate further as to 
their probable or potential use. Although intent may change over time,
49See for example, S.M.Meyer, Soviet Defense Decisionmaking ACIS 
Working Paper No. 33. Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA. 
January 1982. A.Alexander, Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement 
Adelphi Paper No. 148. IISS London 1978. K.F.Spielman, Analysing Soviet 
Strategic Weapons Decisions Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1978.
possession does not of itself imply intent. However it does provide the 
Soviets with an enhanced capacity and readiness to exploit opportunities 
and indicates a concern about regional security.
In attempting to posit a relationship between military power and 
political influence we are concerned with an abstract concept. We can 
measure and quantify the components of military power but how do we measure 
’influence’? Nor can we posit a simple equation that more power equates 
with more influence, for this is demonstrably not always the case. Also it 
would be a further mistake to depict influence as being related to a 
perception of an ability to project power.
Can we outline some sort of categorisation of types or objectives of 
influence? Bull outlined some basic parameters which are useful starting 
points : persuasion can be sought through the symbol of national power and 
commitment rather than of a particular situation : it can be directed 
towards compulsion or deterrence of certain actions : it can be ’latent’ in 
the sense that it occurs through routine actions or : it can be ’active’ in 
the sense that it involves a deliberate attempt to invoke a specific 
reaction. 50
A complicating factor arises in examining the concept with regard to 
Japan because implicit in the statements made by Western analysts positing 
a Soviet counterproductive policy is the connotation of a deliberate and 
continuing policy of coercion. Other commentators have explicitly stated 
this. 51 Our problem is that it would seem to be difficult to sustain an
50H.Bull, ’Sea Power and Political Influence’ in J.Alford, Sea Power 
and Influence : Old Issues and New Challenges Adelphi Library 2, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,1980. pp.3-12.
51 See references in footnote 2 for example. Kimura ’agrees with the 
observation prevalent even among many non-Soviet watchers that the Soviet 
military build-up in East Asia appears to be counterproductive’, (p.l). 
M. Leighton in ’Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan’ in Survey 
Vol. 27 Autumn/Winter 1983 pp. 112-151, talks of ’patterns of Soviet coercion'.
argument of 'deliberate intent’ not least because we are not privy to
policy decisions within the Kremlin.
Kaplan in his seminal work on the use of Soviet armed forces as a
political instrument delimits the following categories and definitions.
A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical 
actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed 
military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the 
national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to 
influence, specific behaviour of individuals in another nation 
without engaging in a continuing contest of violence52
For this situation to have occurred four elements must be present
according to Kaplan; (1) a physical change in the disposition (location,
activity, readiness) of an armed unit, including exercises or
demonstrations or the movements of any units away from or toward a specific
location. (2) Behind this activity there had to have been a consciousness
of purpose aimed at achieving some specific outcomes abroad. (3) Soviet
decision-makers must have tried to attain their objectives at least
initially by gaining influence in a target state rather than physically
imposing their will and (4) Soviet leaders must have tried to avoid a
sustained contest of violence. 53
Kaplan suggests that regular or routine occurrences do not constitute
coercive incidents. He further excludes the ’continued presence of forward
deployed forces, non-discriminating political deployments, and operational
deployments’ as well as flights over territory to test readiness and
defences and the ’large number of seizures by Soviet patrol ships of
foreign - usually Japanese - fishing vessels operating in or said to be
52S.Kaplan, The Diplomacy of Power Brookings Institute, 1981. p.13.
53Ibid. pp.13-15.
overfishing waters claimed or protected by the Soviet Union' . 54
If we accept Kaplan’s definitions and criteria it is difficult to see 
any real cases in which the Soviet Union could be accused of coercing 
Japan. Even the notable cases of the deployments of SS-20s in the Eastern 
military districts of the Soviet Union would be discounted as Kaplan 
excludes deployments or modernisations associated with strategic nuclear 
questions and the improvement of war-fighting capabilities.
But is this really where we should be directing our appraisal'?' Even 
if, by some criteria we find it difficult to substantiate an argument of 
coercion we should be aware of a Japanese perspective which might be very 
different. Each nation has an interpretation of the present that is always 
to an extent the product of earlier events - for many nations this proves 
to be the tyranny of historical experience. The constant feature of 
twentieth century Russian/Soviet - Japanese relations as been hostility : 
even now no peace treaty has yet been signed, and the two countries are 
thus still technically at war. There can be little dispute that the 
Japanese perception sees a significant and growing threat from the Soviet 
Union which has for the most part materialised in the early 1980’s; or at 
least this is the image with which we are confronted. But some 
qualifications should be made to views of Japanese interpretations of the 
Soviet Union.
Japanese public opinion polls indicate that the Soviet Union is the 
foreign country least liked, or most feared. But probing what that fear 
means in real terms qualifies the image of antipathy. On the question of 
threats to national security, ’Do you feel threatened...’ responses in 
1979, 1980, 1981 ranged between : ’greatly threatened’ - 6.0%, 7.5%, 5.1% 
respectively; ’certain extent’ - 24.5%, 32.4%, 24.0%; ’a little threatened’
s4Ibid. p.17.
- 41.6%, 36.0%, 34.3%; ’not at all’ - 10.2%, 5.6%, 8.7%; ’Do not know’- 
17.8%, 18.6%, 27.9%.55
In the same surveys 77.3%, 83.6% and 77.4% of those surveyed replied 
that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to Japan, but only 7.6% 
thought that there would be any conflict between Japan and the Soviet 
Union. Only 27.3% viewed conflict between the Soviet Union and China as 
likely. 56 Thus even though a threat is perceived, the majority does not 
appear to consider it great.
We can take the argument a stage further by asking what form the 
Japanese see the Soviet threat as taking. Psychological, political, 
military, etc? In a study of a specific sector of the Japanese population, 
the ’defence influentials’ as he terms them, Young C. Kim’s results suggest 
that it is seen in psychological and political terms ; ’by psychological is 
meant the intimidation resultant from the Soviet military build-up. 
Political refers to the political use by the Soviets of this military 
capability. In either case the threat perceived is one of gradual 
Finlandisation of Japan’ . 57 However Kim qualifies his comments by stating 
that these views are held by a very closed group, even within the spheres 
of the ’defence influentials’. These perceptions of the Soviet threat are 
related to other factors; ’in general, those who perceive a Soviet threat 
to Japan tend to... have an especially favourable attitude towards the 
United States’ military presence’ . 58
55S.Eto, ’Japanese Perceptions of National Threats’ in E.Morrison, 
Threats to Security in East Asia-Pacific. Lexington Books, D.C.Heath and 
Co., Lexington, Mass., 1983. pp.53-64. Quotation p. 57.
56Ibid. p.58.
57Y.C.Kim, G.Sigur (eds), Japan and US Policy in Asia Praeger, New
York, 1982 p.17.
58Ibid. p.20.
What is the threat based upon in real terms '? The Japanese Defence 
Agency compiles statistics of violations of Japanese airspace and scrambles 
by ADF aircraft are presented in Tables Eighteen and Nineteen. Movements 
of vessels around Japanese waters are also listed in Table Twenty. (The 
geographical features of the Japanese straits are also indicated (Table 
Twenty-one), showing the problems confronting the Soviets with regard to 
these straits. The Soya strait is so shallow that Soviet submarines often 
transit it on the surface).
The Defence Agency is very reticent in presenting its own data 
regarding Soviet military actions around Japan, so that it has been 
necessary to compile these incomplete tables from various sources. The 
information presented by the Agency tells us very little; moreover it 
presents a rather distorted picture of Soviet movements. The Agency 
figures represent five year averages, without indicating whether they 
derive from steady growth or from high activity in some years followed by 
decline.
This is particularly to be borne in mind regarding Soviet air and
naval movements through/over the Tsushima strait in 1979-80. Following the
invasion of Vietnam by China the Soviets undertook a substantial resupply
mission that obviously necessitated more numerous flights and sailings.
Given the growth of ties between Vietnam and the Soviet Union these
increases would have to be expected anyway, especially with the growth of
the Soviet base at Cam Ranh bay. This is a specific point acknowledged by
Kyodo the Japanese newsagency which has stated that :
In the year to 31 March 1982, ASDF aircraft were alerted on 263 
occasions, compared with 137 the previous year against Soviet 
aircraft over Kyushu...the Force attributed this to more 
frequent (166) flights by Ilushin transports between Moscow and 
Hanoi, and also by more frequent flights by TU-95 aircraft to
TABLE 18 179
1977 1
1978 2
1979 1 (15 November)
1980 1 
1981 1
1
1982 1 (3 April)
1983 2 (15 October, 16 November)
1981+ 3 (12, 20 (?), 23 November)
Between 19^5 - 1977 there were five confirmed violations of 
Japanese airspace by Soviet aircraft. By the end of 1983 this 
confirmed total had risen to 13, These figures are still very much 
speculative due to the reluctance of the SUP to release specific details. 
Often information in non-official sources conflicts with what little 
is released by the SHF.
Violations of Japanese Airspace
Sources : Defence Agency of Japan, Defence of Japan 1982 p.79.,
Defence of Japan 1984 p.155. Research Institute for Peace and 
Security, Asian Security 1980 Tokyo, 1980. p.42. USSR and Third 
World 1 September - 15 December 1977.p.99., 1 February - 30 June 
1978 p.28., 1 January - 28 February 1979 p.4. Canberra Times 
17 November 1983.
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Scrambles By Japanese Aircraft
TABLE-1,9
1970 370
1971 345
1972 306
1973 257
1974 323
1975 305
1976 528
1977 496
1978 798 Royal Norwegian Airforce
1979 636 Scrambles
1980 783
1981 939
1982 929
1983 n. a. 290 (est.)
1984 n. a. 471
Source : Defence Agency of Japan, Defence Of Japan 1984 Tokyo, p.155.
To put these figures into a more useful context it had been hoped to 
compare figures with the number of scrambles launched by the Norwegian 
airforce or with the RAF in Britain. However only the information cited 
above on Norwegian air force scrambles has been forthcoming. This is cited 
from 'Moscow apology for drone cheers up Scandinavians' in Times 17 January 
1985. Coincidentally the Norwegian report confirms a speculation made in 
our examination of Japan - that an increase in scrambles may well be due to 
use of more sophisticated detection equipment rather than an increase in 
the number of Soviet flights. Specifically it states that 'A (Norwegian) 
defence ministry spokesman said the increase was probably caused by 
improved Norwegian detection equipment and not by an increase in Soviet 
flights'. D. van der Aart, in Aerial Espionage (Airlife, Shrewsbury,UK 
1985) claims that in 1983 the Royal Norwegian Air force carried out about 
300 "interceptions” and in 1984 about 125 "interceptions". (See p.132).
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Soviet Naval Vessel Movements Through Japanese Straits
TABLE 20
1979 1980 1981 1982
Tsushima Strait 140 150 165 165
Tsugaru Strait 50 55 60 60
Soya Strait 130 155 205 230
Totals 320 360 430 455
Source : Defence Agency of Japan,Defence of Japan (relevant
TABLE 21
Geographical Features of Japanese Straits ’
Narrowest Width Average depth Deepest Point
Soya (La Perouse) 43 kms. 50m(l64ft.) 74m(243ft.)
Tsugaru 20 kms 210m. 449m.
Source :Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan Vol.1-9. Tokyo, 1983- Ministerstvo 
Oboroni SSSR : Voenno-Morskoi Flot, Atlas Okeanov : Tikhii Okean Glavnoe 
Upravlenie Navigatsii i Okeanographii, Moskva,1974. p.282.
The SDF have chosen to make this point public only in the 1983 edition of 
the Defence of Japan yearbook. 60
Qualification must also be made concerning what can reasonably be 
inferred from the total number of scrambles by the ASDF. An increase in 
the number of scrambles could as well result from an increase in the 
sophistication of the ASDF's detection equipment, as from an increase in 
Soviet flights. There is also an obvious discrepancy between the figures 
quoted by Kyodo for transits over Kyushu as compared to the official Agency 
figure. This might be explained if the Agency incorporated most of these 
flights in the 'over the sea of Japan' category, but that can only be 
speculation.
The balance of air-scrambles is not favourable to the Soviets. There 
is no specific information available on this subject but the author has not 
encountered references to Soviet air force scrambles to intercept ASDF 
flights, though these doubtless occur, but not on a comparable scale. More 
so is this the case where the ASDF have supposedly penetrated Soviet 
airspace. Both the United States and Japan place strict limits on how 
close aircraft and naval vessels can approach the Soviet Union, though the 
United States operates electronic surveillance and eavesdropping flights 
along the limits of Soviet airspace and probably within Soviet airspace
Da Nang59
59Kyodo 3 April 1982. Quoted in USSR and The Third World Central Asian 
research centre, London. 7 March-6 July 1982. p.48.
600n commenting on the increasing number of scrambles it says that 
'The reason the number of scrambles is increasing these days is that 
flights of Soviet aircraft to Vietnam have been constantly scheduled, thus, 
the number is increasing in the West and southwestern airspace of Japan, 
and the Soviet flight activities over the Japan sea have been extended 
closer to Japan'. Defence Agency, Defence of Japan 1983 Tokyo, 1983. p.155.
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when specially authorised. 61 But nevertheless the Soviets are clearly far
more active and provocative in their use of air operations than the
Japanese and United States combined.
The calculations involving naval figures are fraught with similar
pitfalls as in the interpretation of the air activity data. The figures
provided by the Defence Agency categorise ’Vessels' but make no distinction
between ’warships’ and ’other’ vessels. Major Soviet settlements in the
Far East such as Anadyr, Magadan, Petropavlovsk or Sakhalin have no rail
access so supply has to be undertaken by air or sea especially to the
Northern islands close to Japan. Consequently a proportion of the totals
cited are in fact a movement of transport ships - icebreakers, water
supply, or oil tankers and the like. The Tokyo correspondent of Pacific
Defence Reporter has written
Another little-known element that casts doubt on the battle­
worthiness of the Soviet Far-Eastern Fleet is its relative lack 
of mobility. According to data collected by the Japanese 
Maritime Self Defence Force, a total of 450 Russian naval 
vessels last year passed through the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima 
straits. This count is the number of units entering or exiting 
from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean and contains some 
duplication. This tally was made not only of warships but also 
of supply vessels, landing ships and barges. However, during
1983 only 19 ships larger than corvettes passed through the 
Soya and Tsushima straits62
61For a greater description of these flights - codenamed "Cobra Ball" 
and "Rivet Joint" see, Seymour Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed. Random 
House, N.Y.,1986. In an interview between Hersh and Marshal P.S.Kirsanov, 
former Soviet Air Defence Commander in the Far East, Kirsanov claimed that 
his men who track such flights view them as "routine" and unless something 
"unusual" occurs the Soviets do not bother to scramble jets to intercept. 
See also, the article based on "The Target Is Destroyed" in Atlantic 
Monthly September 1986. pp.47-69.
62R.Horiguchi, ’Hokkaido - Japan’s Front Line’ in Pacific Defence 
Reporter August 1984. pp.24-27. Quotation p.27. A Kyodo report 16 March
1978 stated that two Soviet missile destroyers sighted passing through the 
Tsugaru channel on March 15, were ’the first passage of the channel by 
Soviet warships since August 1971’. See USSR and Third World 1 Feb. - 30 
June 1978 p.29. If true, this is quite a striking statement. However the 
author has not been able to obtain confirmation of it from other sources.
Soviet naval activities axe, on the whole, geographically limited, 
certainly in comparison to the number of ship days at sea accumulated by 
opposing Western navies. The prevailing tendency has been for the Soviet 
surface fleet to hug coastal waters, rarely engage in long-range cruising 
and spend much time in port. The Japanese raised a great deal of concern 
over the arrival in the Far East of the Soviet carrier Minsk, but in the 
slightly more than three years it bias been with the Soviet Pacific fleet it 
has spent most of its time either in port or in short coastal water 
sailings. It has participated in only one long-range cruise in August- 
November 1980 and in one distant exercise in the Tonkin Gulf in April 1984. 
Between 1-17 April 1985 the carrier Novorossiysk participated in what has 
been termed the Soviet navy’s "first carrier battle group" cruise. The 
group of 7 ships sailed in a circular route out round Japan, at its 
furthest point the group was about 1500nm from Japan (1200 km north-west of 
Midway) . 63
The Soviets also conduct conventional live firing practices in waters 
around Japan as well as rocket launching tests. Normally the Soviets give 
advance warning and designate the danger areas. On occasions the Japanese 
government has lodged protests over these practices, because they claim 
they axe taking place in Japanese waters, usually the disputed waters 
around the northern islands. The requests for cancellation of a practice 
in disputed waters are usually turned down, but the Soviets agree to other 
requests. 64
There is also a difficulty in trying to interpret Soviet air or naval 
manoeuvres or deployments as attempts to influence specific events. On 11
63Jane’s Defence Weekly 18 May 1985. p.833.
64For an example of both see, USSR and Third World 7 July - 6 November
1981. p.77.
January 1978 the Japanese press reported that the sailing northward of two 
Soviet vessels, 400 kilometres off the Japanese coast in the east China 
Sea, when talks between the Japanese and Soviet foreign ministers were 
breaking-up ’may be considered as a flagrant show of force’ . 65 Later, on 7 
June 1978, the Japanese claimed that the Soviets had begun manoeuvres in 
the Kurils to dissuade them from concluding the China treaty, particularly 
as the manoeuvres had been announced on 31 May only one day after the 
Japanese had announced the recommencement of negotiations with the Chinese. 
However between 13-15 June the Japanese themselves changed their minds, and 
foreign minister Sonoda retracted the original condemnation, and stated his 
government’s belief that the manoeuvres were ’only part of usual firing 
practice’ and had no political design. ’It would be excessive to consider 
the manoeuvres as causing a strain in Japanese-Soviet relations. But it 
was extremely regrettable that the military exercises were staged on 
Japanese - claimed territory’ . 66
If anything the evidence points to Soviet deployments as a result of 
a trend of modernisation. The Soviets have justified their moves by 
claiming that certain things have been reactions to American or Japanese 
initiatives. The most noticeable instance of this is the Soviet deployment 
of Mig-23’s on the Kuril islands. Soviet commentators have openly claimed 
that this was a response to the American announcement of their intention to 
deploy advanced F-16s at Misawa. Similarly, Andropov was reported67 to 
have stated that the Soviet decision to deploy SS-20s in eastern Siberia 
was specifically a response to the planned stationing of the F-16s at 
Misawa. These arguments are unconvincing. Given the Soviet trend of
65USSR and Third World 15 December 1977 - 13 January 1978. p.4.
66As quoted in USSR and Third World 1 February - 30 June 1978. p.29.
67Financial Times 26 January 1983.
modernising their forces in the Far East, it is probable that these 
deployments would have taken place in any case : deployment of nuclear- 
capable F-16s in Japan would certainly be a worrying factor for the Soviets 
but would not be the basic reason behind the decision to deploy SS-20s.
That an increasing number of ’incidents’ have taken place 
demonstrates growing Soviet activeness. The important proviso on the above 
view of instances of Soviet behaviour is that while we might find fault 
with Japanese interpretation of specific cases, there can be little doubt 
that the Japanese perceive a threat from the overall trend.
Can we conclude anything from the above;? That the capabilities of 
Soviet forces in the Far East have increased dramatically is an observable 
fact. The argument has to centre around relating this new military power 
to a political purpose; incidents involving Soviet forces have taken place 
but the question is whether they are, per se, proof of Soviet intent to 
intimidate Japan.
Perhaps the most useful concept would be the idea of ’latent’ 
influence. In the case of Soviet behaviour towards Japan it is difficult 
to correlate specific military actions with specific political aims i.e. 
there is no pattern of Soviet manoeuvres or flights etc taking place at 
the same time as negotiations or Japanese policy announcements. In this 
sense the categories suggested by Kaplan, where he rules out certain' 
factors, are applicable to the Japanese case. But his guidelines are not 
entirely satisfactory, there is a ’threat’ there - if only because the 
Japanese or some of them, perceive that one exists - and the idea of a 
’latent’ threat might be the best way to interpret this situation.
The definitions provided by Bull become pertinent. If ’suasion’ is 
there at all then it is being sought by the Soviet Union through the symbol 
of national power and commitment and not by specific action. To take the
case a stage further - at what is this suasion directed? Is it to 
constrain Japanese behaviour or to achieve specific Soviet goals; is the 
suasion aimed at deterring unfavourable actions or at prompting new 
developments or courses of action from Japan. The answer here would have 
to be that Soviet suasion has been directed towards gaining the former 
rather than the latter, to deterring Japan from pursuing a course it has 
declared it wishes to follow. In this context it can be argued that Soviet 
efforts at suasion have been reactive rather than initiatory. That Soviet 
moves have been reactive prompts the thought that there has been, on their 
part, a lack of firm direction in the policies which they seek to pursue 
vis-a-vis Japan. This point we shall explore further in our examination of 
the general aims of Soviet policy towards Japan.
186
SOVIET POLICY AND JAPAN 
Understanding the Japanese : A Barrier to Effective Policy? 1
In all situations of interaction the actions of the participants on 
each other create their own effect. Thus, while our concern is with a 
study of the Soviet Union, to be comprehensive we must be aware not only of 
the peculiarities of the Japanese policy process but more importantly of 
whether or not the Soviets are aware of these peculiarities and if so, of 
how they took account of them.
It is therefore proposed to outline the major significant features of 
the Japanese style of government and then to elaborate upon those in the 
context of a Soviet interpretation.
In a general sweep of Japanese affairs the consensus of Western 
analysts (though not of their Soviet counterparts) has been that Japan has 
never achieved internal consensus on what foreign policy goals should be, 
nor on how Japan should participate - if at all - in the "international 
system". The Japanese tradition of isolationism (both cultural and 
geographical) has served to reinforce Japanese unease about playing a 
greater role in international affairs in this case. Japanese ideas of 
"distinctiveness" have made Japan wary of too deep an involvement. The 
emphasis of observation on Japan’s position changed by the late 1970s to 
suggest that while Japan could afford the luxury of such a stance while her
PART IV
J-The focus of the discussion concerns Soviet ’policy’ rather than 
’relations’. Providing a lexical definition of ’policy’ tends to lead in an 
abstract circular pattern involving the relationship between a ’strategy’ 
and a ’policy’. Therefore the proposed definition of policy utilised 
herein is an operative - ends/means - one. Foreign policy here is being 
viewed as that area of government responsibility for promoting the national 
interest involving political, economic and military means. It involves the 
formulation of desired outcomes and means of achieving them within those 
terms of reference. It expresses the aims of government in terms 
considered to be more or less capable of fulfillment.
economy boomed it could not be maintained as Japan became afflicted with 
the ills which affected other economies, and as the political climate in 
North East Asia began to assume a more complicated form. It was postulated 
that pressure from these changing circumstances and from the United States 
would force Japan to assume a less distant stance.
This would however seem to have been the theory rather than the 
actual course of events. Statements by Japanese politicians in the late 
1970's that Japan was striving to avoid non-participation, did not manifest 
themselves in concrete action. The vacillation apparent in the Japanese 
position has led one commentator to characterise policy within that country 
in the following manner : "the Japanese strong desire to avoid 
international isolation and to conform to world trends have made Japanese 
foreign policy ad hoc, reactive and equivocating. Thus at best Japanese 
foreign policy is characterised by a shrewd pragmatism and at worst, by an 
incomparable immobilism". 2
Despite some cultural affinities Japan holds no identification with 
Asia as a whole, though her relationship with China is well developed and 
of long standing. On the other hand, for all that Japan is feted as a 
member of the camp of Western nations, she is only so in terms of her 
industrial development and in the superficial framing of her democratic 
system of government. Japan is still the "odd man out" among advanced 
industrial nations in terms of the employment structure in industry, the 
organisation of the union movement and the organisation of the workforce. 
Japan is an Asian giant in a Western-oriented world economy.
Japan’s foreign policy in light of the country’s stable position 
assumed a form of omni-directional diplomacy until the 1970’s when a
2Chapman, Drifte, Gow, Japan’s Quest for Comprehensive Security : 
Defence. Diplomacy. Dependence F.Pinter, London,1983. Quotation p. 81.
renewed debate on resource supplies encompassed the direct concerns of 
Japanese security. The new term of "comprehensive security" came to be 
applied as a description of policy. But the nearest that anyone in Japan 
has ever come to defining this vague term was former Prime Minister Ohira 
who said merely that "Japanese security has to be comprehensive...we can 
only maintain security effectively when not only military power but also 
political power, dynamic economic strength, creative culture and thorough­
going diplomacy are well combined" . 3
The vacillation claimed by Western analysts to be still a feature of 
Japanese government can well be illustrated by its response to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Ohira’s government although quick to condemn the 
invasion was rather slower than the other Allies to initiate sanctionary 
steps against the Soviet Union. It was not until February 1980 that, under 
pressure from within the LDP (which according to some reports was resisted 
by certain Japanese business groups), the government began to undertake 
serious sanctions, and not until March 13 that the House of Representatives 
passed a resolution requesting the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan. Within this time frame Premier Ohira moved from the neutral 
position stated on January 22 that "Japanese foreign policy was based on 
co-operation with the United States...the Soviet Union is a defensive, 
cautious, diplomatically skilful and experienced country - not a reckless 
country" and that on the Olympics boycott, "for the time being the 
government intends to observe the reactions of Western and other 
countries"4 - to one of anti-Sovietism which aligned Japan with Western
3Quoted in N.Akao, Japan’s Economic Security Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London,1983. p.7.
Statements made by Ohira at the Japan Press Club, January 22 1980. 
Quoted in H.Kimura, 'The Impact of the Afghanistan Invasion on Japan- 
Soviet Relations’ in R.Kanet (ed), Soviet Foreign Policy and East-West 
Relations Pergamon Press, New York,1982. pp.144-165. Quotation p.147.
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nations on February 1 when he stated in the Diet that "It is a stark
objective fact that recently the Soviet Union has been greatly reinforcing
its military forces, judging from the Soviet military deployment in the
northern islands (and in other areas). Thus I cannot help but regard the
Soviet troops (there) as a potential threat to Japan" . 5 This was the first
time in the postwar Diet that a Prime Minister had openly labelled the
Soviet Union as a ’threat' to Japan.
Kimura sums-up the entire process when he suggests
The slow and inconsistent foreign policy stratagems of the 
Ohira administration must be seen in the context of the 
indirect process of decision-making which characterises 
Japanese leaders and often involves their waiting patiently 
until the "last minute" when there is no alternative but 
finally to decide. Unlike their Western counterparts Japanese 
leaders do not dictate, initiate or discuss various plans and 
alternatives with the general public and others concerned. 
Instead they create an environment out of which they can later 
insist certain policies have evolved naturally6
By May the government had resumed credit of the Export-Import bank of Japan
to the Soviet Union which had been cancelled in February, and requested
that exceptions to sanctions be made in the cases of Sakhalin oil
development and sale of steel pipe to the Soviets.
A major phenomenon of the Japanese political process is the factional
system of politics. Let us outline some descriptions of this system.
Stockwin, Director of the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies at Oxford,
makes the following comments on it :
...ovabun - kobun is commonly encountered in contemporary 
descriptions of Japanese politics...it signifies that a fictive
- parent status is being attributed to a certain prominent or 
powerful political individual, while his coterie of personal 
followers (kobun) are demonstrating family - like loyalty their 
oyabun (p.30.) ...Another closely related usage is the 
ubiquitous term batsu. Given a variety of prefixes, the term 
signifies ’clique’ or ’faction’, with overtones of some quasi-
5Ibid. p.149.
6Ibid. pp.147-148.
familial relationship, (p.30.) ...It may be more accurate to, 
therefore, regard political parties as coalitions of self- 
standing and independent-minded habatsu. (p.31.) ...The 
Japanese do not confine habatsu to political parties. They are 
regarded as fairly ubiquitous phenomena within government 
ministries, industrial firms...What the phenomena have in 
common is that personal connections kankei. often of a quasi 
familial kind, are utilised for purposes of 
advancement. . .(p.31. )7
One of the results of such a system is that anyone seeking to rise to
preeminence and high office in Japan needs to be a manipulator of that
system as well as a product of it. Consequently it has been the case that
experience and knowledge of foreign policy has not been considered an
important stepping-stone to a successful political career. The Foreign
Ministry is not held in especially high regard as a career path, certainly
not in comparison with the Finance Ministry or the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry. The case of Suzuki illustrates this
point. Suzuki was elected to the Diet by a fishing constituency and prior
to his appointment as Prime Minister his only experience of foreign policy
was in representing Japan, as Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, at
the annual fishery negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Factionalism has other relevant consequences. Writing as far back as
1969, Hellmann, while commenting on the factional units in Japanese
politics as constituting the basic mechanism by which business gets done,
pointed out two consequences :
the practice of unwavering party discipline in the Diet votes, 
together with the responsibilities of the Prime Minister, both 
in selecting the cabinet and assuring day-to-day party 
leadership, has made the politics and policies of the ruling 
party the main domestic influences on Japanese foreign policy 
...issues, particularly international issues, come to be 
considered not only as to their merits as policy but to their 
worth in advancing the party position of faction 
leaders...fractions and individual rivalries and petty personal 
ambitions are thus projected into the heart of the policy
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7J.A.A.Stockwin, Japan : Divided Politics in a Growth Economy 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1975.
formulation process, thereby complicating the situation and 
virtually proscribing decisive action8
Hellmann may be overstating the case, in that all policy processes
are subject to individual rivalries or preferences, but it would be fair to
draw from the argument the point that the Japanese arrangement makes such
influence more likely. One associated point not mentioned by Hellmann is
worth stressing; that is that unlike other nations where factions or
lobbies etc can interact to influence policy from a predominant economic,
social or ideological base - the Japanese situation is unique in that these
factions are not so organised but are based purely on loyalty to an
individual in a client - patron relationship.
Concerning another consequence of the factional system,
J.A.A.Stockwin has written that
Factional competition within the LDP is the principal reason 
why Japan since the early 1970’s has experienced a quite rapid 
turnover of Prime Ministers, with the average Prime Ministerial 
terms lasting about two years. It also tends to result in 
cabinet reshuffles, since factional claims on government posts 
need to be satisfied. This in turn makes it difficult for 
ministers to dominate portfolios, and facilitates the exercise 
of effective power by a highly meritocratic and self-confident 
public service. There have been times (most recently 1979-80) 
when factional rivalries threatened to tear the party apart. 9
Stockwin argues that on balance ’consensus mechanisms’ have developed
those situations into a ’rolling compromise’. Nevertheless it may be
suggested that these circumstances of interfactional conflict cannot have
been conducive to the pursuit of effective policy and negotiations with the
Soviets nor can the resultant image projected abroad, of instability or
indecisiveness of purpose, have contributed to the idea of a resolute
8D.C.Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics : The 
Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union University of California, Berkley, 
1969. Quotation p.14, p.18.
9J.A.A.Stockwin, ’Politics in Japan’ in Current Affairs Bulletin 
(Sydney University) Vol.59. No.2 July 1982 pp.22-30. Quotation p. 27.
Japan. In the popular Soviet journal, New Times, for example, the Tanaka 
bribe scandal and its ramifications was constantly exploited for propaganda 
in the second half of the 1970's.
The responsibility for conducting foreign affairs lies with the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet. It is assumed that the cabinet has the support 
of the ruling party in the Diet. Differences between the ruling party and 
the government rarely occur in Diet debate as all important policies are 
decided upon beforehand by informal agreement between the party and the 
bureaucracy. One Japanese political commentator has pointed out that ’the 
Japanese Diet has never originated any legislation that had to do with 
foreign or defence policy’ . 10 The same statement can be made with regard 
to treaties. The Diet can only approve or reject an already written 
treaty, it cannot alter or draft a treaty. To date the Diet has approved 
every treaty submitted to it.
Constitutionally the Japanese Diet is the sole law - making authority 
and the highest organ of state power. It is divided into two Houses : the 
lower, the House of Representatives and the upper, the House of 
Councillors. The power of the House of Councillors lies in its ability to 
delay bills and to act as a forum which the Opposition utilises to hinder 
legislation it finds disagreeable.
In the field of international economic policy-making the influence of 
the Keidanren and through them the Keiretsu is a factor to be considered. 11 
The predominant attitude taken by the Japanese government towards deals 
with the Soviets has been to categorise projects as the responsibility of
10S.Kimura, ’The Role of the Diet in Foreign Policy and Defence’ in 
F.Valeo, C.Morrison, (eds) The Japanese Diet and the US Congress Westview, 
Colorado, 1983. pp.99-114. Quotation p.105.
1 1 ’Keidanren’ is the Federation of Economic Organisations. ’Keiretsu’ 
the big-business corporations.
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the private sector and accordingly not to participate in them. As a result
the representatives of Japanese businesses abroad in fact conduct diplomacy
on behalf of their country, and the results of their contacts are reported
to the government. Thus it has been the business representatives who have
been in the forefront of contact with the Soviet Union. This,
superficially, appears to be no different from the situation of Western
trading partners of the Soviets. However there is a difference of degree
as the Japanese government takes considerably less of a role in business
with the Soviets than its Western European counterparts.
While it is possible to delineate a clear hierarchical path of
authority in negotiations conducted by the Soviets it is not clear whether
a similar exercise can be conducted in the Japanese case. Trade policy is
a case in point. A former Japanese trade official comments that :
All of MITI's trade responsibilities are more or less 
duplicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The distinction 
between the two ministries' responsibilities however is clear.
MITI is in charge of trade policy which in turn not only 
affects but is also affected by domestic industrial policies 
and conditions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other 
hand, is responsible for international negotiations and 
agreements...nevertheless, MITI takes the position that the 
collection of information through direct contacts with trade 
partners is essential for effective policy formulation, 
therefore the ministry should be allowed to engage in 
international negotiations. To retain control over
international relations the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
naturally seeks to bar MITI from such direct contacts. Thus 
the two ministries are frequently involved in jurisdictional 
conflicts12
Soviet Interpretations of the Japanese Policy Process 
In the preceding paragraphs we have set out briefly some of the major 
mechanisms and components of the Japanese political process. We must now 
seek to see how the Soviets would be likely to interpret those components. 
Are the Soviet aware that the Japanese system functions in this manner j? Do
12C.Higashi, Japanese Trade Policy Formulation Praeger, New York,1983.
p.42.
they recognise the difference between the theory and practice of Japanese
policy making,1? An awareness of those problems depends to an extent upon a
knowledge of Japan and of the obstacles which the Soviets have to overcome
can be found in the testimony of former intelligence officer Stanislav
Levchenko who served in Japan and wrote for New Times as their Tokyo
correspondent. When asked why he could successfully function as a
journalist he replied :
The general rule is that most KGB officers under journalistic 
cover do not write in the field. Stories are filed on their 
behalf. My case in Japan was somewhat unusual. I actually 
sent one or two articles back to New Times each month. Two 
reasons may explain this. First, I had an extensive 
understanding of Asia because of my postgraduate studies. 
Second, New Times had no one at its headquarters who was 
knowledgeable about Japan. 13
That an international journal, published in nine languages, should 
have no-one on its staff competent to comment on Japanese affairs would be 
a deficiency of some impact. It does not provide an impressive picture of 
Soviet expertise on Japan in the mid 1970's.
Foreign Minister Cheysson of France reputedly said of Prime Minister 
Suzuki that ’it is no use smiling in a language nobody understands’. It is 
not sufficient for the Soviets in their contact with the Japanese to be 
able to identify the differences in communication, they should also be able 
to understand those differences.
If we were to try to establish a general theme of the history of 
Russian/Soviet - Japanese relations it would on balance have to be one of 
distrust and fear. Long before Commodore Perry obtained his treaty which 
’opened-up’ an isolated Japan Russian traders and naval expeditions had 
been in contact with the Japanese. The treaty of Shimoda, (the Russian 
equivalent of Perry’s treaty) was vague enough over territorial boundaries
13R.Godson, R.Shultz, Dezinformatsia : Active Measures in Soviet 
Strategy Pergamon, New York, 1984. Quotation p.179.
to leave the problem open as the source of future conflicts. Those clashes
which were the later result of expansionist policies on mainland north east
Asia are well known. But the years after 1905 proved to be a period of
stability with the signing of the Russo - Japanese ententes of 1907, 1910,
1912 and 1916; the intervention of Japan in Siberia brought that abruptly
to an end. The continual engagement of the two powers in northern China
was only successfully brought to a close by the Soviet defeat of the
Kwantung army in August 1945. It is a process characterised by a cycle of
revenge and counter-revenge. Territorial disputes tend by their nature to
leave deep memories, in this case particularly for the Japanese. Another
feature noticeable in past relations and arguably still very applicable
today, is that of mutual contempt and under-evaluation. Commentators
otherwise favourable to the Japanese still are prone to assert that the
Japanese tend to be overbearing; 'There is a certain smugness in Japan
about the failure of all foreigners to cope effectively with modern
industrial challenges. This affects the Japanese assessment of the Soviet
Union, among others', is how two Western analysts see things. 14
The Soviets for their part, have a respect - even if grudging - for
Japanese industrial capabilities, mixed with a degree of antagonistic envy,
fuelled by the constant impression that Soviet leaders have wrestled with,
of Soviet backwardness and of the need for the Soviets to 'catch-up'.
Vadim Zagladin, deputy head of the International department of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union commented after a recent visit to Japan
I had visualised Japan as one of the most up-to-date countries 
of the non-socialist world. This was fully confirmed, though 
some notions had to be corrected. Perhaps - let my friends in 
the Western countries not take offence at this - Japan has left 
the Western countries far behind in many respects. And it not
14B.Gordon, L.Vasey, 'Security in East Asia and the Pacific' in C.E. 
Morrison, Threats to Security in East Asia and the Pacific Lexington Books, 
Lex., Mass., 1983. Quotation p. 37.
only ranks among the foremost today. It looks ahead. The 
technical blueprints of Japanese researchers and engineers are 
projected to the 21st century. Indeed, one cannot but marvel 
at and admire Japan’s accomplishments in gradually going over 
to less and less material and energy intensive production 
processes. (In our age of global problems this is of particular 
importance) . 15
Yet the suspicion must remain that because of Japan’s relative 
military insignificance the country does not carry sufficient political 
weight in Soviet eyes. To the Soviet Union in its capacity as a military 
superpower it could conceivably be perplexing as to why an economic giant 
should not wish to have military power commensurate with that economic 
strength. An example of this 'lack of respect’ as the Japanese see it 
could be the draft treaty on ’Goodneighbourliness and Co-operation between 
the Soviet Union and Japan’ unilaterally published by the Soviets in 
Izvestiia 23 February 1978. The publication was viewed as discourteous by 
the Japanese, but some articles were interpreted as actually insulting to 
Japan. The treaty required Japan to revoke the security treaty with the 
United States and contained a clause concerned with ’security in case of 
emergency’ - such a clause is only included in Soviet treaties with Eastern 
Europe or developing states. Nor was there a clause which provided for the 
termination of the proposed treaty.
It is not at all clear that the Soviets have estimated well the force 
of Japanese nationalism. Some writers, Hellmann and Christopher for 
example, are prone to attribute to the Japanese a strong sense of cultural 
homogeneity; the idea of a ’national family’. On the whole the evidence 
suggests that the concept has been over-emphasised (aside from the problems 
of how we quantify its influence) - the Japanese are much like everyone 
else in this regard. What has served as the motor of resurgent post-wax
1 5V.Zagladin, ’A Step Closer to Each Other?’ in New Times No.47 1984. 
pp.18-20. Quotation p.18.
nationalism has been the force of the Japanese economy, but at the same 
time that confidence has tended to breed arrogance and aloofness, and these 
attitudes have irritated the Soviets. The Soviets have tried to avoid 
purposely taking action that fuels the undercurrents of nationalism but 
because they have not been able to gauge accurately its strength and 
premises their actions have more often than not stirred that nationalist 
sentiment. An indication of this can be gauged from the results of 
Japanese opinion polls which throughout the 1970’s showed a rise in the 
degree of anti-Soviet sentiment, or of the rating of the Soviet Union as 
the nation ’least liked’.
The Soviets voice the opinion however that it is unlikely that the 
fanatical ultra-nationalism of the 1930’s will recur; though loath to state 
it openly the orientation of their moderate critiques of Japanese 
militarisation imply that the political conditions necessary for that to 
occur just do not exist. Yu.Tavrovsky details the frequency of ’pro­
militarisation’ meetings and demonstrations and describes the ’great deal 
of clamour around the revival of militaristic chauvinistic tradition’ . 16 
He continues to list those against the trend : the ’ordinary people’, all 
the opposition parties, and businessmen ’who are convinced that the policy 
of militarising the economy is baneful’. ’Even within the Liberal 
Democratic party, of which the Premier is the leader, there is growing 
criticism’ according to Tavrovsky.
Soviet experience of Western processes of political decision-making, 
especially their extensive experience of the American system has presumably 
given them knowledge of the fluctuations and delays as well as ’policy 
somersaults’ that are inherent in such systems. Therefore they could
1 6Yu.Tavrovsky, ’Grey Jeeps from the Past’ in New Times No.15 1983. 
pp.12-13.
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reasonably only have expected similar trials from the functioning of the
Japanese system. It should not be surprising, then, that an analyst
contends that the Japanese stand has 'lacked consistence' . 17 Arguably
these 'inconsistencies' are only superficial18 ; rather than being
inconsistent, Japanese policy, has demonstrated by and large a pattern of
continuity and only relatively recent public utterances have been
inconsistent with what has been voiced before.
Very few Soviet authors comment on the Japanese policy process but it
is evident that at least one commentator has a clear appraisal of the
mechanics of the Japanese policy process as the following excerpts show :
The specifics of Japan's postwar development have conditioned 
the complex nature of her foreign policy mechanism, which 
involved the Diet, government, ministries, monopoly 
organisations, political parties and the mass media. Quite 
naturally, the influence of each of those factors was far from 
equivalent and depended on the specific policy issue in 
question and on the domestic and international situations.
...some Japanese historians even assert that the Prime Minister 
is the country's most powerful political leader whose status is 
similar to that of the British Prime Minister, who in critical 
periods exercises great power to no less a degree than any 
dictator. International issues enjoy the special attention of 
every new Japanese Prime Minister. This is largely because of 
a desire to associate his name with some significant foreign 
policy act. ...in the post-war period the bureaucracy and the 
top officials of ministries...have had great influence on the 
planning of Japan's foreign policy. Most of them were from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry, Ministry of Finance and the National Defence 
Agency. ...despite the existence of constitutionally 
stipulated official institutions designed to shape the 
country's foreign policy, relevant control in the post-war
17V.Dalnev, 'Impediments to Soviet - Japanese relations' in 
International Affairs (Moscow) February 1981. pp.49-53. Quotation p.49.
18H.Kimura, argues that 'it is almost impossible for anyone to 
pinpoint the major policy orientation of the Suzuki administration towards 
the Soviet Union...because...(it) has been marked by ambiguities, 
inconsistencies, zigzagging and even mysteries’. See "Recent Japanese- 
Soviet Relations : from Clouded to 'Somewhat Crystal' in Journal of North 
East Asian Studies Winter 1982. pp.3-22. Quotation p.4. For more details 
of the inconsistencies see the upcoming section on 'The Soviet Union, Japan 
and the United States' which shows how Japanese contact with the Soviets 
continued despite the public rhetoric.
years was largely exercised by the ruling party, whose leader 
automatically became Prime Minister and formed the cabinet.
Due to its majority in the Diet, the ruling party can control 
the Diet committees concerned with foreign policy issues. . . 19
Though a brief description of the Japanese political process,
Verbitsky has summarised aspects of its effective functioning. The main
constitutional theory behind the Japanese system was to produce a
bureaucratic central government, however though this has been achieved it
has been distorted by the peculiarities of a Japanese approach.
Factionalism is perhaps the biggest single influence in causing the
distortion of the original idea.
We have pointed-out that constitutionally both Houses of the Diet
have a say in policy. In practice this constitutional counter-balancing
has been nullified in recent times as both Houses have been dominated by
the LDP. 20 The system of House committees, to which Verbitsky refers in
his closing comments, serve as important forums for debate on foreign
policy issues but these too have been dominated by the LDP. While the
House of Councillors can delay legislation, it can delay the most important
bills such as the budget, passing of treaties or the election of the Prime
Minister, by only 30 days.
Though individual parliamentarians may propose that certain bills be
debated in parliament this is merely a pre-arranged method of operation
between Cabinet and parliament. The Cabinet, through dint of practice, has
established a superior position over the House of Representatives and in
fact proposes the bills to be debated in House and merely agrees that a
19S.Verbitsky, ’Japan's Policy Towards the Soviet Union’ in Present 
Dav Japan Social Sciences Today Editorial Board, USSR Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow 1983. pp.100-122. Quotations pp.103-105.
20As of 1/12/84 main party strengths were - House of Representatives 
(511 seats total) : LDP - 264. JSP - 111. JCP - 27. Komeito - 59. House of 
Councillors (252 seats total) : LDP - 138. JSP - 43. JCP - 14. Komeito- 
27. See, Asahi Nenkan 1985 p.83.
particular parliamentarian should raise them on its behalf.
Critics (including Hellmann and Higashi) have made plain what they
see as the rivalries between MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
may have tended to exaggerate the extent to which MITI 'makes' Japanese
foreign policy. If anything the more issues oriented themselves towards
defence policy in the latter 1970's, the more the pendulum of influence
swung back in favour of the Foreign Ministry. Stockwin in 1975 argued that
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is now 
seen as one of Japan's best-known and powerful ministries 
largely as a result of the central role it has had in 
formulating industry and trade policies during the period of 
spectacular economic growth...The status of other ministries 
reflects changing national priorities. Thus the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was not highly regarded during the post-war 
period, but has slowly been rising to a position of greater 
prominence with the emergence of Japan into a somewhat more 
active role in international affairs21
Stockwin's judgement is echoed by a Soviet analyst. Head of the 
Japan section at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow, K.0.Sarkisov, 
expressed the opinion that by 1980 the Japanese were pursuing a more 
diplomatically oriented course and that 'therefore the Gaimusho (Japanese 
foreign ministry) had moved to the fore in policymaking' . 22
It is impossible to state with confidence how the Soviets interpret 
that realignment of influence as in public they do not go beyond 
speculation that it is the top groups of bureaucrats, the administrators 
who are a part of the 'ruling circles', that dictate a particular policy 
line, rather than the bureaucracy as a whole which propounds a cause. 
Sarkisov, for example, stated that those in the 'Soviet desk' at the 
Gaimusho were ’quite good at their job', however he also added that the 
Gaimusho 'constantly puts forward an anti-Soviet position'.
21J.A.A.Stockwin, op.cit. p .125.
22Interview with Sarkisov, Institute of Oriental studies, Moscow. 
September 1984.
In the above we have tried to stress the fact that aside from the 
obvious concessions to Party doctrine which appear in their writings on 
Japan (mainly with regard to the status of ’progressive forces’ or the 
influences of the ’ruling circles’) these Soviet academics (and a few 
others, Lukin and Zagladin, for example) concerned with contemporary 
politics and foreign policy demonstrate an informed appraisal of the 
details. The difficulty that we face in trying to establish inputs behind 
Soviet policy however is that we must include not only inputs from academic 
researchers but also from government personnel. We must also evaluate the 
problems inherent in the process of transferring available knowledge to 
policymakers.
Soviet researchers on international politics have to act as 
transmitters of the party line as well as encourage the ’creative 
development’ of the theoretical foundations of current Soviet policies : 
there is always then a conflict between academic credibility and 
partiinost’. Institute staffers are regularly called upon to brief TASS, 
or Izvestiia or Pravda on appropriate issues and through their writings are 
also used to disseminate Soviet policy positions. Oriental studies is one 
of the few areas which holds opportunities of study outside the Moscow or 
Leningrad complex but even the ’China school’ is not held in such high 
regard nor has such a high profile as ISShaK (Institute of the United 
States and Canada) or IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations). It would be wrong to interpret the position of members of 
these institutes as analogous to those in some Western ’think-tank’. To 
date only a handful of their number have risen to political appointments as 
advisers, chiefly the Amerikantsi - the Soviet experts on the United States
- and some staffers from IMEMO. The main exception to the concentration of 
top appointments being from the Amerikantsi or IMEMO, is personified by the
Sinologist Mikhail Kapitsa, at present a Deputy Foreign Minister. 
Interestingly enough, Kapitsa also has some expertise on Japan. To what 
extent an adviser can influence policy via the policymaker is still a 
matter of great controversy and speculation. While the Brezhnev years saw 
an expansion in the number of specialists overall it is questionable to 
deduce a resultant increase in effectiveness from that expansion. 23
Soviet assessments of Japan are primarily economically oriented. 
MEMO, the journal of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations, regularly features such articles. The largest grouping of 
contributions to the Japan Yearbooks published by the Academy of Sciences 
is similarly economics based.
From the results of our literature survey (summarised in Table 
Twenty-two) most attention, as we would expect from Marxist-Leninists, 
centres around economic appraisals of Japan and of its influence. Military 
questions probably rate a second place in terms of frequency, especially by 
the latter half of the 1970’s. Lastly comes the purely political coverage. 
Tables Twenty-three and Twenty-four present more data drawn from literature 
surveys.
It seems fair to conclude that the expertise of the Soviet ’Japan 
watchers’ is mixed. In interviews with the author it was commented that 
traditionally Japanese specialists in the Soviet Union/Russia had been 
quite numerous. This is not the case today (see Table Twenty-five). 
Predominantly the traditional areas of study had been language, literature 
and history. One academic lamented that there was not sufficient emphasis 
on modern-day concerns thus, he thought, ’we fail to see the subtle
23For ’insider’ views of the Soviet international research institutes 
and the relationship with Party and government see, N.Beloff, ’A Defector’s 
Story" in Atlantic Monthly November 1980. pp.42-49 and A.N.Shevchenko, 
Breaking with Moscow Jonathon Cape, London,1985.
C O V E R A G E  D EVOTED TO JAP A N  IN S E LECTED SOVIET JOURNALS
Year Internat l'ina 1 
Affairs 
12 Issues 
per year
N.irod 1 Azi 1 
1 Afrlkl 
6 Issues 
per year
S.Sh.A.
12 Issues 
per year
Nóvala 1 
Nove 1 sha 1 a 
Istorl la 
6 Issues 
per year
New Times 
52 Issues 
per year
Foreign Trade 
of The USSR 
12 Issues per 
year
MEMO 
12 Issues 
per year
Kommun 1st 
18 Issues 
per year
Kommun I St 
V o o r u z h e n n I k h  SII 
24 Issues 
per year
Vnesh n al a  Polltlka 
Sovet skovo 
Soluza: Sbornik 
D okumentov
1970 2A 
1 c
4A 1A None 1A 5A
(3c)
None 1A None
1971 ÌA
1 c
( H 19 ) 
2A
1A 
1 BR
None 1A (BR) ¡ A
(lc)
None 2 A 
1 BR
None
1972 4 A 
le
5A ( H 19) 
(H)
2A None 1A 3A
(2c)
1 A 2A 2
1973 None 1A (H 19) 3A ( 1 BR) None None 2A 
( lc)
None None 1
19 74 1A
2c
3A (U l 9) None 1A None 2A
(2c)
None 
1 BR
None None
1975 2A (H) 
1 BR
2A (L) 
1 BR
None None 1A 2A (1st on m i l l -  None 
(le) 1A tarlsm)
1
1976 1A 
1 BR
1A (H19) 
1 BR
None 1A 12A (4) None 2A
(lc)
1 BR None 1
1977 None 3A (H 10) 
1 BR
None None 9A (4) 3A 5A ♦( 1 s t on None 
( 2c ) ml l ltarlsm)
1A None
1978 3A 1A 1A None
(*lst
14A (6) 1A 
on militar i sm )
3A
(2c)
None None 1
1979 1A (S-J Treaty) 3A (H6)
1 BR (L2)
1A None 11A (4) None (lc) None 1A (1st on 
m i l i t a r i s m )
None
1980 1 BR 3A 
1 BR
None None 9A (3) 1A 4A None 1 BR None
19 ß 1 1A 
1 BR
None None 9 A (4) 1 (Document) 4A None None 1
1982 2A 
1 BR
None None 10A (3) None 1A
(lc)
1A None
-
1983 1A 1A (H) 1A (H) 13A (6) 1 2A 1A -
1984 2A None 2 0 A ( 6) *“ 6A
(lc)
—
1985
Key to Table A : Art ic l e (for New Times the figure In brackets Indicates the nu mber of ar t ic l es  of the total wh i c h  were of one page
or less In length).
c : Comment a ry .  Us u a l l y  a m a x i m u m  of two to three pages long.
BR : Book Review.
(H) : Indicates that one of the ar ti c le s  was of h is t or i ca l  content (20th Centu ry ) .
The number following, e.g. (H 19) In dicates the cen t ur y  con c er n ed ,
I.e. (116) Indicates an arti c le  about 6th C e nt u r y  histo r y.  PO
(L) : Indicates an a r ti c le  c o nc e rn e d with literature. O
None: No ar ticles, co m m e n t a r i e s  on book reviews for that year. pj
- : No Inf o rm a ti o n a vailable.
General comments on Table Twenty-two by .journal 
International Affairs
This is the main English language journal published in the Soviet Union on 
international politics. Although articles on collective security in Asia,
South Asia and China are relatively common, coverage of Japan is minimal. 
Articles on, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy 
and Britain occur more frequently.
Narodi Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa)
Coverage devoted to Japan compared with other subjects is low. The main 
orientation of what little coverage there is focuses upon historico- 
cultural and linguistic concerns.
S.Sh.A. (United States and Canada)
This is the journal of the Institute of the United States and Canada.
Within these terms of reference comment on Japan occurs in the context of 
Japan as a trading partner/rival of the United States or on Japan as the 
main military ally of the United States in the Pacific. As the table 
indicates these comments are very few in number, we might expect, given the 
declared importance of Japan to the United States in the eyes of the 
Soviets, for them to be more numerous. Apart from comment on the United 
States itself the mainstay of content deals with American relations with 
Europe. However Japanese involvement with the United States fares badly as 
an issue of comment even in comparison with the coverage given to United 
States' association with non-European nations or with non-European areas of 
the world, e.g. SE Asia, Gulf.
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Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia (New History)
Nothing to be said in the case of this journal except to state that 
obviously Japan holds no interest as a subject for the compilers of the 
journal.
New Times
The Soviet popular weekly journal published in English and other languages.
As a ’popular’ journal the content of the articles varies accordingly. 
Features cover a wide range of subjects from conversations with Japanese 
fishermen, articles on crime in Japan, travel, to comment on Japanese 
politics and trends of militarisation. Increasingly by the late 1970’s 
some comment on militarisation was a regular feature of the Japan coverage 
in each issue.
Foreign Trade of the USSR
An English language journal on Soviet foreign trade. We might expect that 
given the attention drawn in public statements by the Soviets to trade with 
Japan comment on dealings with Japan would be fairly frequent. This is not 
the case. Trade with the Federal Republic of Germany, France and even the 
United Kingdom occurs more frequently as a topic. Overall, even trade with 
quite minor partners such as Portugal or Greece features almost as often as 
a subject for comment as does trade with Japan.
MEMO
The journal of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.
The strongest area of Soviet expertise is probably economics - both 
domestic and international. The main concentration of this expertise is at 
IMEMO and is reflected in the coverage given to Japan in the house-journal,
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MEMO. However, as a comparison with other areas Japan once again fares 
poorly. As the comparative information on the secondary table shows, the 
journal is dominated by work on the United States and Europe. In fact the 
imbalance is actually greater than indicated on the table as the numerous 
theoretical articles on trends in (European) capitalism which appear in 
each issue of the journal have not been included in the figures. 
Commentary on Latin America or particular nations (Chile, Brazil) is fairly 
common and in quite a few cases coverage devoted to Japan during particular 
years is at a comparable level even with that of individual Latin American 
nations.
Kommunist
The theoretical journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Given 
the nature of the journal there is no special reason why Japan should 
feature as a regular subject of contribution. However given that other 
nations do feature as such, it might be of interest that Japan does not.
An interesting indication of the poor state of relations between the CPSU 
and the JCP can be found in the later 1976 editions which covered the 26th 
CPSU congress. Reports of speeches of the visiting guest communist parties 
were printed in Kommunist. including speeches by parties from Sri Lanka, 
Lebanon, Cyprus, Canada, Iraq and South Africa. The report given by the 
JCP is not mentioned at all.
Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces)
The Party journal of the Soviet armed forces. Apart from providing for the 
political education of the Soviet armed forces the journal carries 
articles, as we would expect, on the threat to peace posed by actions or 
designs of other nations. Developments within those nations which are
202 d
labelled as ’militaristic' or ’trends towards militarism’ are a standard 
subject of comment. The attention drawn in public by Soviet leaders to 
what they characterised as resurgent Japanese revanchism is not reflected 
by the comment in the journal. In fact in all the journals (e.g. S.Sh.A., 
International Affairs) including this one, which might have been expected 
to devote space to the militarism question, scant space is devoted to it.
This journal, which we might expect to be the most aware of the concern 
proved to be the last (all the others published before it) journal to 
publish an article on Japanese militarism. It did this in 1979.
202 e
202 f
TABLE 23
COVERAGE OF JAPAN IN RSFR OBLAST* NEWSPAPERS APRIL - MAY 1983 (in column 
lines)
OBLAST' JAPAN TOTAL MILITARISM ANTI-WAR CHINA TOTAL
West of
Urals
Murmansk 975 515 205 260
Leningrad 525 90 250 550
Moscow 85 10 0 200
Novgorod 850 110 280 70
Kursk 985 345 125 135
Riazan 1100 110 345 ’* ' 90
Vologda 1190 505 180 120
Western
Siberia
Tiumen 615 225 230 170
Novosibirsk 840 200 235 175
East
Siberia
Krasnoiarsk 1020 250 250 40
Irkutsk 1270 130 605 180
Chita 1510 385 150 505
Far
East
Iakutiia 450 95 155 275
Magadan 1040 515 235 185
Kamchatka 1330 275 485 320
Amur 1820 295 115 1205
Khabarovsk 1915 1210 115 950
Sakhalin 2325 980 375 400
(*) The term ’Oblast*' used here includes the terms ’Krai’ and ’ASSR’. The 
column ’militarism’ covers those articles concerned with the threat from 
Japanese militarism. ’Anti -war’ refers to those about peace issues. Both 
totals are sub-totals of the first column. Source; Data selected from J. 
Hough, ’The Evolution of the Soviet Political System’ in Acta Slavica 
Iaponica Tomus II 1984. pp.127 - 158. Figures pp. 139 - 140. Comment on 
Table information The results here indicate nothing for certain other than 
that there seems to be no fixed•policy of comment on Japanese affairs. As a 
general proposition, it is fair to say that the closer the Oblast* is 
geographically to Japan the larger the amount of coverage is likely to be. 
However in the face of this proposition we have to explain the high coverage 
given by Riazan, Murmansk, Novgorod and Kursk and the almost nil coverage by 
Moscow. Murmansk might be explained by the presence of navy personnel, the 
others probably by the preferences of the individual editors. From the 
results it. would also appear that there is no necessary relationship between 
proximity to Japan and coverage (either as a percentage of total coverage or 
as a total) of militarist issues. For example, as a percentage of the total 
coverage devoted to militarism, Khabarovsk - 63Î ; Sakhalin - 42$ ; but 
Murmansk - 52% ; Kamchatka - 20% ; Amur - 16$. In Iakutiia and Tiumen 
oblasts, where because of the continuing economic connection, we might expect 
the coverage of Japan to figure quite prominently - in fact comparatively 
speaking, the opposite is the case.
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TABLE 24
Total Number of Articles for Period 1970 - 84
Journal Japan PRC W.Europe US FRG UK Franc
MEMO 42 - 24 121 39 21 27
Kommunist 4 3 5 9 1 3 2
K.V.S. 7 7 3 26 2 6
Comment The heading for Western Europe does not include articles which deal with 
NATO or the EEC, thus the European bias is far more pronounced that might appear 
from the table.
perceptions'. The same lament is obviously behind statements made by 
another Soviet writer when he suggests that ’Soviet scholars attach much 
importance to analysing present-day relations between labour and capital in 
Japan. Nevertheless, the substantial changes in this field in recent years 
have not been adequately studied in Soviet literature’ . 24
The bureaucracies present an altogether different picture. By 
comparison with the Institutes we know very little about internal 
functionings and structure of, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
or Trade. The bureaucracies themselves in the late 1970’s became 
increasingly concerned to encourage their own ’in-house’ research staffs, 
if only to promote their own perspectives on issues. For example, the 
Scientific Research Marketing Institute (NIKI) is part of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and its job is to explore profitable markets for Soviet 
goods. The Research Institute of Economic and Technical co-operation was 
established in 1979 to handle foreign aid assistance also under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Research in these organisations 
as we would expect is more tailored towards specific objectives than the 
work undertaken by the formal research institutes. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Trade Ministry of course have their own sources of 
information from their posts abroad.
An area where the talents of the staffers and bureaucrats may overlap 
is in the operation of the International Department of the Party. 25 This 
is now recognised as the main co-ordinating body in relations with non­
ruling Communist parties and is thought to have an important voice in
24A.Orfemov, op.cit. p. 98.
25See, L.Schapiro, ’The International Department of the CPSU : Key to 
Soviet Policy’ in International Journal Winter 1976-77. pp.41-55. Also, 
R.W.Kitrinos, ’International Department of the CPSU’ in Problems of 
Communism Vol.XXXIII September-October 1984. pp.47-75.
Staff Numbers of Japanese sections of Soviet Research Institutes
T A B L E  2b
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Institute of the Far East
Total Institute staff : 300 - 500.
Japan section : 20 (mainly foreign policy oriented).
Institute of World Economy and International Relations
Total Institute staff : approx. 700
Japan section : 14 (with 10 more involved in Japan study scattered
throughout the institute.)
There is a special section within the above which 
deals with the Japanese economy and Japanese 
labour politics.
Institute of Oriental Studies
Total Institute staff : 800 (of which 200 in Leningrad)
Japan section : 40 - 45 (approximately 15 of which 
concentrate on language and literature).
Institute of the United States and Canada
Total Institute staff : 300 
Section on US policy in the Far East 
(including relations with Japan) : 9
Source : Author’s conversations with Soviet academics at each of the ^above 
Institutes.
formulating foreign policy. The department is organised into geographical 
sectors. Each of these sectors is in turn composed of ’desks’ usually 
given a country or geographical area as its administrative responsibility. 
I.I.Kovalenko has, for example, been identified as Head of the Far East 
sector which comprises South East Asia and Japan. Interestingly, within 
the Far East sector Japan is given the designation of ’sector’ rather than 
’desk’. Kovalenko is himself a former academic and Japan specialist (he 
still occasionally contributes articles under the pseudonym of I.I.Ivkov) 
with extensive experience of Japan. Amongst his past positions was one 
responsible for the political education of Japanese prisoners of war in 
Siberia and according to Japanese who have met him, he often adopts an 
overbearing attitude towards Japanese. 26
One report suggests that in the late 1970’s the International 
Department maintained a staff of four Japan specialists under a sector 
chief called Senatorov. The Japan Sector has been known to consult with 
I. A.Latyshev (Chief of the Japan department of the Institute of Oriental 
Studies), D.V.Petrov (Head of the Japan section at the Institute of the Far 
East) and V.B.Ramzes of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations. 27
The images which nations form of each other and of each others’ 
actions have been accepted in the literature of foreign policy research as 
a crucially important factor in international politics. If the information
26Conversations with H.Kimura, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido 
University. Some reports indicate that Kovalenko was actually the 
commandant of a camp for Japanese POWs.
27See, L.Dzirkals, T.Gustafson, A.Johnson, The Media and Intra-Elite 
Communication in the USSR Rand Paper R-2869. September 1982. A more recent 
study lists three members of the Japan Sector of the International 
Department. A.Senatorov (Head); V.Kuznetzov (responsible for JCP affairs); 
V.Saplin, (JSP affairs). See, W.Spaulding, “Shifts in CPSU ID" in Problems 
of Communism July-August 1986 pp.80-86.
TABLE 26
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Soviet Radio Broadcasts
TO : Radio Moscow Radio Peace and Totals
Progress
Europe 40 6 520.5
Americas 63 20 6
Central/
S.America 81.5 10.5 92
M.East/
N.Africa 197.5
Sub-Saharan
Africa 126 3.5 129-5
South/South
East Asia 297 21.5 318.5
Far East 245 91 336
Source; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Soviet External Propaganda 
Background Brief. London, October 1984. The 'Total' figure includes 
hours broadcast from regional stations not listed. Also it does not 
include the Moscow 'World Service' broadcasts nor the clandestine radio 
stations' output for the Middle East (this represents a few hours a week 
in Persian or Turkish). Comment Although a breakdown of the total figures 
was not available, it is reasonable to assume that in the case of the Far 
East category most of the outout is in Chinese and English. The 91 hours 
of Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts are, for example, solely in English 
or regional Chinese dialects. Given that as a representative 
distribution, it is probably the case that total broadcasts to Japan will 
constitute less than approximately 100 hours out of the 245 broadcast by 
Radio Moscow. Actual hours broadcast in Japanese (rather than English) 
will therefore be even smaller. Japan therefore receives less coverage 
than the major European nations.
which the Soviets receive about Japan is deficient then we must expect that
any Soviet policies involving Japan will be lacking in some way.
The difficulty is that the Soviets (like other governments) are not
necessarily aware of the extent of their deficiencies and of the irritation
which they arouse in the Japanese. We have tried to argue that the Soviets
have, for example, probably under-estimated the strength of Japanese
nationalism. We must differ from Vadim Zagladin’s (Deputy head of the
Information Department of the CPSU) statement that
One cannot agree with the contention advanced in some Japanese 
press organs that the USSR underrates Japan or does not regard 
it with sufficient respect28
This is not to say that the Soviets underrate the Japanese, but that the
Japanese think that they do. Some incidents of provocation against the
Japanese have been deliberate (from the petty snubbing of diplomats to
larger scale concerns), others not so, have been undoubtedly exacerbated by
mutual misunderstanding.
Soviet - Japanese Negotiations 
In considering the course of Soviet policy towards Japan there are 
certain important factors, the impact of which can only be estimated 
because of their abstract nature. One of these areas covers the images or 
impressions of each other created by interaction during meetings or 
negotiations.
The point to be made at the outset, at the risk of stating the 
obvious, is that Japan and the Soviet Union sure very different from each 
other. To the Soviets the Japanese are still very much an alien race with 
which they have had comparatively little contact and correspondingly little 
substantial experience. In these respects the Soviet Union shares with the
28V.Zagladin, 'A Step Closer to Each Other' in New Times No.47 1984. 
pp.18-20. Quotation p.18.
rest of the world in the exclusionary nature of Japanese society and 
culture. The specific characteristics of a Japanese style have manifested 
themselves in negotiation with the Soviets.
Except for the early post-war negotiations with the Japanese, the 
Soviets have kept their demands and positions in negotiation free from any 
obvious influences of ideology in the sense that they have entered into 
negotiations in a businesslike manner and subsequently steered a pragmatic 
course. This general observation is applicable whether the negotiations 
have concerned trade questions, the northern islands issue or fisheries. 
What may we say then about Soviet approaches ? An American survey 
undertaken for Congress characterises the Soviet approach to negotiations 
as ’not only sitting down and haggling over language at the bargaining 
table but rather manoeuvering for position, and achieving certain 
adjustments by one means or another, including the threat of force or 
agitation, or bribery or inducements or any number of things’ . 29 Other 
general attributes of a definitive Soviet ’style’ have been suggested as 
comprising an attention to detail (hard-line Western critics argue that we 
can rely on the Soviets to adhere to the letter of an agreement but not 
necessarily the spirit); a tendency to let the other side take the 
initiative; there is also a traditional view which depicts Soviet 
negotiators as being aggressive and unwilling to compromise easily. 30 It
29Soviet Negotiating Behaviour : Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Document No. 96-238. 1979. Quotation p. 505.
30See for example, C.Jonsson, Soviet Bargaining Behaviour Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1979. pp.45-48. Also, Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behaviour : 
Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy Document No.96-238 1979. pp.493-502. 
This sets out a list of basic Soviet attributes or tactics. Soviets have an 
’aggressive sense of realism...are competent negotiators but always 
unpleasant, mostly unpleasant. .. (they) do not compromise willingly...’ 
( P . 501).
is always a dubious business to attribute ’national' characteristics, let 
alone make deductions from them. No nation ’invariably’ possesses the 
attributes assigned to it. We can substantiate particular points by 
example but should always be wary of the problems involved in moving from 
the general to the particular. Bearing that in mind let us move to some 
estimation of Japanese methods of operation.
In a study of Japanese negotiating techniques the concluding remarks 
were made that ’the Japanese approach to negotiations was dominated by a 
philosophy of risk minimisation and confrontation avoidance. They seemed 
to prefer doing nothing when it was safe to do nothing and acting only when 
the pressure of events forced them to act’ . 31 Japanese conduct during the 
annual fishery negotiations illustrates well this trait; often Japanese 
negotiators would only act when the Soviets imposed a deadline or 
threatened unilateral action. The principle of confrontation avoidance- 
whether it be group-based or individual - seems to be part of the Japanese 
ethic. A corollary of this attribute is that the Japanese will operate by 
a consensual process of decision-making in order to avoid the prompting of 
confrontation. Operating by consensus is in some circumstances a benefit 
but in others a distinct handicap. In either case it is a mode of 
operation which is very time consuming.
The Soviets, for their part, are renowned for their willingness to 
’sit-out’ negotiations and grind down an adversary’s position almost by a 
process of attrition. The fact that Soviet negotiating positions are 
always determined from the centre, forces Soviet negotiators to refer back 
for new instructions thus adding to the drawn-out process of delays and 
frustrations. This can be advantageous or disadvantageous depending upon
31C.Higashi, Japanese Trade Policy Formulation Praeger, New York,1983. 
Quotation p. 4.
the circumstances.
An initial observation then is that both parties, though for 
different reasons, utilise a tactic which results in the taking-up of great 
amounts of time. The difficulty in such a situation is self-evident. 
Moreover the Japanese idea of consensual decision-making has led to 
accusations, from other Japanese negotiating partners as well as the 
Soviets, of duplicity. The problem seems to be that until consensus is 
reached on which line to take in negotiations the Japanese negotiators 
concerned will say differing things simply because at that point they are 
not sure of what they are supposed to be saying.
The Japanese interpretation of the role of concessions in 
negotiations differs markedly from other nations. When they do make a 
concession they
...do so on the assumption that whatever 'concession' they make 
will be accepted by the foreigners as a gesture of good will 
and an effort to reach a solution that saves face all round.
And they never cease to be astounded when the foreigners, who 
are interested not in saving face but in achieving concrete 
goals, denounce the Japanese gestures as meaningless or 
deceitful and interpret them as tacit admission of guilt32
Related to this is a peculiarity of the Japanese 'style' whereby they tend
not to appear at negotiations with a structured agenda of points or
demands. This has been a common feature in negotiations with the West and
we have no reason to assume it would be any different where the Soviets
were involved. This approach, coupled with a desire to avoid open
confrontation, leads to the Japanese constantly being disadvantaged by
placing themselves on the defensive in negotiations. This situation
clashes directly with two of our assumed Soviet methods of operation : the
Soviet tactic of trying to let the other side take the initiative
32R.C.Christopher, The Japanese Mind : The Goliath Explained Linden 
Press, Simon and Schuster, New York,1983. Quotation p.178.
(hopefully so that they end up negotiating with themselves) and the Soviet 
approach to signs of weakness which is to adopt a harder stance.
The Soviets have an especial penchant for attention to detail on 
agreements and to the legal foundation of documents. Always aware of the 
propaganda bonus of being seen to operate within legal norms, the Soviets 
like, when possible, to be seen to be adhering to international legal 
stipulations and in this they are no different from most other nations. It 
follows from this assumption then that a legal document is more important 
than some sort of informal understanding : arguably, this principle can be 
demonstrated in the case of the Soviet reaction to the Japan-China treaty 
of 1978 and in the Soviet approach to their peace treaty with the Japanese.
In the first example, the Japanese-Chinese treaty of 1978 is almost 
exactly the same text - in some places it is identical - as the Japanese- 
Chinese protocol of 1972. Both documents contain the much vilified ’anti- 
hegemony’ clause. Yet why then was the Soviet Union so critical of the 
latter document of 1978, especially as the document also contains a 
qualifying clause (which had been omitted from the 1972 protocol) to the 
’anti-hegemony’ clause ? The important difference is that the former was a 
’protocol’ whereas the latter was a ’treaty’ and hence legally binding upon 
the signatories. The context in which the two documents were agreed was 
different but with the 1972 protocol coming so soon after the Nixon visit 
to China and the Nixon doctrine there must have been cause for worry then 
also, however no noticeable furore was made by the Soviets on that 
occasion. Presumably, if the ’anti-hegemony’ clause was in itself a 
hostile act against the Soviet Union in 1978, then it was also so in 
1972.33
33For contents of each text see, Y.Tagano, ’The Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship of 1978 between Japan and the People’s Republic of China’ in 
Japanese Annual of International Law No.23 1979-80. pp.1-16. The
Pressure behind the Soviet moves to conclude a peace treaty seem to 
be based on a desire to have things ’tidied-up’ with the Japanese and put 
on a regular footing - a visible sign for all to see of Soviet acceptance 
and legitimation in North East Asia. Although both parties have developed 
relations to a satisfactory level without a treaty the Soviet longing for 
one is still there for the reasons given. 'Of course, both states can get 
along without a peace treaty. However, considering that the USSR and Japan 
faced each other across the frontline during the last world war, the 
placing of their relations on a strong legal basis would be an important 
and useful thing' . 34
In examining the course of Soviet-Japanese negotiations it appears 
curious that a nation such as the Japanese which is conscious of the 
importance of rank or formal status should put itself constantly in the 
position of being ’outranked" in negotiations by the Soviets. It is 
possible that because of the very significance which the Japanese give to 
formal status they have not sent high ranking officials to meetings with 
the Soviets as this would be seen to confer status on the Soviets. That 
apart, in general the Japanese have always been put at the disadvantage of 
having to travel to the Soviet Union to negotiate and have often been 
confronted by high ranking Soviet personnel. Heads of Japanese 
Parliamentary delegations and business groups were regularly met by 
Politburo members such as Kosygin, Gromyko or Suslov, though very rarely by 
Brezhnev. This may have been done by the Soviets as a matter of courtesy 
but it can also be seen as an attempt by the Soviets to emphasise their
qualifying clause is in Article 4 of the 1978 Treaty, it states that the 
treaty will not affect the position of either signatory as far as its 
relations with a third country is concerned.
34V.Dalnev, 'Impediments to Soviet-Japanese Relations’ in 
International Affairs (Moscow) February 1981 pp.49-53. Quotation p.51.
authority. In practice the tactic has quite often backfired on the 
Soviets, for the Japanese would take at face value the statements made at 
meetings by such high leaders and then would subsequently be disappointed 
and frustrated when the promises they made or implied (or that the Japanese 
thought the Soviets had made) were not subsequently implemented.
The most obvious example of where the Japanese negotiated on an equal 
footing concerns the annual fishery negotiations. Even here, although 
formal rank can be equated, the Soviet team had a vast experience always 
lacking in the official Japanese minister, due to continual changing of 
portfolios within the Japanese cabinet. Moreover, the actual portfolio is 
that of ’Agriculture and Fisheries’ and any minister is therefore required 
to divide his time between both concerns. The Soviet team leader and 
Minister of Fisheries, for most of the period examined, A.A.Ishkov, had 
twenty-five years of experience behind him. The closest the Japanese came 
to matching that sort of experience was in the person of Zenko Suzuki who 
was elected in a fishing constituency but he was only in office for two and 
a half years. By all accounts Suzuki was constantly advised by his team of 
civil servants from the ministry, and in particular by one top official 
with great experience of negotiations. Potentially there exists in that 
kind of arrangement a source of friction between formal status of the ’top 
man’ and the status of the person with ’greatest experience’. This is a 
phenomenon found throughout pluralist systems and in some instances one- 
party systems; it appears particularly acute in the case of Soviet-Japanese 
fishery negotiations.
In conducting negotiations in the private sector with Japanese 
companies the Soviets again were at the tactical advantage in that the 
Japanese, by and large, had to come to them to do business. The advantage 
was reinforced due to Japanese companies not being able to establish
suitable premises in Moscow to use as a base. The Soviets were therefore 
able to make on-the-spot decisions unlike the Japanese deputations who 
often might have to refer back to Japan for instructions; in these 
circumstances of competition against other companies it was the Japanese 
who needed to be able to make the on-the-spot decision. Also, faced by 
hints from the Soviets of alternative terms being offered by competitors 
(the Soviets were indeed negotiating with major competitors of Japanese 
companies, as was common knowledge) Japanese businessmen were inclined to 
accept less favourable terms on the spot rather than return home empty 
handed.
Conceptualising Soviet Policy Towards Japan 
Analysts sure divided over the question of whether the Soviets have 
formulated any specific policy with regard to Japan. Some observers remain 
sceptical, arguing that Soviet policies towards Japan sure merely an 
extension of Soviet global policy or of policy towards the United States 
and China in the north east Asian region. At least one leading Japanese 
Sovietologist takes a different standpoint, contending that ’...such 
interpretations may have been credible in the past; however with the 
growing Soviet realisation of the significant role which Japan occupies in 
North East Asia, the Kremlin leaders have recently been increasingly 
recognising the need to formulate a specific policy for Japan. ’ 35
The ’do they or don’t they have a policy’ controversy still dominates 
the analysis of Soviet behaviour towards Japan. In this sense there is not 
an approach which we could label as ’the conventional wisdom’ vis-a-vis 
Soviet policy and Japan, though it would probably be accurate to say that 
on balance the largest group of analysts tend to come-down on the side of
35H.Kimura, ’Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Japan since the Conclusion 
of the Japan-China Peace Treaty’ in Slavic Studies (Hokkaido University) 
No.26, 1980 pp.31-55. Quotation p.32.
ascribing policies to the Soviets - if only to argue at a later point that 
these policies have 'failed'.
We have seen how in the analyses of Soviet foreign policy towards 
Japan commentators have utilised terms such as 'failure', 'bad', 'counter­
productive', 'coercive'. The use of these concepts implicitly entails a 
comparison with either earlier Soviet policy or with Soviet policies 
involving other nations or the policies of other countries towards Japan. 
It also entails an implied notion of some objectively ascertainable set of 
Soviet goals; attainment of which is also ruled-out by the meaning implied 
in the concept. What might these objectives be?? What can we say
concerning Soviet strategy in East Asia ?
I
The Soviet Union : Perceptions, Objectives and Strategies in East Asia
Writing in 1983 Paul Dibb concluded on the Soviet security outlook
that
At its most basic level, the view from the Kremlin is informed 
by a perception of the contemporary international situation 
that is tense and potentially threatening to Soviet state 
interests. Militarily stronger than ever before, the USSR does 
not necessarily feel more secure. Although the Soviet Union 
has attained broad nuclear parity, or in Soviet parlance 'equal 
security' with the United States it does not feel confident of 
its position. 36
It is accepted that the 1970's saw, as the Soviets would interpret 
it, a swing in their favour at last in the correlation of forces that 
proved decisive in propelling the Soviet Union to a situation where it was 
perceived by other states to hold equal status with the United States. The 
SALT agreements and Helsinki were a legitimation of that status and the 
increased Soviet activity in the Third World a manifestation of it. The
36P.Dibb, 'The Soviet Union's Security Outlook'. A paper presented 
for the conference on Asian Perspectives on International Security 11-14 
April 1983, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University.
litany of successes and failures of Soviet policy in the 1970’s and early 
1980’s illustrates the global reach of a rising power out to assert its 
place in the sun.
Central to the Soviet conduct of its international affairs is its 
relationship with the United States. The United States is, and will remain 
for the foreseeable future glavni protivnik - the main enemy. That global 
evaluation of the position of the United States is as applicable to the 
role that the Soviets assign to it in the Pacific. That apart, Soviet 
preoccupation with the United States has not obscured perception of the 
sources of other potential threats in the Pacific region. Nor has it 
prevented sophisticated analysis of American policy changes in the region.
V.P.Lukin, head of the Pacific foreign policy section at the 
Institute of the United States and Canada, made it clear in an interview 
with the author that as American interests have moved from continental Asia 
to a new Centre in North East Asia the United States has striven hard to 
encourage a new relationship with its allies in the region, akin to the one 
it has with its NATO allies, in the shape of a ’division of labour’. The 
earliest signs of this redefinition of interest could be seen as coinciding 
with a period when Soviet inactivity in East Asia and, most obviously, in 
Africa, was coming to an end. The Soviets are also aware that the process 
of realignment was the product of not only American unease and 
dissatisfaction but also of the allies’ own changing perceptions of their 
responsibilities and the threats which confronted them. The superficial 
manifestation of that trend, with regard to North East Asia and Japan, so 
the Soviets argue, is that the term ’ally’ as applied to Japan has come to 
carry with it more the connotation of ’partner’.
Soviet interpretation of the extent of Japanese ’partnership’ has not 
been fully resolved by Soviet analysts. The more sophisticated analyses
propose a balanced judgement of the Japanese-American relationship, Lukin, 
in his own contribution to an edited collection of works entitled SShA i 
Problemi Tikhovo Okeana : Mezhdunarodno - Politicheskie Aspekti (The United 
States and the Problems of the Pacific : International Political Aspects)37 
suggests that Japan has, from the beginning of the 1970's, slowly and 
cautiously become more forceful in presenting its own approaches to 
questions. It has developed its own dynamic on matters of defence and 
other international concerns.
Other analyses have sought to stress the continuing primacy of the 
United States as the driving force.3® Lukin has commented that the 
relationship between the two powers is complicated, in that while Japanese 
forces have grown significantly in quality, and that while Japan is 
possibly America's closest ally, Japan has proved less willing than the 
NATO allies to convert its economic potential into an appropriate military 
effort. Many of the initiatives taken under Nakasone have been cosmetic in 
terms of fulfilling some of the more exaggerated promises outlined below.39 
This was the case under previous Premiers also. Premier Ohira asserted in
1980 that 'The days are gone when we were able to rely on America's 
deterrence' yet the pace of Japan's reply has not been hurried. But they
37See V.P.Lukin, Tikhookeanskii region i protsessi razriadki 
mezhdunarodnoi napriazhenosti (The Pacific and Processes of Detente and 
International Tension) in o p . cit. Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, Moscow, 1979.
38See, V.G.Leshke, Iapono - Amerikanski Soiuz : Itogi Trekh 
Desiatiletii (The Japanese - American Alliance : The Thirty Year Mark) 
'Nauka', Moscow, 1983. The section for example which begins p.97.
39While Nakasone has taken Japan closer to the United States than his 
predecessors the gulf between statement and deed has remained. The 
'commitment' to the defence of the 1,000 mile naval zone of communication 
is the most outstanding example. Nakasone also made comments at the same 
time (January 1983) about Japan's armed forces being able to defend Japan's 
airspace, and control the straits surrounding Japan. The SDF is still in 
no position to do either unsupported by American forces and is a long way 
from achieving either goal.
have made, and are making incremental advances. The defence budget for 
example, escaped the strict public spending cuts applied in August 1984 and 
thus allowed projected spending to rise by 7% in 1985.40 The recognition 
of the importance (some would argue, the weakness) of the air and naval 
defence of Japan has been met by the JSDF’s plans for 1986-90. The stress 
has been laid on the continued fast procurement of the F-15J and P-3C and 
the upgrading of squadron strength to twenty-five aircraft. At the same 
time the MSDF hope to be equipped with AGM-84 Harpoon and Phalanx close-in 
weapon systems. Japanese capabilities in advanced high technology are 
enabling a general future upgrading of JSDF ECM capabilities, and in 
particular a programme to be launched into development of a new indigenous 
high technology aircraft, the ,,FS-X,,.41 Lukin's point is that they (the 
Japanese) could be doing much more.
The Soviets are probably as uncertain as other observers about the 
most likely course that Japan will follow. However, it should be 
emphasised that probably mere Soviet perception of American indecision 
(especially in the Carter years) and of Japanese hesitancy would have been 
enough to encourage them to pursue initiatives already underway more 
forcefully and to launch new ones. The Brezhnev-Andropov proposals on 
Confidence building measures in North East Asia are a good example of this.
Commentary on the main axes of Soviet strategy in the Pacific has
40Jane's Defence Weekly 11 August 1984 p.178.
41 Jane's Defence Weekly 31 August 1985 p.397. On increasing co­
operation with the US the Japanese record is mixed. There has been an 
increase in Japanese participation in exercises with the US e.g. the 12-20 
September 1984 joint naval exercise (90 ships, 125 aircraft, 22,000 
Japanese) but US success at gaining access to next generation dual 
technologies has been limited. The record of sharing knowledge of 
technologies which have a military application has been to date limited. By 
November 1985 the US was still requesting that Japan invoke legislation to 
control the export of technology to the USSR as a precondition of Japanese 
involvement in SDI. See Jane's Defence Weekly 23 November 1985, p.1121.
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centred upon the limitations to Soviet intervention in the region.42 The
Soviets themselves have little in common with the nations of the region and
in the economic sphere have little to offer either on a scale desired or in
terms of type of goods desired.
At various stages in the discussion of military, and now of wider
policy questions, it has been suggested that the Soviets see themselves as
facing a coalition or "array" of powers that stretch across the Pacific.
The military dimension of this view is that the Soviets see a line of
military bases dominated by the US presence on "islands beyond the
horizon". For example,
New bases are being built and old ones modernised on the 
perimeters of the Asian continent - in the Persian Gulf, along 
the coast of the Arabian Sea, in Australia land in Japan. Bases 
are being established on the islands of Micronesia in the 
Pacific such as Tinian, Saipan, ' ¡Palau, Kwajalein and others.
Along with the base at Guam, these form a frontier from which 
the Pentagon would like to exercise strategic control over 
vital passageways from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.
In addition, the recent talks between the USA and the 
Philippines have ended with the former retaining its bases in 
that country. The Pentagon has also "frozen" the decision on 
the withdrawal of its land troops from South Korea.43
Soviet views of being confronted by such an amalgamation are predated by
Russian perceptions of the same - if on a smaller scale. In both cases
there was/is a sense of a barrier set by the US (the dominant power) and
Japan; in the present day context to these can be added South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, (arguably) Indonesia and Australia and
New Zealand. Some of these states the Soviets view as not necessarily
being naturally anti-Soviet but amount to as much by default in that they
42See for example, R.Menon, 'The Soviet Union in East Asia' in Current 
History October 1983. pp.313-317, 339-343. J.R.Kelly, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defence, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Statement to the House 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs October 19, 1983.
43Y.Lugovskoi, "The United States and Asia - The Withdrawal That 
Didn’t Take Place" in Soviet News 6 March 1979 p.76.
come under a large degree of American influence. Beyond this main barrier 
lies a collection of smaller island states which might be more susceptible 
to Soviet influence. From a Soviet grand strategic viewpoint the aim is to 
break through the barrier using whatever means is most appropriate. Most 
recently Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok (28th July 1986) gave notice of 
an increased Soviet interest in the wider reaches of the Pacific. In 
August 1985 the Soviets finally concluded a fishing agreement with Kiribati 
and in December 1986 with Vanuatu. Negotiations are also underway with 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji.44 Soviet "penetration" in this case has been 
primarily economic and thus should be containable. The importance of Japan 
and of the Soviet-Japanese relationship to the Soviets stems at a high 
level from the Soviet perception of Japan’s position in this barrier.
Although it has only been in the later 1970’s that the Soviets have 
acquired a limited military capacity to project their influence to the far 
flung corners of the Pacific, influence in the region predates the military 
capacity. Indubitably that interest has been of a lesser priority than 
elsewhere but that has not of itself made it negligible. As we shall 
propose, the Soviet relationship with Japan has been in fact of a far more 
positive nature than critics of it would contend.
The most fragile aspect of regional relations has been the economic. 
If it were not for the levels of trade with Japan (even though the Soviet 
Union’s trade with Japan has slackened, Japan remains its most important 
trading partner in East and South East Asia) Soviet trade with the nations 
of East and South Asia could reasonably be categorised as pitifully small.
44The Guardian 9 December 1986. See also F.Evgeniev, "Fresh Winds over 
Oceania" in Izvestiia 7 August 1986. The Soviet fishing agreement with 
Kiribati fell-through at the end of 1986. The Soviets were disappointed by 
the low catches and sought to renegotiate the agreement for a lower fee and 
involving fewer boats. No agreement to date has been reached on this with 
Kiribati and the Soviets have effectively withdrawn.
On average, trade with Japan constitutes 50% of total Soviet trade with the 
region. Therefore trade with Japan for the Soviets should be evaluated not 
only in the context of their bilateral relations, but also be seen as of 
value in projecting their trade position in East Asia generally. Trade 
with Japan serves to legitimate Soviet interest in trading developments in 
the other parts of the region and the wider reaches of the Pacific. 
Although the Soviets have continually attacked the ideas of a proposed 
'Pacific Community' as providing the framework for another military 
alliance, (as well as implicitly denying the Soviet Union membership) they 
have expressed genuine interest in participation in creating a trading 
organisation in the Pacific, even though expressing doubts as to its 
feasibility. However the Soviets have not brought forward any detailed 
proposals themselves on Pacific co-operation or its mechanics.
From the Soviet viewpoint ensuring 'sufficient' national defence is a 
daunting prospect. The range of contingencies which the Soviets must plan 
for in a potential war against an array of powers is too large for them to 
be confident of success. In prolonged hostilities against the Western 
coalition, the additional support of operations in the Far East would 
probably be beyond the logistic capabilities of the Soviet forces.45 The 
main preoccupation in their search for security has been with the nuclear 
balance and part of their answer has emphasised a growth in commitment to 
the SLBM component of their nuclear forces. That in turn has prompted a 
change in their approach to maritime strategy and defence. The concomitant 
change in mission has imposed changes in the force structure of the Navy,
45See, P.Dibb, Soviet Capabilities. Interests and Strategies in East 
Asia in the 1980s Strategic and Defence Studies Working Paper No.45 
February 1982. Australian National University, Canberra. Soviet Military 
Power 1984 published by the US Department of Defence gives the Soviets a 
stockpile of material in the East that would support operations for two 
months.
in the design, numbers and size of its ships and in the missions of the
surface fleet. Gorshkov has explained that ’command of the sea’ for the
Soviets is based not on the old concept of dominating every sea but on that
of dominating the areas in which theatre operations are envisaged. In
other words it is a local command concept. However even with a
qualitatively improved Pacific fleet the Soviets are still not in a
position to command or deny the North-West Pacific to the US navy. The
North West Pacific constitutes the outer defence region of the Sea of
Okhotsk and the inability of the Soviets to fight effectively in the North
West Pacific would force them to fight from a position that lacks strategic
depth. That cannot give Soviet planners much reassurance.
The Soviet build-up in the Far East has not been prompted by a
relatively sudden desire to exploit perceived weakness, nor has it received
special attention in comparison to other theatres where the Soviets deploy
substantial forces.
When we examine Soviet behaviour in other parts of the non- 
Western world (Africa or the Middle East, for example) or 
compare the military build-up in the Soviet Far East with that 
on the European front, we find no convincing evidence for the 
contention that Asia during the 1970’s has suddenly and 
dramatically gained special prominence at the expense of other 
areas where the Soviets have an important stake. In other 
words, the growth of Soviet military capabilities directed 
towards Asia on the ground, in the air, and on the sea has 
proceeded during the past decade not markedly faster than in 
other theatres...it appears that the Soviet military build-up 
in Asia is in essence part of a world-wide, relentless process 
transforming the USSR into a truly global power. . . 46
The notable feature of Soviet forces in the Far East is not that they have
increased in numbers - in fact the ground forces and air forces have
decreased numerically from their early 1970’s levels - but that they have
improved qualitatively. In practice the Soviets have stabilised the
46P.Langer, ’Soviet Military Power in Asia’ in D.Zagoria, Soviet 
Policy in East Asia. Council on Foreign Relations Inc., Yale University 
Press, 1982. pp.255-282. Quotation 256.
manpower levels of their forces-in-being in the Far East and have set about 
to improve their capabilities and correct their shortcomings by 
organisational restructuring and equipment modernisation.
We shall start our examination from the premise that the Soviets do 
indeed have discernible policies and objectives. As stated in the 
introductory paragraphs, some commentators express certainty over Soviet 
aims in the region but this view cannot be ascribed to the majority of 
commentators. In the opening sections of a recent book Zagoria states 
unequivocally that ’the principal unsatisfied power in Asia is the Soviet 
Union’ 47 because with the exception of Indochina the Soviets have so far 
not been very successful in realising their ambitions, particularly towards 
the Great powers, the United States and China. He goes on to suggest that 
the two major Soviet efforts have been centred on the containment of China 
and keeping it weak and the weakening of the American alliance system in 
East Asia. In Zagoria’s view the Soviets have failed to achieve either of 
these. Zagoria has highlighted two objectives; a complete list of 
objectives would probably comprise the following :
the containment of China
a reduction in the role played by the United States in East Asia
the establishment and acceptance of the Soviet Union in some regional
role (preferably in place of the United States)
the legitimation of the territorial status quo
the neutralisation of Japan, or as a minimum aim, the keeping of
Japan as distanced as possible from the other main regional powers
As we would expect, in a regional setting these aims largely interact 
with each other. However the attainment of any one might well not have a 
beneficial effect on another. For example, attainment of the second
47D.Zagoria, ’The Soviet Union’s Eastern Problem’ in M.Weinstein, 
North East Asian Security After Vietnam Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana,
1982. pp.72-94. Quotation p.72.
objective on the list (reducing the American role) may superficially seem 
to aid in containment of China but equally it could also provoke a counter­
reaction based on increased Chinese fear of the Soviet Union, or might 
prompt the Chinese to try to replace American influence with their own and 
in the process heighten competition between themselves and the Soviet 
Union. 48 This same kind of effect has been observed in a wider Asian 
setting : ’...the success of Soviet policy is debatable...in fact the 
build-up of Soviet military power has led to a greater political co­
operation among the East Asian states...and it has increased their co­
operation with the United States. It has also increased China’s role in 
the region. . . ’ . 49 It is not unknown for policymakers to pursue 
contradictory policies simultaneously, certainly over the short term, 
though over a long term it is likely that their behaviour will be 
consistent with the attempted attainment of specified goals.
Accepting the above as constituting a list of Soviet objectives only 
surmounts one obstacle. Questions left to be answered are whether we can 
attach a priority to each and how Japan fits into Soviet plans to attain 
each goal. For example, China is clearly the unspoken enemy, but the 
threat from the United States is more immediate and far greater. In 
relation to the latter, Japan occupies the pivotal position in the region 
due to its geographical location and its industrial/technical capability. 
Without a presence in Japan, the ability of the United States to intervene 
effectively in Asia would be severely circumscribed. But this does not 
necessarily accord any significance to Japan per se. The Soviet Union may
48It could be argued, from a Soviet viewpoint, that a weakened United 
States would be a worthwhile trade for a strengthened China. The obvious 
problem with this would lie in achieving the balance between weakening the 
US and strengthening the Chinese.
49R.Menon, ’The Soviet Union in East Asia’ in Current History October 
1983. pp.313-317, 339-343. Quotation p.313.
see itself able to achieve its goal of nullifying American influence by 
other means than by action directed via, or against, Japan. Japan as the 
lynch-pin may be the obvious target - but it is not necessarily the best 
nor easiest target.
The Soviet Union. Japan and China
The containment of China is often described as the major Soviet goal
in east Asia. Possible extension of the United States-Japanese alliance
into one involving the Peopled Republic of China has been a recurrent fear
for the Soviets and the idea is commonly expressed that in order to avoid
this singular catastrophe the Soviets have always been willing to make
concessions to the Japanese. One writer cites the events of 1972 as
evidence of this. After the Nixon visit to China in 1971 he suggests that
the Soviets were very quick to react to a Japanese invitation for
ministerial talks involving Gromyko. According to this writer
During his 1972 visit, Gromyko offered the Japanese a 
compromise on the issue of the northern islands; access to 
Siberian resources; an expanding Siberian market; verbal 
support against the PRC; and political co-operation where 
possible on East Asian issues, preferably with Japan as an 
independent power, but even with Japan as an American ally if 
Japan so desired. In return Gromyko asked for a pledge that 
Japan would not develop a relationship with China that was 
detrimental to Soviet interests50
Aside from vague suggestions of a compromise on the northern islands 
what of the other "concessions’? Siberian co-operation, as we have 
discussed in our examination of Soviet-Japanese trade, was initially to 
both parties’ benefit; verbal support against the PRC was likely to be 
forthcoming anyway; political co-operation can be deemed highly unlikely in 
practice, in what realistic areas of co-operation might it occur?
50J.Ha, ’Moscow’s Policy Towards Japan’ in Problems of Communism 
Vol.XXVI Sept-Oct 1977 pp. 61-72. Quotation p. 62.
Expressing a willingness to enter into a dialogue with Japan - even if she 
still desired to be an ally of the United States - is giving nothing away.
In practice the Soviet ’ concessions ’ did involve giving nothing away. 
The quotation cited above is symptomatic of the over-emphasis some analysts 
place on Soviet fears of Japanese collaboration with China. In practice 
the Soviets have undertaken no substantial initiatives nor changes of 
course, in response to Japanese moves towards closer ties with China 
arguably not even in the military sphere where the growth in quality of 
Soviet forces in the East since the early 1970’s has been the product of 
long term modernisation plans and an acceptance of a stable situation on 
the Soviet-Chinese border, not an obvious response to any manifestations of 
a Japanese-Chinese alliance.
Japanese-Chinese relations, either in peace or war, have a long 
historical background. The period of substantial contact between the two 
nations is considerably longer than that of Russian/Soviet-Japanese 
association. As a recent trade figures show, Japanese trade with China has 
been greater than with the Soviet Union; indeed the Soviets only appeared 
as a trade rival to the Chinese during the 1970’s. For the most part the 
Soviets are aware of the history and nature of the relationship between 
Japan and China and moreover of its limitations. Many of the barriers 
which contained the development of ties between Japan and the Soviet Union, 
particularly in trade, can be seen to be operable in similar circumstances 
of Japanese trade with China. There are factors which are pertinent only 
to the Chinese case but these are to an extent double-edged and have on 
occasion militated against favourable developments between China and Japan.
For example, in the 1950’s the Chinese, in line with their concept of 
’people’s diplomacy’, adopted a more lenient approach to the repatriation 
of Japanese prisoners of war than the Soviets chose to. Also in the early
1950’s, the Japanese parliament called for the widening of trade 
associations with China but the gains made here were lost due to an 
incident in 195851; however the situation had corrected itself by the early 
1960's. Politically, due to domestic upheavals brought on by the Cultural 
Revolution in the 1960’s the Chinese were more vociferous in their public 
criticism of Japanese foreign affairs, than the Soviet Union. The Chinese 
openly attacked the Japanese role in ASEAN, the Asian Development Bank and 
the Asia Pacific council as attempts by Japan to achieve regional 
leadership and build an anti-Communist alliance detrimental to Chinese 
interests.
We have mentioned specific points of Japanese-Chinese relations not 
notable in Japanese relations with the Soviet Union. One example of this 
is the existence in Japanese politics of a sizeable pro-Chinese lobby, 
which was particularly active during the six years of negotiation which 
preceded the signing of the peace treaty with China in 1978. This lobby’s 
influence can be seen to vary from issue to issue and is mainly oriented 
towards self-gain in trade. Its influence and allegiances are also very 
much determined by the structure of Japanese politics which functions 
around a system of factions within parties rather than around the actual 
parties themselves. The pro-China group is a product of the long history 
of ties which Japanese governments and traders have developed with China. 
Certainly no similar grouping exists so oriented towards the Soviet Union; 
although by 1980 evidence was beginning to emerge of some sort of movement 
in certain Japanese businesses involved in trading with the Soviets, it was 
clearly not comparable in size or influence with the pro-China lobby.
There exists a degree of parallelism in both Soviet and Chinese
51This involved the burning of a Chinese flag at a trade fair by some 
Japanese. The issue escalated and relations were effectively severed.
relations with Japan which constrains both parties. Of relevance to our 
investigation is the question of whether or not the Soviets were indeed 
aware of the limitations of any Japanese-Chinese partnership and acted 
accordingly.
The most pressing Soviet fear in the East is of a war with China 
simultaneously with a coalition war with NATO. The Soviet concern is not 
with suffering defeat at the hands of the Chinese; it is generally accepted 
that the Soviets would achieve their (probably) limited objectives, namely 
the occupation of northern China, the destruction of the core of Chinese 
forces and the curtailment of Chinese ability to wage a prolonged war, but 
rather with the unknown factor in that war which could lead to a global 
nuclear escalation. Because of the unwelcome possibilities, war with China 
is not to be sought or provoked. The pre-eminent Soviet concern therefore 
is to contain China militarily as much as possible. In that light, Japan 
is seen as the only nation in the region with the capability not only to 
develop its own military capacity but also to assist in the development of 
Chinese military capability. A further expressed Soviet concern has been 
that Japanese involvement with China would inevitably lead to the 
involvement of the United States. 52 The Soviets are at least publicly 
divided over where to attribute the leading role in the development and 
maintenance of the China-Japan relationship. Two Soviet writers, Krupyanko 
and Petrov, argue that though Japan has economic reasons for seeking 
involvement with China, the real motive behind Japanese moves has been
52See for example, V.Andreyev, 'The Partnership between Peking and 
Imperialism : A Threat to Peace and Independence' in International Affairs 
(Moscow) November 1980 pp.68-78. He writes "In May-June 1980, a Chinese 
delegation headed by Premier Hua Guo-feng made sin official visit to 
Japan...to prepare the ground for a military and political alliance between 
the US, Japan and China’ (p.72). See also Y.Bandura, 'The Sino-Japanese 
Alliance Runs Counter to Peace Interests’ in International Affairs (Moscow) 
August 1979. pp.70-77. especially p.76 for Chinese proposal of joint 
US/Japan/PRC action.
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political. Petrov suggests
The Japanese financial oligarchy thus directly ties in the 
economic relations with China with political aims and often 
shows readiness to forego immediate profit for the sake of the 
long-term tasks of separating China from the world socialist 
community. It aims at drawing it as deeply as possible into 
the world capitalist economy, confident that this will make it 
possible to bring pressure on the PRC’s political line. 
Special emphasis is laid here on attempts to encourage the 
PRC’s rapprochement with the United States within the framework 
of the Peking-Washington-Tokyo triangle53
Krupyanko takes a similar view
An analysis of Japan’s economic policy towards China during the 
1970’s and early 1980’s shows that it is based above all on 
political, rather than commercial, considerations...all 
actively involve China in the orbit of Western economic and 
political influence. . 54
We can contrast this position with that of another Soviet commentator 
who argues that
The Peking leaders attach great importance to their ties with 
Japan and regard her as a partner who can play a significant 
role in the implementation of their plans of world 
domination... China is trying to use the inter-governmental 
and other contacts with Japan to push her back on the dangerous 
track of military preparations... and to steer Japan’s policy 
towards anti-Sovietism55
The Sino-Japanese treaty of 1978 is the most obvious benchmark by 
which to measure Soviet attitudes. Two statements can be used to 
illustrate Soviet declaratory views on the signing of the treaty. A 
broadcast by Radio Moscow on August 10 accused the Chinese of pressuring 
Japan but also stated that ’at the present time when the Japanese 
delegation’s attitude to the negotiations has come so close to that of the
53D.V.Petrov, ’Japanese-Chinese relations : Problems and Trends’ in 
Far Eastern Affairs No.l 1985. pp.25-34. Quotation p.28.
54M.Krupyanko, ’Japan’s Economic Ties with China’ in Far Eastern 
Affairs No.2 1985. pp.52-59. Quotation p. 58.
55V.Andreyev, ’The partnership between Peking sind Imperialism a threat 
to peace and independence’ in International Affairs (Moscow) November 1980. 
pp.68-78. Quotation p. 73.
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Union's repeated warning that the conclusion of a treaty based on an anti-
Sovietism would cause difficulties in the normal development of Soviet-
Japanese relations. The Soviet Union will probably be compelled to revise
its policy towards Japan’ . 56
A commentary in Pravda on August 13 suggested that
many Japanese politicians, including some in the ruling LDP as 
well as the Japanese public and press, called on their 
government to take a cautious approach to the talks in Peking 
and not to give in to Chinese pressure...(however) by giving in 
to Peking’s diktat and agreeing to sign the treaty on the 
latter’s terms, Japan has placed itself in a position in which 
it may become an accessory to Chinese hegemonistic policy57
Soviet media attacks upon the treaty and negotiations are
surprisingly few in number and it is noticeable that these slackened-off in
both tone and frequency as it became obvious that despite Soviet efforts
both parties were going to proceed with the signing. In part this could be
explained by Soviet recognition of a fait accompli but there is arguably
more to it than that. Certain aspects of Soviet comment deserve attention
Chinese side, it would be useful for the Japanese to recall the Soviet
(1) In both the press and radio comment was concentrated only 
in the few weeks preceding the actual signing and for a short 
while afterwards. Statements throughout the preceding year had 
only been sporadic.
(2) The substantially critical attacks were confined to press 
and radio broadcasts; journal commentary was more constrained. 
We might expect this; however, a scanning of content of the 
relevant journals shows that no effort was made to make a 
significant issue out of the treaty either before or after its 
signing. The main Soviet journal on China and Japan, Far 
Eastern Affairs, seems to have devoted only a few articles to 
the treaty in the months prior to its signing, and none after. 
Nor was there any noticeable increase above normal levels in 
the journal's coverage of Japanese affairs.
(3) Soviet comment is itself divided over which nation was the 
principal instigator of the treaty. On balance China was
56BBC, SWB SU/5887/A3/2-3 August 10,1978.
57M.Demchenko, ’In Defiance of the Interests of Peace and Detente’ in 
Pravda August 13,1978 p.5. Also translated in CDSP Vol.XXX No.32. 1978 p. 4.
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accused of ’dragging’ Japan into negotiations. 58 Other 
commentators even accused the United States of being behind 
events. 59 Few openly attacked the Japanese government outright; 
often these accusations were made with the proviso that only 
’certain circles’ were responsible while other elements of 
Japanese government and society were depicted as holding strong 
reservations on the desirability of this course of action.
(4) A common thread to run through Soviet comment was that the 
Soviet government’s response to the treaty would be based upon 
future Japanese behaviour. For example, as late as August 24th,
Deputy Foreign Minister Firiubin is reported to have told the 
Japanese ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet Union ’would 
watch Japanese future policies and form its own conclusions as 
to whether it genuinely desired friendly relations with the 
USSR’ . 88
These Soviet statements cast doubt upon the thesis that they viewed 
the treaty as some sort of swing by the Japanese into some kind of Chinese 
alliance.
While publicly the Soviets were seen to be trying to dissuade Japan 
from participating in the treaty with China, their arguments were evidently 
not held with intensity in private. The immediacy of the military threat 
which featured so prominently in the public campaign was transferred in 
private to an emphasis upon the potential military consequences of 
Japanese-Chinese co-operation, indeed very much the long-term potential. 
The suspicion held in more reasoned quarters was that Sino-Japanese co­
operation, but more specifically military co-operation,would likely be kept 
within strict bounds, as has indeed proved the case since. Increasingly 
this has been stated in public also. ’To be sure, so far full-fledged 
military ties between Japan and China can be regarded as only a 
potentiality’, so wrote the Tokyo correspondent of New Times in 1982 in an
58See, Gromyko’s view that China was ’foisting’ a treaty on Japan. 
BBC, SWB SU/5709/A3/1/ 10 January 1978.
59See for example, D.V.Petrov, ’Japan’s place in US Asian policy’ in 
International Affairs (Moscow) No.10. October 1978. pp.52-59. He cites 
Secretary of Defence, Brzezinski as an ’instigator and mediator’ of the 
treaty negotiations, p. 58.
60USSR and Third World 1 July - 31 December 1978. p.73.
article which touched upon the many problems besetting relations between 
Japan and China, particularly in the field of economics. (These stem from 
many of the constraints which we outlined above). This writer concluded by 
stating that each of the signatories had adopted an attitude to solving its 
own problems 'at the expense of one’s partner, to outwit and use one 
another in one's political game, mutual distrust and disrespect for one's 
obligations - such are the principals of relations between China and Japan 
at the present stage' . 61 The fact that the Soviets declared that their 
future policy towards Japan would be based upon future Japanese actions 
prompts the suspicion that they expected future developments to take this 
form.
Even Krupyanko qualifies his otherwise positive survey of relations 
by implicitly testifying to the existence of problems in the economic 
relationship which are indicative of wider political divergences. He 
points out that Japan’s credit policy towards China is constantly bedeviled 
by a Chinese reversal of policy on overseas borrowing so that China now 
seeks credits 'cautiously and as a subsidiary' to its own resources. 
According to him the Japanese government has purposely limited its co­
operation in the development of the Chinese export base. 62
Kimura cites a Soviet analyst as implying that part of the limitation 
on developments with China will result from conscious Japanese governmental 
decision; 'Japan prefers to keep an equidistance from China and from the 
USSR, without allowing any overt measure, which could do damage to her 
relations with the USSR. The developments in Sino-Japanese relations have
61 Yu.Tavrovsky, 'Ten Years of Mirages' in New Times No.24 1982 pp.26-
27.
62M.Krupyanko, o p .cit. pp.52-53.
We have tried to show that gauging the Soviet position on Japanese 
relations with China purely from the rhetorical evidence would lead to an 
erroneous conclusion. In private, and in some cases from published work, 
it is clear that the Soviets axe far more cautious in their estimation of 
the relationship. The Japan-United States relationship is the centre-piece 
of Soviet attention, and the stable situation on the Sino-Soviet border 
merely serves to reinforce that predisposition.
The Soviet Union. Japan and the United States
The following main points are distinctly seen now in the US 
administration’s activity on the international scene, aimed at 
directing developments in Asia along a track that suits the 
interests of US imperialism. First, the US administration is 
out to maintain, even escalate, the presence of US armed 
forces, especially those with nuclear weapons, in Asian 
countries and adjoining seas and oceans. Second, it seeks 
closer political and military co-operation with imperialist 
Japan, the latter’s total commitment to the global designs of 
US imperialism, to its confrontation with the Soviet Union and 
the other countries of the socialist community and the other 
members of the socialist community. Third, it is bent on 
forming a political and military alliance of the NATO model in 
Asia and the region of the Pacific ocean, which would 
unprotestingly serve the far-reaching expansionist plans of the 
US monopolies. Fourth, it is taking all possible steps to 
prevent China from reverting to good-neighbourly relations with 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries... Lastly, it 
has perfected the machinery of lies and slanders about the 
socialist countries, notably the Soviet Union, of frightening 
Asian peoples with talk of a ’threat’ to them from their 
socialist neighbours. . . 64
These points, quoted from an editorial in the main Soviet China 
journal, Far Eastern Affairs in early 1984, summarise the basic Soviet view
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thus their own objective limits’.63
63Quoted in H.Kimura, ’Soviet foreign policy towards Japan since the
conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty’ in Slavic Studies (Hokkaido 
University) No.26 1980. pp.31-55. Quotation p.39.
64Editorial, Far Eastern Affairs No.2 1984. pp.19-29. Quotation p. 20.
on American strategy in the Far East and Pacific. 65 The Soviets see their 
allegations as borne out by President Reagan's visit to Japan and South 
Korea in November 1983 when his prime purpose was seen to be expediting the 
two countries' war preparations and the speeding-up of a Washington-Tokyo- 
Seoul triple alliance. In connection with American overtures on the Far 
East, the Soviets voice the opinion that "Japan is responding to 
Washington’s calls for various sanctions against the USSR and other 
socialist countries. Moreover, Japanese leaders are endeavouring to play 
an active role in ’rallying’ the West to the side of the United States and 
demanding, as Premier Nakasone has done at the Williamsburg summit meeting, 
that European capitalist powers should unreservedly support Reagan’s 
adventurist policy" . 66
Soviet interpretations of Japanese-American relations stress that 
1978-80 has proved to be a turning point. The beginnings of changes can be
65For more detailed views see S.L.Tikhvinskii, Mezhdunarodnie Problemi 
Azii80-kh godov (International Problems of Asia in the 1980’s) Izdatel’stvo 
"Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia", Moscow, 1983. pp.145-150 deal with Japan’s Asia 
policies and pp.81-85 with the Asian policies of the Reagan administration, 
pp.138-144 deal with the US and China under the heading of "sotrudnichestvo 
i protivorechiia" ("co-operation and contradictions"). For a full 
exposition of the US-Chinese relationship as seen by two Soviet analysts 
see, A.A.Kagornii, A.B.Parkanskii, S.Sh.A. i Kitai : Ekonomicheskie i 
Nauchno-tekhnicheskie aspekti Kitaiskoi politiki Vashingtona (USA and China
: Economic and Scientific - Technological Aspects of Washington’s China 
policy) Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", Moscow, 1982. This is a detailed treatment of 
the process of normalisation of relations between the US and China and 
deals in depth with trade and the ties in scientific and technical 
collaboration. In it they deal with many of the problems and "objective 
limitations" which hinder a full development of relations. These are in 
numerous instances the same problems which place limits on Chinese-Japanese 
collaboration. Amongst others that, "there are those in Peking who do not 
agree with the tendencies of the US approach. Firstly, the Chinese 
leadership wish to limit the tempo of economic and scientific 
connections.. . Secondly, military-bureaucratic circles at a high level in 
China do not wish to lose control of their lever over the leadership of the 
political and economic administration of the country... thirdly, Peking’s 
economic experiments have not strengthened, but weakened internal political 
stability...there are different levels of internal Chinese economic 
development... "(pp. 204-205)
66Ibid p.25.
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traced back to the advent of the Ohira government. One of the foremost
Japanese analysts of the Soviet Union concedes as much :
To begin with, the Kremlin generally considered the foreign 
policy of the Ohira administration to be extraordinarily anti- 
Soviet. .. even more important, Ohira was regarded as a more pro- 
Western, especially pro-United States-oriented leader than his 
predecessors. This belief was published by Mr. V.Kudryavstev 
in the May 27 issue of Izvestiia in these terms : "No postwar 
government leader has formulated foreign policies with as much 
lack of independence and authority as Mr. Ohira" . 67
The increasing pro-American orientation of Japan, has progressed
according to the Soviets, through the period of office of the Suzuki
government to its present high level of anti-Sovietism under Nakasone.
Nakasone has been the subject of the most vitriolic Soviet attacks due to
his pledges to increase military co-operation with the United States, his
measures to facilitate American access to certain high technology more
sophisticated than that presently utilised by them in missile guidance
systems and his signing of the Williamsburg communique whereby he
'supported the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in
Europe towards the end of 1983'. 68
As we indicated in Part I the Soviets are unsure who should be held
primarily responsible for the trend of Japanese militarisation : the United
States or Japan.
Throughout almost the entire postwar period Japan has followed 
in the tracks of Washington's foreign policy. This became 
especially obvious at the start of the 1980's, when the 
American administration caused a dramatic increase in 
international tension and an intensification of the arms race.
As the United States continued with this policy, it demanded 
from Japan an increase in its military might as fast as 
possible, and more active co-operation with American strategy 
in Asia and the Pacific. American-Japanese relations reached
67H.Kimura, 'Japanese-Soviet relations from Afghanistan to Suzuki' in 
Slavic Studies (Hokkaido University) No.25 1981 pp.55-80. Quotation pp.73- 
74.
68V.Bunin, 'Nakasone's military policy' in Far Eastern Affairs No.2 
1984 pp.64-74. Quotation p. 73.
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their highest level in May 1981 when their relationship was 
officially declared to be an alliance. Behind this formulation 
was a desire on Washington's part to ’raise’ the ’mutual 
security treaty’ to a level of the North Atlantic pact, and 
thus impose alliance obligations on Japan similar to those of 
NATO countries. In 1982, the United States raised for the 
first time the suggestion that both nations’ armed forces 
should co-operate in situations of ’special circumstances' 
outside Japanese territory in the Far East. This signalled 
that a new stage in American-Japanese military co-operation had 
been reached. Washington is also demanding that Japan fulfil 
its promise to patrol naval and air lines of communication in a 
radius of 1,700 kilometres from their shores... The Washington 
administration is constantly asking Japan to increase its 
military power and its defence budget...(actions by Weinberger 
and Congress)... are prime examples of interference in the 
country's internal affairs, which are designed to take it on a 
dangerous course with the most dire of consequences. 69
The general thrust of Kuznetsov's comments is at odds with the
emphasis of the article by Bunin cited earlier. Kuznetsov is clearly
suggesting that Japan is conceding to American pressure. While he refers
at a later stage (p.102) to the ’Japanese ruling circles’ also ’pursuing
its own interests', this is almost a cursory reference in an argument which
otherwise stresses the responsibility of the United States for guiding
Japan in certain foreign policy directions.
As we also discussed in our conclusions on ideology and militarism,
there is no doubt in Soviet opinion as to the end result of this Japanese
course of action - rather that the distinction has been that in private the
views held have been less intense and more cautious in appraising Japanese
moves. However the division among the Soviets as to who (Japan or the
United States) is the driving force behind the course of events, it has
been argued, could have led the Soviets to be uncertain of the best
counter-policy and to treat Japan as merely a subject of overall Soviet-US
relations in North East Asia. This reasoning is the mainstay of those who
argue that Soviet policy towards Japan is merely a by-product of Soviet
69Iu.Kuznetsov, 'Kuda tolkaiut Iaponiiu?' (Where is Japan heading?) in 
Kommunist No.4 March 1983. pp.98-109. Quotation pp.100-101.
policy towards the United States and China. 'The Soviets simply do not 
have a clear, distinct positive policy towards Japan. Offers which they 
have made have really been spin-offs of Soviet policy towards the United 
States and/or towards China' . 70
This argument cannot be substantiated. Soviet analysis of the Japan- 
United States relationship displays a more sophisticated framework than a 
simplistic dual 'independent or puppet' argument. Even if we were to 
accept the validity of the 'puppet' (and therefore, 'Soviet Japan policy is 
merely a spin-off of Soviet US policy') argument - this could only be 
accepted as such in relation to specific aspects of military policy, 
particularly the strategic nuclear. The Soviets have made very distinct 
economic and political approaches to Japan, and equally, Japan has pursued 
policies in these fields independently of the United States.
The United States has enormous interests in East Asia and the 
Pacific. Trade with the region has surpassed that of trade with Europe, 
and there is a wide range of treaty commitments, including the stationing 
of American troops. The Soviets are aware of this, and are also aware of 
the geographical relocation of United States' strength and commitment 
during the 1970’s to North East Asia and the North West Pacific. Equally 
they are aware of the changes in policy emphasis initiated by the Reagan 
administration which according to one American analyst had criticised the 
'zigzags, the inconsistency and general independability of previous 
administrations' and placed new emphasis on 'consistency and the need to 
demonstrate 'loyalty' and 'commitment' to US allies and friends at the top
7°B.Dmytryshyn, as quoted in H.Kimura, 'Soviet foreign policy towards 
Japan since the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty' in Slavic 
Studies No.26 1980. pp.31-55. Quotation p.32.
of its policy priorities’ . 71
The Soviets understand the ’selective commitment’ strategy which the 
United States has been pursuing in East Asia since 1975. They are also 
aware of the inconsistencies and unresolved elements of that strategy which 
Carter, and subsequently Reagan, have tried to balance. On the one hand 
the United States has declared its renewed commitment to its allies, 
stressing the greater military emphasis in American policy but on the other 
hand has often repeated its equally-held aim of desiring a greater division 
of labour between itself and its allies, in this case Japan. The Soviets 
claim that fundamentally this looks like ’decoupling’ and a means of 
distancing the United States from Japan so that it can be used as a nuclear 
hostage.
In deploying nuclear arms, including first strike weapons, at 
its base in Asia, the United States is reproducing the 
’European option’. It is counting on a retaliatory strike 
being diffused and falling mainly on countries where the United 
States’ nuclear weapons are deployed, while the United States 
itself escapes with minimal damage. Essentially Washington is 
trying to turn the Asian countries, on whose territory the 
United States has military establishments into ’hostages’ of 
its policy, assigning them the dubious honour of becoming a 
theatre of military operations72
In terms of regional security issues we can make a distinction 
between those which are primarily autonomous but affected by Superpower 
relations, and those that are induced by Superpower politics. North East 
Asian security falls into the latter category.
To be sure the main preoccupation of the Soviet Union with the United 
States is the strategic nuclear balance. The situation with regard to 
United States nuclear capability in East Asia and the Pacific has been
7 1N.D.Levin, In Search of a Strategy : The Reagan Administration and 
Security in North East Asia Rand Paper, P - 6801. August 1982. Quotation 
p. 3.
72N.Nikolayev, ’Asia : Washington’s Imperial Ambitions’ in Izvestiia 
June 10 1983. FBIS translation. USSR Daily Report 13 June 1983. pp.C2-C4.
particularly unfavourable to the Soviet Union. The proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and delivery systems (the deployment of nuclear capable F- 
16s, and air/sea launched cruise missiles) has complicated already probably 
difficult targeting requirements for Soviet planners, and made defence of 
the Far East more problematic. The defence of this region may for the 
Soviets constitute a worst-case nuclear scenario. The modernisation of 
Soviet nuclear forces in the Far East has been a part of their wider 
modernisation. But at whom is this process directed!? V.Petrov, of the 
Sino-Soviet Institute at George Washington University, is of the opinion 
that, 'This action is geared to impressing US (and Chinese) eyes, and in 
this sense impressing Japan does not serve much purpose’ . 73
Is Japan therefore left-out of nuclear questions? While Japan 
obviously does not have the same degree of leverage with the United States 
over nuclear matters as the European allies, its leverage can nevertheless 
stem from the very fact that it is the indispensable ally of the United 
States in North East Asia. At an overall strategic level, Japan like the 
other allies effectively has to accept the arrangement worked-out by the 
Superpowers, and its input into the final American-Soviet agreement may 
well be less than that of other allies. At this level, it is fair to state 
that the Soviets have not considered Japan as an object of policy. However 
at a theatre level this position is becoming less clear. In part this is 
due to the blurring of the boundaries between a ’strategic’ and ’theatre’ 
weapons system, but there are other reasons. V. P.Lukin, in an interview 
with the author cited above, argued that through the 1970’s United States’ 
doctrine in the Pacific had been consistent overall but had fluctuated in 
’waves’ - with Nixon in the early 1970’s and with the second part of the 
Carter administration. He stated his belief that these ’waves’ were
73Interview with Petrov, Washington D.C. October 1984.
indicative of the possibility to divorce specific theatre concerns from 
global concerns, and that the United States would have to accept (as it has 
done elsewhere in a European context) that there are East Asian regional 
peculiarities to security questions.
In the Japanese case the Soviets have begun to take regional nuclear 
security initiatives directed at Japan. Specifically, Lukin commented that 
the recent Soviet proposals on confidence building measures (CBMs) were 
proof that the Soviet government recognised regional theatre peculiarities, 
and that behind the initiative was ’an assumption that Japan has some input 
to make into nuclear security processes in North East Asia’. The 
initiatives on CBMs therefore may foreshadow change in aspects of Soviet 
policy to make nuclear concerns a matter of bilateral relations with Japan.
CBMs of course also have applicability at the conventional level. 
Here the Soviets and the Japanese have more latitude in seeking a bilateral 
agreement, but it appears unlikely that Japan will do so, even in accord 
with the United States. Brezhnev stated in 1980 that the Soviets were 
interested in extending the CBM concept to naval matters also, and in 1982 
particular reference to the suitability of the idea in a Japanese context 
was made by T.B.Guzhenko, Head of the Soviet merchant fleet and Chairman of 
the USSR-Japan Friendship Society. 74 In a major speech at Vladivostok, 
given during his tour of Siberia and the Far East, Gorbachev also picked up 
on the theme of an increasing pace of naval militarisation and stressed the 
need for long term co-operative plans with Japan. To that end he proposed 
the idea of a conference a la Helsinki that would start talks on the 
reduction of fleets in the Pacific, especially nuclear armed ships. 
Moreover he suggested that restrictions be placed on the rivalry in the
74See, T.B.Guzhenko, ’Soviet-Japanese Relations’ in Far Eastern 
Affairs No.3 1982.
sphere of ASW weapons. A stage by stage "reduction of armed forces and
conventional armaments in Asia to limits of reasonable sufficiency" was his
suggestion and that a
switch be made to a practical plane on the discussion of CBMs 
and non-use of force in the region. A start could be made on 
the simpler measures, for instance measures for security of sea 
lanes in the Pacific, and for the prevention of international 
terrorism. . . 7 5
Given the increasing stress within North East Asia on the military face of 
relations, the circumstances for negotiations into CBMs in the region could 
not be more appropriate.
As far as economic or trade relations are concerned, the Soviets have 
indeed considered Japan a worthy subject of attention. In this sphere 
Japan has always been treated, and responded, as an independent nation. As 
detailed above, though trade may have been limited by ideological 
constraint and technical considerations, no significant limitation could be 
attributed to perception on the part of either party of bad relations with 
the other, or with third nations (United States or China). As we pointed 
out, for example, trade had already started to fall in absolute value, 
before the sanctions over Afghanistan were implemented. Trading between 
the Soviet Union and Japan has its own dynamic and in fact set the tempo 
for overall conduct of relations.
The general problem for the Soviets in pursuing policies in East Asia 
is that the region lacks a focal point. It can be said that there is no 
one issue, or one nation which can act as a point of concentration. This 
is true even within the confines of North East Asia. A comparison with 
Soviet policy in Europe can help to illustrate the problem. Although 
Europe comprises numerous states this has not particularly hindered the 
Soviets from pursuing coherent policies with a "Europe-wide" appeal. In
7sTASS 28 July 1986
Europe there has been the postwar tradition of ’shared experience’, the 
development of European umbrella organisations such as the EEC and NATO, 
the focusing of mutual attention on the centrality of various aspects of 
the "German question". Even the various European communist parties have 
come to embrace many of the same aspirations, making the Soviet task of 
having to come to terms with "Euro-Communism" that much more 
straightforward. The Soviets have to synthesise some sort of coherent 
policy vis-a-vis Japan out of dealing with the United States, China and 
Korea as well as Japan. The Soviet Union lacks significant diplomatic 
relations with South Korea, and in dealing with North Korea is involved in 
a clash with China and is, in South Korean eyes, vilified as a major 
sponsor of a nation viewed as the irreconcilable enemy. In these 
circumstances co-ordinating policy is especially problematic : in the short 
term the circumstances dictate contradictory actions, uncertainty in 
statements, and policy swings. These factors we have suggested have been 
the main contributory factors in commentators’ doubting the existence of a 
’Soviet policy towards Japan’.
However these fluctuations are products of short term considerations. 
They are often reactions to particular stimuli or actions undertaken to 
achieve a specific immediate objective. Over the long term the evidence is 
that policymakers’ actions are usually consistent with perceived goals; 
Soviet actions towards Japan have been no different.
If we assert that the Soviets do indeed have discernible policies and 
goals towards, or involving, Japan, we should distinguish between the long 
and short term. By not doing so we create a problem, through not 
identifying the difference in the nature of the goals and therefore not 
pointing out the limitations such a categorisation (long term/short term) 
imposes upon an ability to assess those goals and those actions declared to
If for example we accept, for the sake of argument, that the 
neutralisation of Japan is a Soviet goal, then, assuming that a complete 
political volte face does not occur in Japan, this is patently a long term 
objective. It is then surely unrealistic to herald, as many commentators 
do, the "failure’ of the Soviets to achieve their objectives vis-a-vis 
Japan or North East Asia. It is more credible to postulate that present 
trends indicate no progress towards certain objectives, but it would be 
premature to deduce failure from that.
A goal may be ’long term’ for two principal reasons : because it is 
difficult, or because it is not important enough for much attention to be 
devoted to it. All the Soviet goals which involve Japan - neutralisation 
of Japan, ’containment’ of China, limitation of the US role - can be 
encompassed by the first category, i.e. reasons of difficulty. Moreover, 
when the Soviets are accused of ’failing’ to ’contain’ China because, 
amongst other reasons, they have not been able to stop co-operation between 
Japan and China, we should ask - what is meant by ’containing’ China? 
Unless we know (which we do not) specific Soviet aims, we cannot say 
definitely whether these aims are being achieved or not.
In the military dimension of Soviet-Japanese relations the goals 
speculated upon by analysts have been reinforced by the construction of 
likely scenarios which supposedly bestow credibility upon the objectives; 
i.e. scenarios which display a Soviet capability to invade or surprise 
Japan make the pursuit of apolicy of coercion or neutralisation more 
believable. This line of reasoning neglects two points. First, even if 
the Soviet military in the Far East are preparing for a war this does not 
tell us what value their preparation has in the formation of policy towards 
Japan. Second, the recurrent problem with the search for and demonstration
be in pursuit of them.
of scenarios is that it becomes an end in itself and detracts from the more 
important considerations of the political impact on Japan of the perception 
of power and from the factors which must be weighed if it is proposed to 
use that military power.
Centring the debate around the existence or not of a definable Soviet 
’policy' runs the risk of distracting observers from the actual functioning 
of Soviet-Japanese relations on a day-to-day basis. Indeed this has 
predominantly been the case expressed by both major Western schools of 
thought. Those who concede that the Soviets have a policy but that it has 
’failed’ suggest that in part it has occurred due to scant day-to-day 
contact. Those who have argued that the Soviets had no policy have also 
contended that this was due in part to a lack of contact on which to build.
It is noticeable that the Soviets and Japanese made steady progress 
from the mid 1950’s (when they got off to a slow start) to the mid 1970’s 
in normalising their relations. Since then contact between the two could 
be said to have levelled-off but has picked-up recently under new Gorbachev 
initiatives which included the visit of Shevardnadze to Japanj15-19 January 
1986, and the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister Abe to the Soviet Union, 
29-31 May 1986.76 Appraisal of the contacts between the two nations 
since the mid 1950’s illustrates a continuity that conflicts with the 
received wisdom. Much has been made of the supposed gulf between the two 
nations, exemplified by the record of official visits by high ranking 
leaders. In the last twenty years, Japanese foreign ministers have visited
76e.g. Geidar Aliyev’s meeting with a visiting Japanese delegation on 
12 October 1984; the significance attached to Gorbachev’s major tours of 
Siberia and the Far East 4-6 September 1985, 24-31 July 1986. Also 
Gorbachev’s personal meeting with a JSP delegation, 25 September 1985. 
Demichev’s meeting with Nakasone, 13 September 1985. More attention than 
usual was also paid to Japan and China at the 27th Congress. For am account 
of the Shevardnadze and Abe visits see, P.Berton, "Soviet-Japanese 
Relations : Perceptions, Goals, Interactions" in Asian Survey Vol.XXVI 
No.12. December 1986. pp.1259-1283.
the Soviet Union on seven occasions; Gromyko had been to Tokyo on three 
occasions the last being in 1976. Japanese prime ministers have visited 
the Soviet Union three times but no equivalent ranking Soviet official has 
ever visited Japan. In fact Japan and the Soviet Union had an agreement 
for the annual exchange of foreign ministers but this was discontinued. Is 
the state of official contact to be considered as an important measure of 
relations 7 State visits are primarily symbolic, and not necessarily a 
guide to the real state of relations between nations. If any dialogue or 
contact exists between countries it is usually maintained, and can be 
measured by, contacts at the lower working levels. It is businessmen, 
traders, bureaucrats, parliamentary or trade union delegations, cultural 
exchanges, sporting contacts, scientific co-operation, etc which establish 
the tempo of relations and determine the real depth of contact. In this 
regard, Japan’s position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is not significantly 
different from many major European nations, but there are differences in 
both the degree and scale of the above in regard to Japan’s contact with 
the Soviet Union.
While the large scale business contacts that caused trade to develop 
so rapidly in the 1970’s are on the wane in absolute value terms, as we 
have indicated in our section on trade contacts, a newer emphasis is 
beginning to be placed on smaller scale agreements. This approach may 
become the dominant trend for the future of economic relations.
Between the end of 1971 and 1975, (not including fisheries 
agreements), the Soviets and Japanese concluded 16 major bilateral 
agreements. The subjects covered ranged from aviation communication, 
scientific and technical co-operation, and exchange of official 
publications, to international sea and air transport. Since then both 
nations have continued to conclude bilateral agreements on new areas such
as the exchange of scientific personnel and compensation for accidents at 
sea, as well as renewing previous agreements and concluding regular talks 
on fishing and whaling, without any of the trouble associated with the 1977 
agreement. Since 1983 the Soviets and Japanese have held annual 
disarmament talks which have been used as a forum for an exchange of views 
on a wider range of subjects, the 1983 talks included discussions on 
Kampuchea and Afghanistan, for example. 77
In assessing Soviet policy towards Japan commentators have generally 
sought to derive a theory from an over-emphasis on observation of the 
symbolic or the most obvious, and in so doing have confused a lack of 
empathy with a lack of contact. Both sides maintain a larger degree of 
contact than they are commonly given credit for. A study of the events 
associated with the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981-82 can be 
illustrative of that. Despite the imposition of martial law the Japanese 
and Soviets still went ahead with the signing of that year’s fishery 
agreement, nor did the Japanese cancel the planned visit of their deputy 
foreign minister to the Soviet Union. By February 1982 in the midst of the 
problems over Poland and with the Japanese celebration of the ’Northern 
Territories Day’ on February 7 (about which the Soviets made no protest) 
both parties went ahead with the appointment of new ambassadors - the 
Soviets replacing D.Polianski, their long-standing ambassador in Tokyo, 
with V.Pavlov, a full member of the Central Committee. Even on the very 
day when Japan announced sanctions (far more modest than American and some 
European sanctions), it also announced the conclusion of a new agreement to 
sell the Soviets 500 pipe-laying tractors. 78
77FBIS, USSR Daily Report III 18 July 1983. p.C.l.
78"Soviet-Japanese relations since the Imposition of Martial Law in 
Poland" Radio Liberty Research RL 89/82 February 24, 1982.
The closing comment made by the writer of the cited Radio Liberty 
paper on Poland is one which would serve well as a general guide for 
viewing Soviet relations with Japan overall : (It is) "if nothing else, a 
reminder that the Soviet-Japanese relationship - deterioration and 
sanctions notwithstanding - continues to be marked by nuances that caution 
against any simplified description or analysis".
The completion of the research has effectively substantiated the 
beliefs which originally prompted investigation and which were outlined in 
the introduction : that Japan does not rank highly in Soviet literature; 
that some of the comment by Western analysts is misleading; and that Soviet 
relations with Japan are more complicated than the vast body of Western 
literature would have us believe.
Soviet ideological interpretations of Japan and the role of ideology 
in the formation of Soviet policy towards Japan have received negligible 
attention from Western and Japanese analysts. The problem in investigating 
this subject, as shown, was compounded by the comparatively low attention 
paid to Japan by the Soviets themselves in their academic literature. Most 
of the Soviet writing concerned with ideology was oriented towards economic 
appraisals of Japan.
In the time-frame in which this study is based ideology can be seen 
to have influenced policy not merely in its accepted form as a backcloth 
but more directly as an issue of domestic politicking. Ideological 
justification of the necessity and extent of trade with the West and Japan 
was a salient feature of Soviet internal politics during the 1970"s and 
impinged openly upon the conduct of trading relations with Japan. 
Specifically this was tied to the debates over the implications for the 
Soviet polity and economy of the scientific and technical revolution. It 
is important to stress that this was not a debate over a reversal of Soviet 
policy on autarky but over the degree to which it would be reversed and for 
how long.
Brezhnev as a proponent of "ideologically orthodox" solutions in this 
debate benefitted from this stance in his clashes with elements of domestic 
opposition.
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Thus Soviet approaches to Japan daring the period in which our 
examination is focused were based on a belief in the swing in the 
correlation of forces in favour of the Soviet Union, particularly in the 
regional context in North East Asia. The most basic Soviet ideological 
view of Japan depicted it as a member of a capitalist bloc racked by 
continual contradictions between the growth rates of mutually dependent 
states and the necessity to co-ordinate economic policies on the one hand 
and the antagonism of state monopoly to the limitation and regulation of 
economics on the other. The particular dynamism of the Japanese economy 
was seen to be an especial point of friction between capitalist nations. 
However despite these economic contradictions many Soviet commentators 
accept that the political necessity of other concerns is likely to limit 
the friction caused by economic clashes. The need to maintain the unity of 
the political - military bloc of imperialism is the most important example 
of such a concern.
Soviet comment on Japanese relations - either economic or political- 
with nations apart from its main industrialised partners is very limited. 
We demonstrated this with reference to Japanese involvement in the Middle 
East and Latin America, which is substantial in both cases. Japan’s 
relations with Asian nations on the Pacific rim are depicted solely in 
terms of the classic Marxist-Leninist theses on exploitation of developing 
countries. The centrepiece of the Soviet ideological analysis has been 
Japan’s relationship with ASEAN states and with the Pacific Community 
scheme which is viewed as a means to formalise Japan’s trading hold over 
the developing nations of the Pacific.
The Soviet ideological views of Japan as a society appear similar to 
Western interpretations at a macro level. However at more specific levels 
the Soviets have a vision of a Japan quite different from that held by the
West. For the Soviets Japan is a slowly changing, stable polity. But the 
Soviets see the forces at work within the polity in different terms from 
Western analyses; the status of the working classes is declining, the gap 
between the "rich" and "poor" is widening. While Western commentators see 
a ’working class’ and a ’poor’ they also see that their position has 
improved significantly since the I960’s. The Soviets deny this and seek to 
stress the continuing struggle of the working classes. It is doubtful 
whether the Soviets can really believe in practice in this ideological 
vision of the position of the Japanese working class.
A general point to emerge from our work is that while certain Soviets
- academics, some policy 'advisors’ - can produce useful and accurate 
comment on Japan, there remains much more which the Soviets could do to 
enhance their knowledge of, and quality of comment on, Japan.
Both sides have stressed the centrality of economic issues. The 
Soviet-Japanese trade relationship is of long standing and in recent years 
has revolved around the trading of energy-related materials : oil, coal, 
gas and timber development.
In constituting a main plank on which wider relations have been 
built, and a tool by which the Soviets have sought to pursue policy, 
trading relations should be accordingly viewed as an important object of 
attention for analysts. This importance should not be overdrawn however. 
Our close examination of economic ties has shown them to be more shallow 
and subject to variance than we might have expected to be the case judging 
by their financial value and high profile in academic literature and 
popular press. However this press coverage has been disproportionate to 
the actual role of economic contacts in policy and the financial value of 
trade with Japan becomes less impressive when seen in the context of Soviet 
trade contacts with other leading capitalist nations. The claims of
complementarity of the Soviet and Japanese economies proved to be largely 
mythical.
Militarily, the situation in North East Asia and the wider Pacific is 
more complex than the conventional literature depicts. It is true that 
there has been a growth in the overall Soviet naval presence in the region; 
but this has been exaggerated by manipulation of the methods of 
quantification employed by the West. This is not to argue that all of the 
misleading or divergent reports on Soviet naval strength sure deliberately 
contrived falsehoods but that such compromises and contrasts are almost 
inevitable when intelligence estimates are formulated in a competitive 
bureaucratic environment. As Admiral Turner, former Director of the CIA 
points out in a recent work, the US Navy "has vested interests that may 
well bias its interpretation. . . " . 1 (Nor are these problems confined to 
naval analysis of course). Agencies concerned can present differing 
pictures of Soviet naval strength depending on whether they choose to paint 
it in terms of absolute numbers, comparative percentages or ratios. Nor is 
it uncommon for agencies to arbitrarily change more specific methods of 
assessment, such as the CIA undertook in 1979 when it reduced the basic 
tonnage threshold at which Soviet warships were considered in the balsmce- 
thus enabling small Soviet ships to appear on an order of battle for the 
first time. It has been shown how the Japanese Defence Agency uses the 
term "vessels" to categorise Soviet ship movements without specifying how 
many "vessels" are actually warships. An increase in quality of Soviet
1Admiral S.Turner, Secrecy and Democracy. Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 
1985. p.236. The book is a general treatise on the problems of intelligence 
analysis. For a more detailed treatment see, J.Prados, The Soviet Estimate 
: US Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey, 1986. For a breakdown of the US intelligence community 
and an overview of the factors and influences involved in sinalysis, see, 
L.Freedman, US Intelligence and The Soviet Strategic Threat (2nd ed.) 
Macmillan, London, 1986. pp.8-61. ("The Intelligence Community" and "The 
Estimating Process").
forces in the region can be seen, but as we have shown their ability to 
undertake the various missions that they might be called upon to fulfil in 
the event of war must be in doubt. Even the defence of the Sea of Okhotsk 
bastion is not without its problems. While actions by Soviet forces, in 
particular the air force, can be viewed as unnecessarily provocative in 
many cases, the thesis which argues that the Soviets have pursued a 
deliberate policy of coercion vis-a-vis Japan must remain unproven from the 
evidence supplied in this investigation.
The Soviet estimations of Japanese force levels have been accurate by 
and large. However the implications of the uses (political or military) of 
Japanese military strength have been overdrawn. The Japanese SDF have the 
capabilities of a defensively-oriented force and their ability to mount 
serious ’offensive' operations on the scale claimed by the Soviets is 
strictly limited by equipment shortages and weaknesses in logistical 
support, and not least by the prevailing political sentiment in Japan.
The study has sought to concentrate on the trends in relations rather 
than on specific incidents which have come to be regarded as legitimate 
indicators of the state of relations and thus, by inference, of Soviet 
policy. In this regard it has been shown that in many cases - the China 
treaty, the sanctions imposed after the Afghanistan invasion and the Polish 
events, the 1877 fishing negotiations, the problems over the northern 
islands, for example - the observable trend of relations conflicts with the 
impressions of antagonism and pessimism which have (in some cases, falsely) 
been derived from treatment of such specific incidents in isolation.
Japanese relations with the United States are a source of uncertainty 
for the Soviets as to whether Japan should be seen as a victim or 
accomplice of American imperialism in the Far East. In practice there is 
no indication that the Soviets have tried to exploit the division which
they believe to exist between Japan and the United States. They view this 
relationship as enduring despite the frictions and realistically see little 
prospect of being able to weaken it.
Japan’s relationship with China has been the subject of more emotive 
and variable Soviet comment than has the relationship with the United 
States. This reflects the Soviet concern with trying to ameliorate or 
minimise Chinese actions detrimental to the Soviet Union and is in part 
connected to Soviet ideological competition with China for the support of 
Asian communist parties. Despite the often charged nature of Soviet 
comment, the Soviets have displayed an understanding of the limits to 
Japanese contact with China, due to self-limitation on the part of both 
China and Japan and to objective factors. This belief was given substance 
by the early years of the 1980’s when Japanese contact with China had been 
mitigated by a change of political heart by the Chinese, a limited Chinese 
ability to absorb Japanese technology and to provide sufficient hard 
currency, and a feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the Japanese with 
the progress and potential of the Chinese market.
The attempt to gauge mutual levels of ’understanding’ was a 
worthwhile exercise to undertake but the conclusions which we can 
realistically draw from this type of study must be tenuous. Care must be 
shown in drawing firm conclusions when dealing with ’abstract’ concepts. 
Overall, in terms of ’understanding’ there seems to be a problem for both 
nations, as their abilities to seek wider comprehension have been curtailed 
by rigid perceptions of each other or have been confined to specific groups 
within policy circles (e.g. the Japan desk in the Soviet ministry of 
foreign affairs or the Soviet desk of the Gaimusho) whose influence we 
cannot measure with certainty. So while there is undoubtedly scope for 
expansion in this area, each nation’s approach is still governed by
The Japanese position as a capitalist economic giant ensures it a 
central place in Soviet ideological formulations, while that same economic 
strength gives it a role to play in Soviet foreign trading. Its 
geographical location and the military forces which are based on Japanese 
territory bestow on Japan an equally crucial significance for Soviet 
military strategy in the Pacific. Finally, the long history of Russian and 
Soviet contact, often hostile, with Japan guarantees that the Soviets have 
strong perceptions of the Japanese which continue to influence behaviour.
To what extent can these differing trends be drawn together to talk 
of a Soviet ’policy’ towards Japan ? Research has shown that there is 
certainly an identifiable pattern of ’relations’ but it is possible for 
states to conduct relations not supported by, or part of, a ’policy’.
It is believed that the investigation illustrates that while the 
articulation of a Soviet national policy may have faltered on instances and 
that its pursuit may have been erratic, the Soviets do indeed have a clear 
vision of what they should strive for and realistically hope to achieve. 
They seem to have pursued these goals with a minimum of contradiction 
between the differing arms of policy : political, economic, military and 
ideological. For the present the most the Soviets can realistically hope 
for is the continuation of the regional status quo in North East Asia. The 
economic aspect provides the basic mechanism for contact with Japan, and 
though it has faltered in recent years, it is still likely to exist in a 
meaningful way supplemented by the growing political contacts. Due to 
their increased political activity, and certainly their military activity, 
the Soviets have built-upon the economic and have successfully established 
themselves as a nation with legitimate interests in East Asia. Soviet 
expectations of seeing minimal Japanese involvement with China have been
preconceptions which will prove hard to break out of.
met and this situation is unlikely to change unless the Soviets initiate 
drastic changes in the regional military order. The American-Japanese 
position the Soviets take as given.
Soviet academics have been the most openly divided over aspects of 
their analysis of Japanese matters. For the most part these differences 
have been over ideological questions - over which there is always a degree 
of debate and flexibility. Whether these differences between academics and 
commentators can be viewed as representative of similar differences in the 
higher echelons of Soviet policy-making it is impossible to say. In each 
case there has been a dominant view which has prevailed in the conduct of 
policy and the pursuit of the long term goals vis-a-vis Japan of itself 
indicates that there must be some sort of lasting consensus among Soviet 
policymakers on Japan as to the desirability of these goals. In pursuit of 
these goals the economic and military have both had their part to play 
either providing a wider backcloth to Soviet involvement in East Asia or in 
direct contact with Japan.
Whether the different arms of policy have been altogether 
successfully integrated in terms of goal pursuit is questionable. While 
the economic has provided a framework for continual contact and helped to 
legitimate the Soviet presence in East Asia, Soviet military actions while 
probably not reducing the frequency of contact have certainly endowed it 
with overtones of suspicion. Whether that suspicion has ramifications 
which limit the potential for further Soviet gains is for the future to 
show.
In assessing the policy of a global power we should never seek to 
isolate one of its regional policies from the wider global. All of the 
factors which have been considered operable in a Japanese or North East 
Asian context are open to fluctuation due to non-regional influences.
Radical changes in the Soviet approach to the region and to Japan axe 
unlikely, incrementalism is the order of day. While a series of 
incremental changes may produce a significant change over time, change by 
this process has the advantage of being more susceptible to guidance and 
control. Soviet-Japanese handling in particular of the military situation 
has demonstrated an awareness of the need to ’manage" important concerns.
While Soviet policy in the Pacific and North East Asia has lacked a 
focal point, Soviet commitment to the region is very real thus Japan has 
held a relatively high ranking in Soviet eyes through the 1970’s, even if 
in some circumstances this was somewhat lower than European nations. If 
the Soviets become less decisively Euro-centric that importance is likely 
to be assured. As much as any other factor it was the increased Soviet 
attention to East Asia and the Pacific in the 1960’s and through the 1970’s 
that of itself could be said to have encouraged the Soviets to come to 
terms with Japan. While, as has been demonstrated, there may be 
shortcomings to the Soviet approach, the Soviets have nevertheless 
increasingly tried to do just that.
In terms of the approaches taken to this work it is difficult to find 
a clear category in which to deal with Soviet-Japanese fishing. It is not 
a military question and does not fit neatly under the heading of trade and 
economic relations. For these reasons it has been decided to include a 
discussion of the fishery question in an appendix.
The Soviets and Japanese have been in dispute over fishing rights for 
a number of years. Within our time-frame the crucial years are the late 
1970’s, sind in psdrticular 1977, which we shall argue was a turning point in 
relations over fishing matters.
The conventional wisdom over the wide issue of Soviet-Japanese 
fishing disputes has been that the Soviets make "tough demsmds’ on the 
Japanese; that they arrest large numbers of Japanese boats; that they have 
single-mindedly sought to drive the Japsmese from the fishing grounds of 
the north west Pacific; and that the effect of these measures has been to 
reduce Japsoiese revenue from fishing and cause significsmt unemployment in 
the Japanese fishing industry. 1 It is this author’s contention that in 
those cases where evidence is available some of these claims cannot be 
substantiated. The Soviet Union and Japan are world’s two largest catchers 
of fish. Both therefore have much at stake sind much to lose where fishing 
is concerned, for both the period 1976-77 which saw the widespread 
introduction of 200 mile economic exclusion zones at sea was a turning 
point.
On December 13, 1976 the EEC ’bluntly’ informed the Soviets that from 
January-March 1977 they would only be allowed to tsdte 40% of their previous 
year’s catch in EEC waters, smd that should the Soviet Union accept
iSee for example, F.Langdon, “Japan-Soviet 200 mile zone 
Confrontation" in Pacific Community October 1977. pp.46-58. The Australian 
27 May 1983.
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reciprocal rights i.e. would allow the EEC to fish in the Soviet 200 mile 
zone it would be allowed to catch only 60,000 tons that year (1977). The 
EEC established its 200 mile zone from 1 January 1977.2 The widespread 
assertion of exclusive economic zones was not an advantage to the Soviet 
Union which does most of its fishing in foreign waters, however 
’negotiated’ rights allowed the Soviets to take fish in EEC waters surplus 
to the capacity of the coastal states of the EEC. A Soviet agreement with 
Canada (May 1976) gave them access to the Canadian zone, but the Canadians 
reserved the right unilaterally to determine the permitted quotas and 
species that the Soviets could fish.
The Soviets announced on 10 December 1976 their intention to 
establish their own 200 mile zone, and on 24 February 1977 declared that 
it would come into effect on 1 March 1977. Despite worldwide action by 
states in the preceding year to establish such zones, Japan still greeted 
the Soviet announcement with ’amazement’ and ’shock’. This was a strange 
response seeing that in January the LDP had already launched two bills in 
the Japanese Diet extending Japan’s own territorial waters.
The point is that although attention has been drawn to the Soviet- 
Japanese case due to their geographical proximity and the complications 
that stem therefrom, other nations also inflicted ’tough demands’ on Japan 
and on the Soviet Union. Japanese catches in American and Canadian waters 
were in 1975/76 three times larger than their catch in Soviet waters and 
both the United States and Canada took strong measures to limit Japanese 
(and Soviet) catches. In 1981 the United States enacted the Blow Act, 
which contained a clause aimed at phasing-out the operation of non-American 
fishing vessels in the 200 mile zone and also included a provision to make 
drastic increases in the fishing fee. From 1979 to 1981 the fee charged by
2Soviet Analyst Vol.5, No.25. 23 December 1976.
the United States for fishing in its waters more than doubled. The 
Japanese catch in United States’ waters in 1979 totalled 1,090,000 tons 
which "constituted the greater part of Japanese pelagic fishing 
operations" . 3
Salmon fisheries have been a preoccupation of Soviet-Japanese
negotiations due to the importance of salmon and to the need to preserve
stocks, however the publicity given to this aspect of Japanese fishing has
obscured the fact that most of Japanese salmon fishing takes place in the
Northern Pacific, off the mouths of rivers in the United States and Canada.
A Japanese journalist writing on this situation commented that
In fact, during recent fishery negotiations with the United 
States and Canada, Japan was compelled to accept considerable 
restrictions on salmon fishing, both in and outside the 200 
mile limit. At the same time, this country supported the 
principle, now internationally recognised, that salmon, an 
anadromous fish, belongs to those countries whose rivers they 
ascend to spawn. What this means is the Japanese can hardly 
fish for salmon in the Northern Pacific, even on the high seas, 
without the consent of the United States, Canada or Russia. . . 4
In 1981 the Japanese catch quota for salmon in the Northern Pacific was set
by the United States at also 42,500 tons but the fee was raised : the
salmon catch quota set by the Soviets in 1980 was 42,500 tons, and was
subsequently maintained at that level for 1981 and 1982.5 The amount of
the Soviet fee is unknown.
Accusations against the Soviet Union of undue harassment or arrest of
Japanese fishing boats are not borne out by the available statistics. By
1983 Japanese sources were claiming that the Soviets had arrested 1,200
3The Oriental Economist, Yearbook of Japan 1981/2 Hong Kong. p.53.
4Japan Times 13 April 1978.
5See, SWB SU/6702/A3/3/ 17 April 1981. Also T.Shkolnikova, ’Co­
operation in Fisheries’ in New Times No.19 1982. pp.8-9.
Japanese fishing vessels and 8,500 crew since 1945.6 In the first nine
months of 1976 twenty-seven Japanese boats were arrested (in the same
period of 1975 the figure was sixteen) . 7 In comparison with the number of
arrests made in national waters of EEC countries an average figure of
thirty Japanese vessels arrested annually in Soviet waters is not abnormal.
In fact, given the total number of Japanese vessels authorised to operate
in Soviet waters the figure is negligible. Soviet figures detail that
4,000 Japanese vessels are authorised to fish in Soviet waters annually. 8
Moreover the overwhelming majority (as is detailed below) of the Japanese
fishing fleet is coastal - the main Japanese fishing vessel is a small boat
crewed by 3-5 people - and it is for the most part these very small,
coastal boats which have been arrested for fishing in the disputed waters
around the Kurils.
Assertions in Japan that the reduction in fishery quotas has caused
retrenchment in the fishing industry receive only qualified support from
statements by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. On
fishery production in the late 1970*s it has this to say :
Largely because of the restrictions imposed in the 200 mile 
fishery waters of the US, the Soviet Union and other countries, 
deepwater catches for Japan in 1977 decreased, while offshore 
and coastal catches increased. Overall, therefore Japan was 
able to maintain fishery production... 9
While on the numbers of persons employed in the industry they stated the
following :
The number of persons displaced by reductions in the number of
6The Australian 27 May 1983.
7The USSR and the Third World 12 September-31 December 1976. p.207.
8Izvestiia 8 July 1983. Translated in FBIS USSR Daily Report III. 11 
July 1983. p.C.2.
9Japan Institute of International Affairs (ed), White Papers of Japan 
1978-79 Tokyo, p.108.
fishing vessels authorised to operate in the North Pacific 
ocean is estimated at 7,600. Subsequently, however more than 
50% of them appear to have found jobs, but only about 20% of 
them are believed to be in secure jobs10
This does not tell the full story. The statistics must be qualified
further by detailing certain peculiar structural characteristics of the
Japanese fishing industry. In 1979 the industry employed 470,000 workers,
of which a figure of 3,800 made unemployed represents slightly over 0.8% of
the workforce. Of this total number employed, 360,000 were involved in
coastal fishery (of the 210,000 fishery firms in Japan, 95% are engaged in
coastal fishing) . 11 In short, the industry is configured around an old-
fashioned, labour intensive, coastal fishing fleet of very small boats.
These boats are least affected by the introduction of 200 mile zones as it
is the more modern and larger units which participate in the offshore and
deepwater fishing, and which take 70% of the total Japanese catch. (See
Table Twenty-seven). Hence it is the workers associated with these deep-
sea zonal catches who are hardest hit :
The number of workers employed in coastal fishing stood at
360,000 and the rate of decrease was smaller than the former 
average. However, the number of those employed by deepwater 
fishing operators - large, medium and small-scale operators 
alike - decreased 3.8% below the preceding year to 99,000 owing 
to the reduced number of fishery vessels in the North 
Pacific. . . 12
but the report continues to say that
More than 80% of those employed in fishing are men and the 
number of younger men has been decreasing with the years, 
thereby increasing the ratio of older men13
It is clear then that at least part of the reduction in workforce of
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10o p . c i t .  p.116.
11 Japan Institute of International Affairs (ed), White Papers of Japan
1980-81 Tokyo, pp.138-139.
12White papers of Japan 1979-80 p.116.
13Ibid.
the fishing industry can be explained by what is in effect ’natural 
wastage’ and voluntary displacement on the part of younger men seeking 
better employment.
It remains to ask whether the Soviets have utilised the fishing 
question with Japan as a political issue. The idea that the Soviets have 
used it as such, or as a tool of leverage against the Japanese has stemmed 
mostly from the impression created by the very acrimonious 1977 
negotiations. However these negotiations were somewhat unusual as the 
introduction of the 200 mile zones made new catch quotas difficult to 
determine. These negotiations are therefore atypical, but the image of 
Soviet-Japanese discontent has remained, although evidence of subsequent 
years shows that this is really a false image.
The Soviets and Japanese also reach yearly agreement on whaling in 
the Northern Pacific. Little is heard of this aspect of Soviet-Japanese 
relations simply because negotiations have presented no particular 
difficulty. The original agreement was signed in 1972 and is now extended 
each year by the exchange of diplomatic notes. Fishing negotiations are 
more complicated. It is not merely a matter of establishing an overall 
quota and one price. Different quotas have to be agreed upon for different 
species of fish, types of fish allowed to be caught have to be agreed upon, 
the number of boats to be licensed decided on, the amount of compensation 
fees assessed and the dates of the season must be fixed. Also other 
questions such as co-operation on preservation of stocks and exchange of 
scientific data and proposals for joing private fishing must be settled.
In interviews with the author one Japanese academic expressed the 
opinion that the fisheries question was a ’non-issue’ . 14 The most obvious
14Conversations with H.Kimura, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido 
University. August 1984.
evidence in support of his contention can be seen from the fact that while 
in 1977 fishing negotiations took 90 days, by 1978 this had been reduced to 
65, by 1979 it was down to 19 and by 1980 to 16 days, and throughout 
subsequent negotiations after 1977 none of the serious conflict that 
plagued those negotiations was to occur again. In fact the fisheries 
question if anything, far from becoming a political issue, took the form of 
a straight business transaction. Jain also suggests as much by stating 
that by 1979 "the Soviets had decided the Japanese quota on the basis of 
the size of the fishing co-operative fee that the Japanese were willing to 
pay’ . 15 Shkolnikova, in the work cited above, quotes the Mainichi Shimbun 
as saying "There is perhaps, no other example of more stable fishing 
relations than those between Japan and the Soviet Union since fishing 
entered the era of the 200 mile zone" . 16
This policy has effectively insulated the fishing question from 
politics. The negotiations have continued, unaffected, through the 
troubles over the China treaty of 1978, and the sanctions over Afghanistan 
and over Poland. Aspects of them have been used by the Soviets as signals 
to Japan. In some cases this has been of a positive nature e.g. releasing 
arrested crews or reducing fines on Japanese boats, 17 though in a small 
number of cases the Soviets have used them to show displeasure, as for 
example in 1978. Japanese businessmen are of the opinion that the Soviet 
cancellation of the private joint venture (the actual overall negotiations 
were never threatened at any time) plans for fishing in the end of the 1978
15R.Jain, The Soviet Union and Japan 1945-80 Harvester Press, 
Brighton, 1981.
16T.Shkolnikova, o p . cit. p. 8.
17See BBC, SWB SU/5959/A3/3 November 3,1978.
season was a retaliation for the signing of the treaty with China. 18 In 
recent years the Soviets have been reviving an old proposal to allow their 
fishing vessels rights to call in to Japanese ports. The Japanese have 
resisted the idea and to date the Soviets have not pressed the issue. 19 
Those issues apart the Soviets have made no attempt to link the fisheries 
negotiations to political events, nor used them as a means of leverage 
against the Japanese.
18BBC, SWB SU/5980/A3/1 September 3,1978.
19FBIS, USSR Daily Report 22 July 1983.
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TABLE 27 
JAPANESE FISHERIES STATISTICS
Production by Type of Fishery (thousand tons)
1975 1976 1979
Total
Production 10,545 10,886 10,590
Coastal 2,208 2,907 2,836
Offshore 4,468 5,559 5,488
Deep Sea 3,168 2,134 2,035
Source * Japan Institute for International Affairs, White Papers of Japan 1980-81 
Tokyo. 1982. p. 135» The Ministry of Fisheries estimated the levels of the 
19B0 catches to be similar.
SIZE OF JAPANESE FISHING FLEET
1975
1979
1980
1981
390,480 vessels 
423,820 vessels
428.207 vessels
424.207 vessels
NUMBERS OF WORKERS IN FISHERIES (1,000s)
Total Coastal Fishing Others
1975 369.5
1979 467.8 364.0 103.8
1980 457.4 359-6 97.8
19^1 449*0 354.1 94.9
Source : Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers of Jaran 19^2 - 83. 
Tokyo 1984. pp. 162 - 16 3* Ft o h this it can be seen that ever, the total 
losses of the offshore/deepsea fleet in numbers of workers is nearly a 
match for those of the coastal fleet workforce. Consequently the 
proportional losses are rruch higher for the offshore workforce.
APPENDIX 2
Area and Population of the Soviet Far East
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Administrative Unit 
(Administrative Center)
Area 
(in Thousands 
of Sq. Mi.)
Population 
1983 
(in Thousands)
Kamchatka District, 
including Koryak National Area 
(Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii)
182.4 415
Magadan District,
including Chukchi National Area
(Magadan)
463 510
Amur District 
(Blagoveshchensk)
140.4 1,007
Sakhalin District 
(Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk)
33.6 679
Maritime Territory 
(Vladivostok)
64 2,079
Khabarovsk Territory, 
including Jewish 
Autonomous District 
(Khabarovsk)
318.4 1,663
Yakutia 
(Yakutsk )
1,198.2 944
TOTAL 2,400 7,297
CITIES OF THE SOVIET FAR EAST (Population figures, as of 1984)
Vladivostok 599,500
Khabarovsk 568,000
Nakhodka 172,300
Birobidzhan 76,800
Blagoveshchensk 195,200
Komsomolsk-na-Amure 291,400
Magadan 150,800
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Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii 252,400
Yakutsk 203,000
Yuzho-Sakhalinsk 163,700
Sources: E.B.Kovrigin, "The Soviet Far East" in J.J.Stephan, 
V.P.Chichkanov, (eds), Soviet-American Horizons on the Pacific 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1986. pp.1-16. See p.3. 
V.G.Smoliak, "Cities of the Soviet Far East" in Ibid pp.165- 
172.
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